Toward an alternative culture of work : political idealism and economic practices in West Berlin collective enterprises by Müller, Birgit
Toward an alternative culture of work : political
idealism and economic practices in West Berlin
collective enterprises
Birgit Mu¨ller
To cite this version:
Birgit Mu¨ller. Toward an alternative culture of work : political idealism and economic practices
in West Berlin collective enterprises. Westview Press, 212 p., 1991. <halshs-00373687>
HAL Id: halshs-00373687
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00373687
Submitted on 7 Apr 2009
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Political ldealism &
Economic Practices
in West Berlin
Collective Enterprises
Birgit Müller
Westview Press
halshs 00373687 (2009-04-07)
Toward an Alternative Culture 
of Work 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Archives ouvertes du IIAC 
http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/IIAC 
 
 
Birgit Müller1 
IIAC - Institut interdisciplinaire d’anthropologie du contemporain 
CNRS UMR 8177 EHESS Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales 
Equipe LAIOS 
54 boulevard Raspail 
75270 Paris Cedex 6 
halshs 00373687 
Facsimile PDF OCR, with the amiable licence of the publisher, Westview Press, Inc. 
Citation for document [OAI] 
Müller Birgit, 1991, Toward an alternative culture of work : political idealism and economic 
practices in West Berlin collective enterprises, Boulder : Westview Press, 212 p. 
ISBN 0813380790 - [oai:halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr:halshs-00373687_v1 2009-04-07] 
http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00373687/fr/ 
Abstract 
ln recent years, and especially in the wake of the upheavals of 1989, there has been a growing 
perception that the "socialist  experiment" has failed and that the "free market" has finally been 
vindicated as the only successful, realistic model for economic  activity. What has become of the 
idealists, the utopians, and the  dreamers of a more humane mode of production within this freshly  
affirmed dominant system of pragmatic capitalism? In the alternative economic sector of West 
Berlin, Dr. Müller  explores the confrontation between an ideologically motivated philosophy  of 
work and the constraints of survival in the heart of  the competitive capitalist market. Through 
detailed ethnographic analysis of relatively successful cooperative enterprises, the author  not 
only discusses the rationale and viability of the collectivist  model of production but also charts a 
complex of social and  psychological factors affecting the participants. Dr. Müller 's unusual,  
thorough, and readable study will be of interest to anyone  concerned with the culture of work and 
to scholars of countercultural  social movements. 
                                                
1 bmuller@msh-paris.fr 
http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/aut/Birgit+Muller/ 
http://www.iiac.cnrs.fr/laios/spip.php?article86 
halshs 00373687 (2009-04-07)
Toward an Alternative Culture
of Work
Political Idealism and Economic Practices
in West Berlin Collective Enterprises
Birgit Müller
Westview Press
BOULDER • SAN FRANCISCO • OXFORD
halshs 00373687 (2009-04-07)
To my father
This Westview softcover edition is printed on acid-free paper and bound in library-
quality, coated covers that carry the highest rating of the National Association of State
Textbook Administrators, in consultation with the Association of American Publishers
and the Book Manufacturers' Institute.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any
form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any
information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.
Copyright © 1991 by Westview Press, Inc.
Published in 1991 in the United States of America by Westview Press, Inc., 5500 Central
Avenue, Boulder, Colorado 80301, and in the United Kingdom by Westview Press, 36
Lonsdale Road, Summertown, Oxford OX2 7EW
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Müller, Birgit.
Toward an alternative culture of work : political idealism and
economic practices in West Berlin collective enterprises / Birgit
Millier.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-8133-8079-0
1. Producer cooperatives—Berlin (Germany). 2. Corporate culture—
Berlin (Germany). I. Title.
HD3190.B47S67 1991
306.3'6'0943155—dc20
Printed and bound in the United States of America
The paper used in this publication meets the requirements
0 of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paperfor Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984.
90-48294
CIP
10	 9 	 8	 7	 6 	 5	 4	 3 	 2 	 1
halshs 00373687 (2009-04-07)
Contents
Preface	 vii
Acknowledgments
	 xi
1 Introduction
	 1
2 Ethnographic Introduction 	 7
Oktoberdruck (October-printing), 11
KoMet (Metalworking Cooperative), 15
FahrradBüro (Cycle-office), 17
Wuseltronick (Fumbling with Electronics), 20
3 Utopian Dreams and Cohesion in Membership
	 25
Political Background of Collectives and Their Members, 26
Four Ideal Types of Collectivist, 34
Generational Turnover and Wearing Out of Utopian Ideals, 45
4 Political Consumer-Producer Relations
	 49
Alternative Forms of Financing, 49
Technological Standards and Competition, 58
The Trademark: Creating a Market Niche, 63
Producing for Ordinary Customers, 68
Conclusion, 71
5 Investment and Consumption 	 73
Legal Forms of Collective Property, 74
halshs 00373687 (2009-04-07)
vi	 Contents
Immediate Expenditure Versus Long-Term Investment, 80
Ifigh Demands on Idealism, 87
Conclusion, 97
6 Self-Management
	
99
Non-Directive Planning, 99
Compromise and No Decision, 110
The "Boss," 115
Conclusion, 124
7 The Division of Labour in Collectives 	 127
A Working Day with Oktoberdruck: 18 February 1984, 129
The Non-Division of Labour, 133
The Problem of Working Together, 145
Transmitting Knowledge, 150
The Limas of Collectivity: Sexual Division of Labour, 154
Conclusion, 158
8 Work-Time and Social Boundaries	 161
A Different Rhythm at Work, 162
Conflicting Demands of Private and Collective Spheres, 168
Labour Power 1s Not for Sale, 175
Conclusion, 181
9 Conclusion	 183
Appendit
	 189
Bibliography	 193
Index	 205
halshs 00373687 (2009-04-07)
Preface
After five years of study abroad and intensive research into precolonial Ni-
gerian society, I fel t in the autturm of 1981 that Iw as missing out on one of the
most interesting developments in my own West German society. Friends in
Berlin were talking constantly, and with admiration, about alternative pro-
jects that had been recently set up and the alternative funds to which they
were contributing. During a visit to Berlin in 1980, they had proudly shown
me theMehringhof and convinced me to take out a subscription to die tages-
zeitung. Other friends, how ever, were less enthusiastic and severely critici-
sed "these individualistic solutions to theproblems of society,"" explaining to
me why small al ternativ eworkshops set upby " freaks" had tobe a failure and
a political mistake. Their insistence did not discourage my curiosity and, in
September of 1982, I was able to set out to find out about these "alternative
movements," thanks to a generous three-year scholarship from St John's
College, Cambridge.
For my first period of fieldwork, I stayed in Berlin for almost two years,
from September 1982 to September 1984 (with an interruption of one terni in
Cambridge). I soon decided to concentrate my research on collectives and
chose four for doser analy sis. Two — FahrradBüro, abicycle shop, and Wu-
seltronick, a group of electronic engineers — were in the service sector,
whereas Oktoberdruck, a printing shop, and KoMet, a toolmaking enter-
prise, were involved in production.
I visited collectives of other trades, participated in innumerable meetings
and discussions, and w as draw n into the regular meetings of the Lindkreis,
which prepared a congress of alternative enterprises in Berlin in January of
1984 and the first issues of the collective bulletin contraste. Since com-
pleting the first stage of my fieldwork in 1984, I have continued to keep in
close touch with the collectives I had studied most intensively, cul minating
in a follow-up study in the summer of 1988.
In the course of my research, I was always aw are of the typical contradic-
tion inherent in the role of the anthropologist as participant observer: I w as at
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limes treated like a member because I shared the collectivists' activities, but
at other moments, I felt very clearly the distance that the role of an observer
implied. Most members w ere interested M a systematic study of their collec-
tives, and they collaborated by giving me access to the minutes of their meet-
ingS, their internai statutes, charts, and even leg al correspondence. But I do
not think they expected my work to be of any help in elucidating their own
problems and contradictions. They may hope, how ev er, that thebook might
give a cl earer insight into collective organisation and its problems to people
who are now vaguely sympathetic toward it.
If my readers don't mind me waving the flag, I was myself fascinated by
the collectives I was studying. Their importance is certainly not in the eco-
nomic impact they make. It is notclear how an economy would look thatw as
entirely composed of collectives of the Berlin type. What lends them a signi-
ficance that goes far bey ond their number and size are the explosiv e ideas that
they not only express but put into practice. They indicate that democracy has
to start at the basic lev el, with the right of self-determination of the producing
individual, to whom skills and information have to be returned. Or to say it
with Bray ermann (1974: 445): " Without the retum of requisite technical
knowledge to the mass of the workers and the reshaping of the organisation of
labour — w ithout, in a w ord, a new and truly collective mode of production
— balloting within factories and offices does not alter the fact that the work-
ers remain as dependent as before upon experts,' and can only choose
among them. "
Handing over property to the state while maintaining the old hierarchies
and division of labour does not necessarily change the conditions of the
workers either. The organisation of work in a Hungarian factory, as descri-
bed by Haraszti (1976), resembles the capitalist version in its basic princi-
, pies. The workers do unskilled tasks at a piece rate, concentrating only on
squeezing as much money as possible out of their badly paid tasks, w hile
administrators try to invent still new methods tomakethemwork harder. "It
is awell known secret, that Soviet administrators largely prefer to exchange
ideas with an experienced Western manager, than with any communie' or
liberal sociologist," wrote Heinrich Bôll in the preface to Haraszti' s book
(1976:8).
Numerous communes and communities, from Oneida to the Kibbutz,
have tried to create alternative structures to those of the dominant capitalist
and industrialist society, but they have done this by demanding asceticism
and the strict subordination of the individual to the community. The diffe-
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rence in the Berlin experiment is the strong emphasis on individual differen-
ces and their realisation in a collective contact.
Note: I did not alter the naines of members nor of collectives al though, fol-
low ing their own usage, I have only used first names. Surnames of members
only appear if they have published under their full names. The capitalization
and use of low er-caseletters in the spelling of the names of collectives and al -
ternative institutions follow the collectivists' practice. I have translated all
German ternis, sometimes leaving the German expression in brackets.
Birgit
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Introduction
In West Berlin, since the end of the 1970s, w ell -educated y oung col lectiv is ts
have started experimental enterprises inwhich they are not only the experi-
menters but also the subjects of the experiment Their aim is to prove that al-
temativ e forms of production can replace those of capitalis ln, ev en inside the
dominant economy. They are attempting to reverse the objectives and
constraints of the capitalist system. Instead of the max imisation of profit, the
primary objective is the development of a new work situation of a non-hier-
archical, unalienated nature — not separated from life in general but promo-
ling the production of socially and ecologically useful items. How do they
reconcile these political aims with their surv iv al as business concerns inside
a capitalist economy?
This book explores the creative tensions that arise when political ideas
and standards clash with economic practice and constraints. It is not primar-
ily an economic feasibility study, although relevant data w il 1 be considered.
Rather, it is a study of deliberately created social structures, in which factors
such as group size, recruitment, leadership, and stability not only prov ide
the framework of the structure, but also play a part in the social action of
members, which is oriented tow ards an aim, an ideal form.
Alternative collectives involv ed in economic activities are a fairly recent
phenomenon: they are rooted in the cultural tradition of the anti-authorita-
rian movements of the 1960s. They can be found in almost all Western indu-
strial countries, though they are largely concentrated in Scandinavia, the
United States (Taylor and Case 1979), the Netherlands, and West Gennany.
The distinguishing feature of the Berlin collectives, though, is their high po-
litical motiv ation. 'The ideals w hich the collectivists ptusue are not unique or
particular to their specific form of production, but correspond to a larger cur-
halshs 00373687 (2009-04-07)
2	 Introduction
rent of thought and criticism of the dominant society. The West German poli-
tical party Alternative Liste, sectors of the party Die Grünen ("The
Greens"), and portions of the trade unions and citizens' action committees
include in their programmes the need for a qualitativ e change in the w ork sit-
uafion, self-determination for theworker, and theproductionof ecologically
useful goods. The collectivists try to put into practice what political groups
have proposed in theory. The problems that arise shed light not only on the
tremendous difficulty of developing different economic relations inside the
capitalist system, but also on the arduous task of holding together indiv idua-
listic human beings in a collective context.
The method I employed was essentially one of participant observation. I
participated in the work of threecollectiv es (FahrradBüro, KoMet and Okto-
berdruck) for about two months each and kept in close contactwith the fourth
one (Wuseltronick). To supplement the information obtained by direct parti-
cipation, I analysed records of collective meetings, legal and productivity
charts, and correspondence, which amounted in the case of Wuseltronkk
and Oktoberdruck to more than 300 documents per collective.
I visited other collectives in the same trade regularly and col lected com-
parative material through informai interviews and questionnaires (see Ap-
pendix). The first questionnaire inquired into the legal form, debts, inv est-
ments, and market situation of collective enterprises; the composition, tur-
nover, and history of the personnel; and the dev elopment of the organisation
of work. I gave the second questionnaire to persons with w hom I had actually
worked and who knew me well. This questionnaire w as rather short and ser-
ved as a guideline for an interview rather than as a detailed and exhaustive set
of questions. I asked questions about the type of work they were doing, their
educational and employment history, their domestic situation, their opin-
ions on thework, their aspirations, and their political ideas and expectations.
I use the concepts of social anthropology for my analysis, and bring the
material from the Berlin collectives into the framework of that discipline.
Social anthropologists have long felt that they had something to offer in the
analysis of industrial society, ev en if only to bring into question the conunon
belief in the turiv ersal validity of Western industrial society 's  values of effi-
ciency,
 , maximization of gains, and the rule of law. This book stands in that
tradition.
My primary intention is to demonstrate the complex inter-relationships
between political thought and economic practice, and to show that, to some
extent, it is possible both to hold revolutionary ideas concerning social and
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economic relations and still to compete as a viable business venture. Thus,
collectivists wishing to abolishcompetition as an economic and social princi-
ple cornpete fiercely, even amongst themselv es, while they are aware of this
and reflect self-critically aboutit. To consider this perpl ex ing contradiction,
I analyse the structural principles with which the collectives experiment
(such as abolition of the division of labour, no separation between work and
leisure lime, imitary pay, and non-hierarchical structures of decision ma-
king) and the economic constraints that inhiba these principles.
Another area for consideration is the extreme complexity of internai col-
lective structures. If notonly business considerations but also private andpo-
litical attitudes become the subject of formai decisionmaking, or at least of
debate, if each and every person is called on tovoicehis or her opi don, and if
all.decisions are made in common, each member will be confronted with a
continuous need to make decisions. Decision-making processes become
long and unpredictable and cause frustrations with whichic  collectives have to
cope. I analyse the extent of collective and individual withdrawals to less
complex forms of organisation; the emergence of a new division between
private, political, and business spheres; the delegation of decisionmaking;
and new divisions of labour and responsibility.
Another intention of this book is to consider these collectives as an alter-
native to the system of human relations and relations of production that they
criticize. Collective enterprises have been carried on thewav e of a social mo-
vement of protesta against the dominant industrial society, and against the
concept expounded by dogmatic and authoritarian left-wing groupa that so-
cial change must be initiated by the state. Without firmly constructed ideo-
logical principles, this movement follows a utopian dream, resembling simi-
lar currents of past centuries. Issues such as striving for harmony with na-
ture, communist conununity, reunification of lime, and the belief in the" ex-
plosiv epow er" of the utopian experimentlink Berlin collectiv ists to their po-
pul ar utopian predecessors. The vagueness of the utopian dream made diffé-
rent and sometimes conflicting views about society compatible.
The leitmotiv of my investigation has been the question of how this uto-
pian dream and the optimistic eagerness to experiment can survive when fa-
ced with economic constraints and individual needs. How strong a force is
hope (Bloch 1982) and how can it affect social change? From the investiga-
tion of this question in the Berlin context, inferences may be made concern-
ing the development of social movements in general and their consolidation
or collapse.
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In my treatment of the political ideas of collectivists, a problem arises in
that the majority cl aim not to follow, nor to hav e their actions determinedby, ,
any fixed ideology. In the 1970s, as members of small left-wing parties,
some of these collectivists usedpropaganda techniques to politicise workers
on the shopfloor. In contrast to this political strategy, how ever, they now
mainly want to gather practical experience. Pragmatic problem-solution on
the one hand and reniflants of prev ions political theories on the other prov ide
a complex blend of ideas that form the basis for the w ay they understand the
essence of collective enterprise.
Alarge and still grow ing section of the discipline of social anthropology is
now concernedw ith the meaning of, andw ith the debate about, the economic
and the social and ideological embeddedness of the economy. Instead of ana-
lysing human economic behaviour quantitatively in terras of gains and las-
ses, they consider the complex social relationships that underlie it and try to
understand it through qualitative analy sis. Even before Sandra Walltnan' s
(1979) book, The Social Anthropology of Work, it has become obvions that
there is a strong connection between ideological convictions and economic
behaviour. The wish tobelong to a community, to gain prestig e, or to satisfy
a transcending principle, be it a belief in gods or spirits or in a utopian model
for society, can be stronger than the desire to maximize gain.
The abolition of the division of labour and of the principle of competilion
was one of the primary driving forces behind the setting up of collectives.
Marx' s writings on the subject of the alienating quality of the capital ist div i-
sionof labour, and collectiv ise s ow n imperience as w agelabourers, inspired
the creation of structures in sharp contrast to existing business enterprises,
the col lectiv ists main objectiv ebeing the self-realisation of the w orker rather
than the maximum accumulation of profits. The question raised by this atti-
tude toward production has occupied social scientists and economists and
concerns the nature of htunaneconomic behav iour: Arecollectiv es an exam-
ple of the falseness of the neoclassical concept of " economic man," or, to the
contrary, does their development show that the drive to maximize gain only
lies dormant at the commencement of the initiative and eventually breaks
through after a phase of non-materialistic idealism?
Vernant' s observations (1965: 28-36) on the concept of work in ancient
Greece show that the div isionof labourw as not always considered a means to
giv e work its maximum productiv e efficiency. Itw as regarded as a necessity
inscribed in htunan nature and, as Plato expressed it, was one of the founding
principles of society because every individual, far from being self-suffi-
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cient, needed a large number of people to mutually exchange the goods they
produced Man would do a giv en task the better if he woul d do only it and if
the different individual talents were allowed to exercise themselves and
create objects as accomplished as possible. The ancient concept considered
less the process of fabrication than the use that was made of the object The
perfection of the object consisted in its adaptation to the need that it w as sup-
posed to satisfy . The craftsman enteredwith the user into a relationship of na-
tural dependence and served the users needs.
The idea of the ancient Greeks that the w ork of the artisan w as to serv epri-
marily the needs of the consumers is consistent w ith one of the principal pre-
occupations of the altemativ emov ement the responsibility of the worker for
the quality of the product he or she is producing — an issue that in the labour
movement took second place behind the issue of the forms of social appro-
priation of the factors of production and the social distribution of the prod-
ucts. In this, the Berlin collectivists stand in the tradition of the anarchists of
the tum of the twentieth century, such as Nettlau and Kropotkin, who clai-
med that workers should refuse to waste their energy on the production of
low-quality or ev en damaging objects and go on strike against the useless
gesture (Ribeili 1980: 89).
Since the writings of Chayanov (1966) and the historical reflections of
E. P. Thompson (1967), social scientists have rediscovered the fact that once
certain essential needs are satisfied, people are often not willing to increase
their work effort. Thompson also pointed out that a strong division between
work and leisure time is not universal nor was it common in our own past.
Berlin collectivists try to link up in this respect with non- and pre-indus trial
attitudes toward work. Spittler (1989), modifying to some extent Thomp-
son' s distinction between "natural" time in pre-industrial and "clock" time
in industrial societies, pointed out that the the w ork-rhy thm in pre-industrial
societies was not only structured by natural factors like daylight, seasons,
andw eather butw as alsoculturally defined. " Time discipline" (determining
the span between beginning and ending of work) and "work discipline" (de-
fining the continuity and intensity of work) follow cultural rules and norms
that are transmitted through learning (Spittler 1989: 5-7). 'The " pre-indu-
strial" culture of work-time that collectives now consciously develop, in
spite of economic pressures and the constraints of industrial society, may
teach us about the cultural embeddedness of economic choices.
For André Gorz, the increased efficiency of industrial production due to
automatisation leads to an unequal distribution of w ell-remunerated produc-
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tiv ework, leaving more thon half of the economically activ e population w ith
a precarious job situation or w ith no job at all. For those w ho retain theirjobs,
the microelectronic revolution might effectively improve the work situa-
tion. "Repetitive taslcs tend to disappear, ...work tends to become more en-
gaging, responsible, self-organized, diversified, requiring autonomous in-
dividuals capable of taking initiative, of comrnunicating, and of learning to
dominate a div ersity of intellectual and manual disciplines" (Gorz 1990:22).
For the others an identification with thework they do becomes impossible as
"the industrial society has no need or no regular need for their work capaci-
ties" (Gorz 1990: 22). From this he concludes that in contemporary society
"work is no longer the principal social cernent, nor the principal factor of so-
cialisation, nor the main occupation for everybody, nor the principal source
of wealth and well-being, nor the meaning and centre of our lives" (Gorz
1990: 22). Has the emphasis collectivists put on a new culture of work there-
fore become anachronistic, or is it rather an appropriate response to the re-
quirements of post-industrial society ? Can their concept of w ork be generali-
zed, or are they rather carving for themselv es a niche in the capitalist market
to become part of the privileged, highly qualified few ?
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Transformations must start with the individual without renouncing, how-
ever, a critical engagement in the (politica4 social, economic and natu-
ral) environment. . Within the maxims of "self-determination, co-opera-
tion and no private profits" we are knitting our owncultural, political and
social network. . . whichspreads over the whole town. It is nota ghetto nor
a "free state" but the sum of attempts to develop, within this society, the
seedling of a new one.... In this network is space for everyone who
wants to strive towards an ecological and socialist form of life.
Written as the introduction to the STATTbuch 2 (1982:5), the alternative re-
source directory for West Berlin, which included 1,800 self-descriptions of
alternative projects, this quote expressed a minimal level of consensus on
which projects related to one another. The book itsel f gave an impression of
ev erything that w as understood by the term " al ternativ e. " The projects pre-
sented ranged from research groups concerned with new technologies to
groups advising tenants on their legal rights, from pubs for gays to Third
World solidarity groups, from groups giving information on medical treat-
ment to small workers' collectives. Some of the projects included operated
on an entirely benevolent basis, like the German-Turkish Initiative against
Fascism, the centre for alternative medical advice, or the women' s centres.
Others, such as the DAYTOP therapy centre for drug addicts, the centre of
childpsychotherapy, or the lcindergartens w here handicapped and able-bod-
ied children played together, received money from the Senate (Berlin city
council). Still others were financed by the contributions of a circle of mili-
tants, such as the group "Citizen observe the police" or the Bildungs- und
Aktionszentrum Dritte Welt. Most of the alternative cafes, theatres, shops,
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repair shops, and small enterprises were self-supporting, and the members
subsisted on the proceeds of their work.
An individual, whether attracted by some of the alternative ideas or just
feeling lonely or lost, coul d find support and advice through this alternative
infrastructure, take action against social or political injustice, or simply
spend his or her leisure time in a pleasurable way. Most of the alternative
projects w ere specifically aimed not only to reach and involve peopl e w ho al-
ready had similar ideas and outlooks but al so to contact their ordinary neigh-
bours in theKiez (neighbourhood). They intended to make ordinary citizen
sensitive to some very precise and tangible social and political problems and
aware that the possibility existed for them to deal with these problems.
Of all the cities in Germany, West Berlin is the one where small enter-
prises and the homes of the less well-off sectors of the population are most
closely intertwined. In the traditional working-class quarters of ICreuzberg,
Wedding, Moabit and Neukôlln, which cuver approximately one-third of
the residential area of West Berlin but house more than hal f of its population
of 1.8 million, blocks of flats and business premises are constructed around
open courtyards. 'The first courtyard is surrounded by flats, a second — and
sometimes a third — by workshops. hi the nineteenth and the beginning of the
twentieth century these courtyards were the centres of small-scale produc-
tive activity. But increasingly, small enterprises are dying out now, and the
workshop areas are instead occupied by communal households (Wohnge-
meinschaften), which transform them into residential spaces. Rents are rela-
tiv ely low for thesepremises as they are often in v ery poor condition and need
to be entirely refurbished.
It was in these courtyards that, around 1977, small collectives started to
dev elop, talcing ov er moreor less the same ty pes of production as theoldones
— such as woodworking, metalworking, the manufacture of industrial com-
ponents, printing, plumbing, etc. — often using the old machiner)/ left from
previous enterprises. At the same time, others wereopening up new areas of
production, starting to develop ecologically preferable alternatives to the
conventional systems of producing food, housing, and energy. Although
their outward appearance w as not distinguishable from the old enterprises,
except for the fact that the workers were on the whole younger, collectives
claimed to have a radically different organisation and attitude toward work
but a similarly intimate relation to the Kiez (neighbourhood).
Originally, Kiez meant the dwellings of feudal vassals belonging to a
castle or manor. Today, it basically denotes "neighbourhood." A social
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A typical second court yard in Kreuzberg, where Oktoberdruck and several
other collectives are housed. Usually the .first court yard is surrounded by
_fiais and the second one by small enterprises (photo by author).
rather than a geographical unit, the coherence of the Kiez depends on the fee-
ling the i nhabi tants have of " belonging" to one another and to their part of the
town. The Kiez often consists of a smal I cluster of si de-streets with restrictcd
traffic, often grouper' around a popular street or a square (Crellekiez, Win-
terfeldkiez, Lausitzer Kiez, etc. ). The Kiez w as traditionally, , and still is to-
day, the basis of social li fe in that part of the town. West Berlin is a city with a
high percentage of elderly people who have lived in the city all their 1 ives and
are closely attached to it The alternative movements adopted this attitude,
revived street feasts, took measures to control the traffic in resi denti al areas,
and initiated citizen' action committees (Bürgerimiiativen) on the Kiez le-
vel
The collectives in Kreuzberg sec themselv es as the continuation of the tra-
di tional Kreuzberger Mischung (Kreuzberg mixture), a terni that describes
the close interrelation between living and working quarters, and the cooper-
ation that ex ists between small traditional enterprises of the same trade or of
di fferent trades situated in the saure Kiez. Today, it al so designates the mix-
ture of national i ti es, especially German and Turkish, which is charactcristic
of Kreuzberg. In the first phase of thei r collective enterprise, members often
lived, together or singly, close to thei r w orkpl ace. They and their supporters
saw the close cooperation between collectives, which they call Vernetzung
(networki ng), as an important step tow ard a differenteconomy Returning to
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the concept of neighbourhood, redev eloping forms of solidarity at the" roots
of society" which had been eroded by the mechanisms of "mass-society,"
was one of the programmatic aims of the alternative movement.
Many hopes and expectations arising from people sympathisizing with,
or involv ed in, " the mov ernent, " were focusedon collectiv es. Their success
or failure w as seen to some extent as a measure of the success of " the alterna-
tive" as aw hole because there existed the conv iction that capital ist, industri-
al society could only be effectively transformed if new forms of werking to-
gether and a different quality of productw ere successfully dev eloped. Foun-
ders of collectives accepted this task and called their collectiv e " a living uto-
pia" or a "social experiment," comparing it to the inventor' s shed where
ideas that change the world are born.
In 1984 in Berlin, therew ere about fifty productive collectiv es, varying in
size from three to fifteen members, that call ed thernselv es and w ere reg arded
by others as collective enterprises. Following heated debates about how to
distinguish " collectives" from "ordinary enterprises," collectives were de-
fmed as enterprises where the means of production were controlled by the
people working in them and which had no external owners. Without formai
hierarchies and without differential pay, they wanted to be different from la-
bour-manag ed enterprises that w ere owned by the work force but that had no
egalitarian structures and unitary pay and were employing outside tempo-
ral), workers. In 1990, the number of enterprises to which this definition
would still apply has became difficult to assess as many have since changed
their ideals and their organisational structure.
Within their sphere of economic activity, it is possible to distinguish,
first, betw een production, service, and trading, and second, according tothe
nature of their activities: building, printing, metalworking, electrical work,
electronics, the preparation of wholefood, and the like. In 1984, their orga-
nisational structures ranged from disorderedgroups of four peoplewho each
performed each and every task in the enterprise, to groups of twelve people
with a formai division of labour. The different types of economic activity
predictably attracted different kinds of people from v arying educational and
professional backgrounds. The metalworking collective, KoMet, for exam-
ple, seemed to draw skilled toolmakers w ho were fascinated with the possi-
bility of taking part in the organisational running of the enterprise and the de-
velopment of their professional skills. The FahrradBüro, a bicycle collec-
tive once well know n for its involvement in the politics of transportation but
which then became merely a bicycle repair shop, seemed to attract former
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teachers w ho were disillusioned with the teacher-pupil relationship, or w ho
were subject toBerufsverbot (dismissal from civil service for political rea-
sons) and wanted to retrain in a useful craft.
The different collectives formed a patchy network of economically inde-
pendent enterprises, which sometimes cooperated. Their common political
convictions led them to undertake joint political action, such as collecting
money and materials to support the revolution in Nicaragua, or helping
squatters in Berlin. They also supported workers w ho, hav ing been made re-
dundant, occupied their factories. Although these actions found strong sup-
port in the collectives, they were not part of a general strategy to transform
the social system, but were rather a spontaneous form of protest
Oktoberdruck (October-printing)
The printing collective — in the summer of 1983, with tw elv e members, the
largest in West Berlin — is situated in one of the typical courty ards of Kreuz-
berg in the premises of an old chocolate factory. When the collectivists mo-
ved into the first floor, they had to scrape chocolate off the walls and move
out tons of old machinez), . From there, the collective slowly expanded onto
the second and third floors as the old traditional enterprises, a cardboard
manufacturer and a passementerie workshop, went bankrupt or moved
away. Oktoberdruck rented all the available space and sublet it to "alterna-
tive projects," an ecological magazine, and a consulting office for alterna-
tive enterprises, STATTwerke. The courtyard has since become one of the
centres of collective activity.
In the larg e storage area on the third floor, the people w orking in the build-
ing hold their parties, and the collective' s band practises there once a week.
On the second floor is the social area of the collective; the kitchen, with a
large table for lunches and meetings, is clearly separated from the space for
dealing with customers. The swinging door that divides the two areas bears
the inscription: " Customer, your road ends here."
In the month following the end of my work in the collective, the table at
which customers were received w as moved out of the office, the office space
reduced, and a reception area created next to the entrance; this became the
most elegant part of the enterprise. The changing of the space allocated to
customers mirrors the relationship between them and the collective. In the
early days of the enterprise, the customers were for the most part political
groups, whom the printers were supporting with cheap printing services, or
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left-wing publishers and newspapers. The intertwining went furthest in the
years 1975 to 1977, when the entetpriseprinted free of charge all the propa-
ganda material for the Trotskyist group TLD (Trotzkistische Liga Deutsch-
lands) and employed its unskilled members at a good salary.
At that time, the v arious activities of the repro-mounting department, the
printing, and die office work were still carried out in a common area on the
first floor, the office informally separated from the remaining space by two
bookcases. TLD members at times kept the books, while customers went in
and out amongst people working there. Today, the role of the customer is in
accordance with their economic importance for the enterprise. Although
most of themstill corne from artistic, "alternative" or left-wing circles, they
now require better quality work, and no longer expect " solidarity" prices.
Nevertheless, the marne of the enterprise, referring as it does to the Russian
Cktober Revolution, stands for a political tradition that discourages right-
wing or purely commerical clients.
Passing through the swinging door and crossing the social area consisting
of kitchen, changing rooms, and show ers, one enters the repro-mounting de-
partment equipped with six light tables. During the period of my fieldwork,
Pive people w ereworldng there and in the darkroom. Two of them w ere trai-
ned repro-photographers, one was a printing engineer, and the other two
were former students who had acquired their skills on the job. Every repro-
monteur had his ow n box of tools with menacing inscriptions or death skulls
painted on them to discourage colleagues from using them. The walls were
covered with slogans, posters, encouraging staternents, or complaints. Mils
décoration disappeared when all the repro-monteurs left. During the transi-
tion period of 1983, when the new workers had not y et settled in, the walls
were left bare; and they were only painted and redecorated a few months lat-
er, testifying that the new group had consolidated itself.
In the sturuner of 1983, in a small office next to the montage room, a type-
setting facility was set up by an individual typesetter, who had hoped to be-
come integrated into Oktoberdruck after he left his previous typesetting col-
lective, Gegensatz, as theresult of anargument. How ev er, most members of
Oktoberdruckwere unw il ling to accept himbecause they knew of his irregu-
lar hours of work and his general lack of commitment.
On the first floor, the printing section was equipped with a large modern
Al two-colour, or perfecting, Miller printing-press and a small new M two-
colour G70-press. Three of the six peopleworking in ibis section during my
fieldwork in the summer of 1983 had formai qualifications as printers. Don-
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ald had several y ears of work experience inbusiness enterprises, w hile Tho-
mas and the only woman in this section, Andrea, hadjust completed their ap-
prenticeships. The other two printers, Jürgen and Werner, were former stu-
dents who had learned to print on the job.
Oktoberdruck was founded in 1974 by Dieter, the co-owner of a small
graphics enterprise, and Marlis and Constantin, two members of a printing
collective, agitdruclç that they had to leavebecause of a dispute over inv est-
ment decisions. Oktoberdruck was conceived as a collective, and the three
founders decided upon a collective charter; but legally the enterprise belon-
ged to Dieter and Constantin. From 1974 onwards, the enterprise was sup-
porting Trotskyist groups. The founders wanted to combine membership in
apolitical organisationwithinvolvement in the collectiv e, but the activ ists of
the TLD were not interested in becoming fully involv ed in the collective en-
terprise. The Trotskyists sent an increasing number of their unskilled mem-
bers towork intheenterprise. Theprofessional rev olutionaries w ere paid far
becter salaries than the founders dared to take for themselves. It prov ed im-
possible to uphold production when dependent on the unskilled temporary
labour of the political activists. Finally, the 7I.D convinced the founders to
also employ skilledwagelabour. When in 1976 the 71D members disagreed
with an attempt by the three owners to cut w ag es in order to sav e the financial
situation, a conflict arose that ended in September of 1977 with a separation
between the 7/D party and Oktoberdruck, and complete political disillu-
sionment.
The TI_D members who left were replaced by wage-labourers experi-
enced in labour disputes. After a w hile, they were each willing to continue
the enterprise as a collective, ev en at the risk of taking DM 10,000 credit to
avoid financial collapse. Their aimw as the creation of strong personal bonds
between people working together. Constantin, however, was not interested
simply in bettering personal relations. He wanted the enterprise tobecome a
model for workers in industry who aimedto take over run-down enterprises.
He maintained, that to set an example, the enterprise shoul d striv e tow ard in-
dustrial dimensions. The interest in making it a" real collective" finally died
out because of production stress, fmancial chaos, and the impossibility of
making decisions collectively. From 1978 onwards, however, the group in-
troduced unitary pay and regular meetings. In the summer of 1978, the foun-
ding group split, and Marlis and Dieter left the enterprise. Production col-
lapsed when three of the four Miller printers left as well and an important
source of credit was discontinued
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The financial collapse fmally occurred in 1979. It reverberated throughout
the "alternative scene," stimulating discussions on the question: "What
really constitutes a collective?" Collectives of left-wing editors, booksell-
ers, printers, and typesetters came together to talk about how Oktoberdruck
could be saved. Netzwerk, the newly created alternative fund, proposed or-
ganising a campaign to collect funds, provided Oktoberdruck became a
"real" collective. In the collective newspaper, die tageszeitung, four mem-
bers of Netzwerk outlined the structure that the Oktoberdruck collective
should adopt (TAZ 15.8 1979). Their main point was that every worker
should become an associate member after six months. The salary should be
basically the same for every member but should take into account differing
needs and should depend upon theov erall monthly position of the enterprise.
The new collectivists of Oktoberdruck accepted some of the conditions
but introduced, at first, a fixed unitary wage and adopted the legal form of a
company with limited liability (GmbH• Gesellschaft mit beschrankter Haf-
tung). Just as every person had to become an associate after six months, no-
body was allowed to keep the status of associatewithoutworking in the col-
lective. People leaving could only take away what they had brought in.
The enterprise' s disastrous financial situation made it necessary for
Constantin to keep his own one-man society which owned the machinery,
and to conclude arrangements with the creditors. As the GmbH could not
prov ide a guarantee for the debts of approximately DM 300,000, repay ment
was assured by the rent that the Oktoberdruck GmbH paid to Constantin
every month. How ev er, an informal contract made it Constantin' s responsi-
bility to transfer ownership of the machiner) , to the collective once the debts
hadbeenpaid off. Nineyears later, in 1986, this transfer finally took place.
During the two months of my first period of continuons fieldwork, in the
summer of 1983, the collectiv e w as going through a phase of reorganisation
and upheaval in protest against the informal authority structure. Constantin,
the former head and ideological leader, had been sent on a year' s holiday in
order to learn to become an ordinary member like everybody else. He had
been severely criticized for interfering with the work of the other members
without doing his own tasks properly and for working overtime when the
others had wanted to go home. 'The authority of the second remaining head,
Helmut, w ho had dealt with a large number of ex tentai contacts, was also se-
riously questioned but for the opposite reasons, namely that he was identi-
fying less and less with the enterprise andw as becoming increasingly cynical
about collective work.
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In 1988, fourteen y ears after its foundation, Oktoberdruck was one of the
wealthiest and most strictly organised collectives in West Berlin. The struc-
ture of Oktoberdruck seemed stable, and personal relations w ithin it were
good, although the turnov er in membership w as still high. Its numbers, how -
ev er, increasedtoseventeen in 1988. Each new conter brought fresh ex pecta-
fions and arriv edwith ideals that the older members hadsincelost. The struc-
ture of the collective bas to adapt to this and is constantly being reshaped ac-
cording to new requirements. Although the organisation of Oktoberdruck is
more formalized thon that of other collectives, it continues to react to chang-
ing membership and circumstances.
KoMet (Metalworking Cooperative)
In 1984, the ten members of KoMet adhered strictly to the ideal of an organi-
sation w ith a minimum of formai structure. Even though the collective was
operating under the most rigorous market conditions, as it manufactured
tools and equipment for the business industry. 13y 1990, it had dissolved into
sev eral enterprises, each struggling with awork organisation that has littl e in
common with their initial ideas.
The workshop w as situated on a factory floor in a courty ard in a better-off
part of Kreuzberg. It w as spacious and light w ith windows on three sides. A
visitor or customer w ho entered theworkshop immediately found himself in
the production area amongst the machinery with a number of busy people
hurrying about. The glassed-in office at the entrance was sel dom occupied,
so he had to ask to find somebody w ho felt a responsibility for dealing w ith his
quety. The shopfloor w as loosely divided into sections of drills, cutters, la-
thes, grinders, and saws. All the machines w ere des igned toproduce special-
ized single parts, not sertes of identical orles. In front of the windows over-
looking the second courtyard, workbenches were lined up — one for each
long-standing member. Newcomers worked initial ly at the bench of an ol der
member who introduced them to the job. Later, peoplew holiked one anoth-
er tended to work side by side.
In the large communal ;cacher; furnished with a sofa, table, and chairs
from a secondhand shop, visitors and established customers were sometimes
inv ited to take coffee or toparticipate in meals. Apart from the w eekly collec-
tive meetings, the communal hot lunches were social occasions in which all
members participated and where an informai archange of information took
place. Prospective members often visited at lunchtime to be g,iv en a search-
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ing examination by older members. In front of the large table, the timetable
with small coloured cards for ev ery order was hung up next to a pinboard
with notices, invitations, and postcards.
"From everybody according to his abilities, to everybody according to
his needs" was the motto of the founders in 1979 when, stimulated by the
wave of new collectives, a group of metalworkers set up their own enter-
prise. Radically opposed to the working conditions in capitalist enterprises,
they wanted to create — both for themselves and as an example to others —
structures of production without fixed wages and working hours.
Most of the founders had been politically active in the seventies, though
not all were members of political organisations. When setting up the collec-
tive, they emphasized the individuality of the members rather than the princi-
ple of equal distribution of rewards. That is, their intention was to create the
opportunity for each member to realize his different needs and expectations.
During the first y ear and a half, each member took from the collective cash-
box as much as hewanted or neededwithout having to justify the use he w as
making of it. In actuality, this amounted to between DM 800 and DM 1, 800 1
per month. It was understood that somebody who, for instance, loved
play ing the piano needed more money to purchase his instrument than some-
body who play ed the flute and that bothways of making music were equally
important for the musicians concerned.
The motivation of the members had shifted over the years from a highly
idealistic sense of mission to the more pragmatic need to find an agreeable
job. The first members wanted " to set an example toworkers in industry and
to show that small-scale decentralized production of industrial goods is pos-
sible." They dreamt of their own ecological product, manufactured in mass
form without any formai division of labour. The tight market in Berlin,
which led to several toolmaking businesses going bankrupt, did not allow for
experiments nor for inv estment in production machinery. The coll ectiv e had
to switch in 1981, for financial reasons, to a fixed system of pay, namely,
DM 1,000 per worker plus DM 200 for each child in the member' s care.
'Me turnover of KoMet members was considerable. In the twoyears fol-
low ing my period of fieldwork in the spring of 1984, four of the nive had left
and five new members had started work. 'INvo of the four who left were
highly skilled and w ere about to take the examination for the rnasters' certifi-
cate; four of the five newcomers came directly from their apprenticeships
and had no other work experience. Only one of the founders w as still work-
ing in the collective, and the new members did not have the same firmpoliti-
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cal intentions. The newcomers, who were younger than the original found-
ers w erew hen they set up the enterprise, were searching for a political orien-
tation and professional experience and tookworking in a collective as a star-
ting point Qualified newcomers were difficult to find as the income in the
collective was half that in a business enterprise. Even toolmakers without
work experience earnedless in the col lectiv ethanthey w oul d hav e if they had
found a beginner's job in industry.
KoMet w as for y ears an all-mal e coll ectiv e. The womenwho laterworked
in it complained that its structures continued to be very male-dominated. Up
to 1984, no woman hadworked there for more than a year, partly because of
the difficulties created by their position vis-à-vis the all- male customers in
the metal industry and partly because of the outright rejection they experien-
ced from some of their male colleagues.
Although KoMet was not one of the most successful collectives in eco-
nomic terras, itw as certainly one of the most exciting to work in. The flexible
working hours, and the fact that members carried out their tasks from begin-
ning to end, made thework v ery satisfying, although sometimes chaotic. Ko-
Met has proved incapable, however, of finding a compromise between eco-
nomic pressures and their challenging fonn of production. In 1990, it ceased
to exist as a collective.
FahrradBaro (Cycle-office)
As the naine FahrradBiiro (cycle office) implies, this collective was not
conceiv ed as an ordinary cycle shop. For y ears, itw as one of the comer-sto-
nes of the ecology movement against official traffic politics. M the time of
my fieldwork in the auttunns of 1982 and 1983, its political role hadbeen al-
most entirely taken over by ecology groups such as the Green Cyclists, and
what remained was mainly a bicycle shop with a collective organisational
structure.
The FahrradBüro is situated in the Crellestrasse, a part of Schôneberg
with severe traffic problems. The street is sandwiched between a four-lane
main road and an unused railway where the Senate of Berlin is planning to
construct a highway. For y ears, the street w as used as a short cut by drivers
wanting to avoid the traffic lights on the main road. They raced through the
narrow cobbled street until, in 1980, the inhabitants took the initiative and
put a stop to this by building a huge sandpit in the middle of the road. The
members of the FahrradBüro were active participants in this successful ac-
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tion for traffic abatement
From the street, the FahrradBüro looked very much like an ordinary bi-
cycle shop, except for the fact that it displayed not only bicycles and spare
parts but also literature on traffic politics, cycling holiday s and the like, some
of which the collective published itself. It consisted of three parts: the shop,
the neighbouring office, which had windows onto the street, and the repair
shop in the courtyard. Crowded and teeming with activity in summer, the
shop looked rather dismal and damp during thew inter months. It w as poorly
heatedby a coal stov e, and during the coldest days of December ev en the toi-
let froze. Bernard, the longest-standing member, had a pennanent backache
in winter and manned the shop with a hot water bottle tied to his back. Be-
cause it was very busy in summer and uncomfortable in winter, working in
the shopwas certainly the mostunpopular task from the collectivists' point of
view. This work was comprised of taking care of the books, postcards, and
cycling clothes displayed in the back of the shop and standing behind the
counter in the front part, where the shopw as filled to ov erflow ing w ithbicy -
cies and had spare parts hanging from all the walls and the ceiling.
In the small narrow office, the administrative tasks were performed: the
bookkeeping, the ordering and the publishing. In 1983, a qualified book-
keeper had been employ ed tobring the accounts into order and to make them
comprehensible to all the members in the hopes that they would then be able
to keep themproperly themselves. Every Tuesday moming, a meeting took
place over a communal breakfast, and the tasks for the coming week were
agreedupon. Every member had towork for tw o days aw eek in the shop, one
day in the office, and one in the repair shop. Once a week the repair shopwas
open for customers who wanted to learn to repair their cycles themselves.
They were assisted by a colle,ctivist and allowed to use the tools free of
charge. Any money they contributed voluntarily was given to the Green
Cyclists.
'nie collective was founded in 1979 by four men who knew cach other
from their common political activities in the BI Westtangente, a citizen' ac-
tion conunittee against the construction of a highw ay on the ol d railw ay line.
They had all completed studies in construction engineering or in urban plan-
ning and were looking for jobs. Although they had no expert knowledge of
bicycles, they decided to set up a shop that would allow them, as they
thought, to finance their more theoretical work on traffic politics from the
sale of bicycles as the "most sensible means of transportation."
In 1982, none of the founders were still working in the collective. Mie
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links with the citizens' action committee had been almost severed, as ev en
Bernard, the last member to be active on the committee, stopped participa-
ting. Ail of the members in 1983 had studied at university; six of the seven
had completed their studies, while Bernhard dropped out shortly before the
final examinations. Most of them hadworked as teachers or educationalists,
or were trained as such, but were subject to a professional ban because they
had been members of parties on the externe left. During my first period of
fieldwork, in the autumn of 1982, four people worked in the collective on a
permanent basis, and one was employed part-time to administer the publis-
hing work. One y ear later, their numbers had increased to seven permanent
members, plus a qualifiedbookkeeper employed part-time. Four, including
the bookkeeper, were women. Although the shop w as prosperous and the in-
corne per perron had increased from DM 1, 000 to DM 1, 300 net per month,
the atmosphere w as much more pessimistic than the previous year. Consid-
erable tensions between the male and female members embittered the work
atmosphere. The male members, Hans and Bernhard, tried to recruit a new
member w hom the women did not w ant They were al so trying to rationalise
the organisation of work and turn the collective into a wholesale business.
The number of hours worked per w eek w as low — twenty-nine in winter
and thirty -four in summer — while the income was higher than the salaries
paid in ordinary shops. Nevertheless, the teachers earned about DM 1,000
per month I ess than they would have in teaching posts. The loss of members
was remarkably low for two and a half y ears, but in 1984 severepersonal pro-
blems started to arise. Members werecomplaining about the lack of a proper
perspective. Some were heard to remark that they did not want to spend the
rest of their days in a bicycle shop selling valves. Some members feared that
the good image of the FahrradBüro as an activist in traffic politics was gra-
dually fading and with it the clients from the ecology " scene. " FahrradBüro
was no longer publishing any thing new, and its participation in traffic poli-
tics was reduced to displaying Green Cyclists leaflets on the shopcounter.
Although the collectivists participated only occasionally in activities that
opposed official traffic politics, they kept their aim of making the use of a bi-
cycle instead of a car as attractive as possible to their customers. Their ser-
vice to the customer included extensive advice on the choice of a cycle; they
tried not to sell overpriced, poor quality machines and attempted to educate
their clients and make them critical toward the products they were buying.
During the last two years, the bicycle collectives in West Berlin and West
Germany have met frequently to develop a common strategy toward bicycle
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manufacturers by setting up their own wholesale group. They hope to exert
pressure on manufacturers to buil d cy cl es that are robust and can be easily re-
paired. In Januar), 1985, they founded the first national union of bicycle col-
lectives, in the creation of which the FahrradBuro had played a major part.
The FahrradBiiro itself, how ev er, was taken ov er in July 1985 and became
the private business of Hans and Bernhard. Three of the other members who
leftbecause of the rising tensions set up a new cycle collective in another part
of tocan.
Wuseltronick (Fumbling with Electronics)
Wuseltronick is one of the best known collectives in West Berlin and is con-
sidered by its numerous admirers to be the successful forerunner of a future
wave of highly skilled collectives using the most advanced technology. It
was initially financ,ed by state research grants, and was therefore subject to
no direct marketpressures, but lias recently entered into actual production of
the products it has designed In December 1977, the members started thecol-
lectiv e with a set of ideological concepts in mind, and these have been
constantly questioned ever since. Theworkings of the collectiv e are continu-
ously checked against the initial ideals in long discussions, of which hun-
dreds of pages of written records are kept.
Since its founding, the collective has been constantly expanding into lan-
ger premises. During the lime of my fieldwork in the w inter of 1983/84, its
administrative section was housed in the Mehringhof, together with thirty-
sev en other alternative prof ects, w hile the electronics and computer section
was situated on a large factory floor in another part of ICreuzberg. The office
in the Mehringhof was also the social centre of the collective. Collective
meetings took place there, the members sitting around the large uval table.
Organisational schemes representing the collective structure w ere painted
on the walls in the form of a wiring diagram. A mov able disc, with all the
members' names and the rotating tasks written on it, indicated the dulies ev e-
ry one had to fulfill on that day. Members cooked, tidied up, and shopped in
turn. At lunch, they ate together with members of projects housed on the
same floor in theMehringhof. One, Ôkotopia, traded in ecologically grown
food, and in tea and coffee bought directly from producers in Third World
countries; another published a journal on Latin American politics. Here the
latest ev ents in theMehringhofwere discussed, as w ell as thegossip of the in-
div i dual collectives.
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The electronics section of Wuseltronick worked together with Südwind, a
collective on the same factory floor, which designed and produced sails for
windmills. Südwind was founded on the initiative of Wuseltronick, which
needed aerodynamic sails for the windmill prototype it had developed. The
laboratory was dominated by creative disorder. Some desks overflowed
withwires, switchboards, and tnicrocomputer components. Along thewalls
were coloured boxes of spare parts and tools for all kinds of purposes, from
plumbing to soldering electric wires.
Next to one of the largew indows, the pride of the coll ectiv e, the prototy pe
of a small windmill, was set up. This windmill had been developed over
many years in cooperation with the Institute for Wind Energy at the Techni-
cal University of Berlin, and was equipped with very advanced electronics
systems. The instruments developed to measure the performance of this pro-
totype hav e become one of the main concems of Wuseltronick. As they canbe
used to measure the performance of otheikinds of rotating machines, the col-
lectiv e has sold some of them to industrial enterprises but has long been un-
able to produce them punctually and efficiently enough to satisfy the de-
mand. The fiv e members working in this section w ere all graduate electron-
ics engineers, with die exception of Reiner, who acquired his skills in elec-
ironies after finishing his studies as an aviation and space navigation engi-
neer.
The collective was set up in December 1977 by three students, Matze,
Berni, and Reiner, together with an assistant lecturer, Hansi, in the sitting
room of the apartment Matze and Hansi were sharing. The first pieces of
equipment w ere purchased using personal savings and gifts, and loans from
friends or acquaintances. The main impulse in founding die collective came
from the founders' previous experience as engineers in academie research.
Clients and the objectives of one' s ownworkwere fortuitous and anonymous
and therefore die work itself, to an unbearable ex tent, was determined from
outside. The collective work allowed one to refuse to do research, for exam-
ple, for nuclear power stations. Scientific intelligence could be employed
where it was politically useful in die development of alternative energy pro-
duction. (Wuseltronick-Kollektiv 1984:31)
Reiner, who had been a member of the KJS (Catholic Students' Youth) for
years, combined Christian ideals with Communist convictions. He wanted
the collectiv e to live and w ork in the w ay that the first Christians had. Priv ate
relationships and children should not be separated from, but united w ith, the
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work in the collective. "We are the revolutionary subjects ourselves" was
his motto; to create collective structures was to give an inc,entive for revolu-
tionary social change. Hansi, Matze, and Berniecame from a highly structu-
red communist party, theKBW(Communist League of West Germany), and
held far less idealistic views about the revolutionary role of the collective.
For them, to run a collective meant "to learn Socialism," to experience for
oneself what it meant to live and work in this way.
This very closed structure, where friendships and work coincided, was
disrupted for the first time when Bernie's girlfriend became pregnant and
wanted to move to West Germany. The suggestion that he follow her was
condemned as a betray al of the collective. With the move into the Mehring-
hof in 1980, three new members, Julius, Michael, and Brigitte, joined the
collective; as a result, further relationships w ith people outside the collectiv e
had tobe established. When the coll ectiv ists decided tomov e from pure theo-
retical research into the development of prototypes and were considering
starting to produce sertes, they increased their numbers to ten. The integra-
tion of these new members posed serious problems for the still rather closed
structure, which had to be abandoned. The newcomers were virtually left
alone to find out for themselves their place in the collective. They did not
know which tasks to take ov er or the extent of their responsibilities; and they
felt trapped in a dependency relationship as they received no systematic in-
troduction into the activities of the collectiv e and had to rely entirely on what
information they could obtain informally from the older members. The dif-
ference in status between the newcomers and the older members was ce-
mented by the fact that the founders hadinv ested their entire property into the
collective, whereas the newcomers brought only their labour-power.
As the collective became larger, it began to split into two groups. In the
autumn of 1983, the electronics engineers, working together on a certain
project, especially Reiner and Eberhard, started to dev elop the idea of setting
up a producers' cooperative with other collectives. They wanted to begin
producing windmills and perhaps other products en masse. The other half of
the collective w as not involved in this planning and remained radier scepti-
cal. M first, only a few of the collectivists were interested in spending their
lime in actual production, and even Reiner and Eberhard, the fathers of the
idea, preferred to do research. How ev er, in 198860% of Wuseltronick' s an-
nual turnover already derived from production and marketing of small se-
ries.
halshs 00373687 (2009-04-07)
Ethnography 	 23
Notes
1. DM 1.00 was worth apprcodmately USD 0.35 in 1984.
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Utopian Dreams and Cohesion
in Membership
Collectivists share convictions and ideas that are in opposition to the princi-
ples of the dominant capitalist society, but these convictions do not forma co-
herent system. They also reject centralized planning, together with the au-
thoritarian politics of the externe left-wing groups of the 1970s . Some mem-
bers have read Marx, Lenin, and Trotsky, , but they do flot accept the strongly
dogmatic interpretation of these authors held by the small Marxist parties of
the past. But they all share the conviction that the ecological destruction of
the environment must be stopped, differing, how ev er, in their ideas as to
how this shouldbe done. They agreethatworkers shouldbe in control of both
their labour and its product but do not agree on the question of whether the
overall economic system should be a market economy, a decentralized,
planned economy, or both.
Some members regard a market economy as being the most uncon-
strained andonly aim to conv ert fromlarge to small scal e production; others
think that the use of resources and the production of useful goods shoul d be
planned on a local or regional lev el; whiley et others aim to see a mixed econ-
omy with both decentralized planning and a market structure. Collectivists
want to abolish the dependency relationship between employer and em-
ployee but have varied ideas about how the ownership of the means of pro-
duction should be handled. Their opinions vary between the daim that each
collectivist should have an individual share in the enterprise, increasing in
proportion with the number of y ears worked there, and the daim that collec-
tive capital should belong to nobody but rather should be "neutralized."
Some collectivists are inspired by Bray ennan' s writings on the workers'
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loss of control in modern industry (Bravermann 1974), or by Yona Fried-
man' s theoretical essays about the maximal size of an egalitarian group
(Friedman 1977), though they do not refer to these writings to solv e their
own problems. Their criticism of the separation of leisure and work time,
and their conviction that self-realization and self-determination should be
possible in the work-situation, have already been stated by Marcuse and
others. Though some collectivists may read these authors, they do not take
them expressly as guidelines for their actions.
Though their motives for joining may be highly diverse, members of col-
lectives do share some convictions and ideals. In the first phase, that of
construction, their common "utopian dream" to create in practice the seed-
ling for a new social order helped them to overcome the initial difficulties,
gave them the incentiv e to inv est time and money in the collectiv e enterprise,
and contributed to the cohesion of the group. Elw ert, follow ing Ernst Bloch
(1982:166ff), calls this inspiration to attempt the realization of social struc-
tures that have not existedbefore and that point thew ay for the positiv e trans-
formation of dominant society " hope":
Hope promises a reward that largely compensates the benefit of daily compe-
tition with fellow-men and that is drawn from established privileges.... It
gives him/her (the individual) maybe for the first time apersonal significance
and maltes his/her acts meaningful for the social whole. (Elwert 1983: 82)
In September 1982, when I started my fieldwork, the " utopian" message of
the collective enterprises was already less strong than it had been in the
founding phase (1978 to 1980). The importance of the ideological factor had
diminished over time. By 1988, when I was concluding this research, the
"utopian dream" had largely been replaced by institutionalisation and by
generalisation of the collective experiment to wider sections of German so-
ciety.
Political Background of Collectives and Their Members
The names and emblems of collectives are drawn from the anarchist, femi-
nist, communist, or ecologist traditions. The first business letters sent out by
collective enterprises were often decorated with black stars, the anarchist
symbol. Trees, rainbows, and laughing suns, the ecological symbols,
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ZWISCHEN
DEM KAPITALISTISCHEN (1),
DEM ORTHODOX-KOMMUNISTISCHEN (2)
UND DEM ALTERNATIVEN )
WEG ZUR SONNE. ZUR FREIHEIT 	
between the capitalist (1)
orthodox-communist (2)
and the alternative (3)
way to the sun and to liberty
1)"Jump! "
2)"The infallible Party has
decided to take the great
leap forward!"
3)"Smoke a joint and float
over it!"
"I would prefer a suspension
bridge!"
"...or a balloon!"
•"Theorizers!"
"Babblers! "
Zeichnung: Fuchsi (FDGO)
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appeared as part of the emblems of many collectivefirms. Black (anarchist),
red (communist), green (ecologist), and violet (feminist) are the preferred
colours. Puns on names, such as STATTwerke, 1 and Gegendruck ("counter-
pressure" plus "...print" ), express their intention to be different from esta-
blished social and political structures.
Collectives, although part of a counterculture, are not isolated from the
dominant culture but have constant interaction with it. One aspect of this in-
teraction is that collectiv es take up practically ev ery issue at stake in the ecol-
ogy mov ement: pollution, the demolition of ol d housing, the poisoning of the
environment through the use of chemical s, mimai thy food, and the like. One
of the reasons for the setting up of collectives in the first place were the fotm-
ders' wishes to switch from mere political criticism to social action, to at-
tempt to produceviablegoods w ith more attention paid to their effects on the
environment.
The pol itical party thatbest represents the v iewpoints of most members of
collectives is the West Berlin party Alternative Liste. In the political history
of the ecology movement, a distinction has to be drawn between the West
German party Die Grünen (The Green Party) and theAlternative Liste of
West Berlin. Both emerged from a fusion of small political parties of the ex-
treme left with ecology citizens' committees. The BerlinAlternative Liste
claimed tobelong to the extremeleft, w hereas the national party Die Grünen,
founded in 1978, tried for some time to preserv e a political profile outside of
any traditional political tendency and to represent interests w ithw hichv oters
from all parties could identify. Both trends have rince corne doser together,
and the more radicalAlternative Liste of Berlin has now practically become a
regional group of the national party Die Grünen.
The main points in which the programmes of the two parties coincide are
onthe questions of energy, traffic, housing, and pollution. They object to the
construction of nuclear power stations but tolerate electricity plants nin on
oil or coal as long as they are providedw ith efficient air filters; but above all
they promote the development of decentralized energy production. They
aim to reduce the number of priv ate cars in citi es and favour increased use of
the bicycle and an expansion in public transport services. The Alternative
Liste went ev en further on this point and demanded a car-free Berlin in its
campaign for the 1985 elections. In its housing programme, theAlternative
Liste not only calls for the preserv ation of ol der urban structures but al so de-
mands the same legal status for communal households (Wohngemeinschaf-
ten) as for families. Both parties have proposed elaborate waste-recycling
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programmes and strict pollution regulations for industry, as w ell as tighter
control of the production and use of chemicals.
The achievement of theseaims through economic change is still under dis-
cussion. During the 1984 strikes in the printing and metal industries, which
aimed to achiev e areduction in w orking hours, both parties w ere in favour of
a reduction to less than 35 hours per week in order to guarantee full employ -
ment. They have recently show n sympathy with the concept of small-scale
production and have allocated funds for the development of alternative en-
terprises in the regions where they form coalition govenunent, with the So-
cial Democrats. 2
Criticism of the destructive effects of industrialization, which is the main
issue of the ecology movement, is nota new theme but is almost as ol d as in-
dustrialization itself. How ev er, the extent to which the industrial infrastruc-
ture and its w aste products impinge on the quality of life and on the health of
the population has become an increasing cause for concem to greater num-
bers of people sincew holehearted confidence that the benefits of technologi-
cal and industrial progress outw eig h its disadvantages no longer exists. In
their extreme politico-geographical situation, shut in by w al ls with no coun-
tryside in w hich to escape, suffocatedby smog in w inter and having to swim
in polluted lakes in summer, Berliners were probably more sensitive to the
arguments of ecologists than any other European population. White the ma-
jor political parties still propose to buil d further highw ays through the centre
of Berlin and allow power stations to run on coal without adequate air filters,
the ecologists take a more radical view and receive some support: theAlter-
native Liste polled 10. 7 percentof the votes in the last local elections in 1989.
The ecological criticism of industrial society is only one aspect of the mo-
tivations which inspiredthecollectiv ists. The other is the Mancist analy sis of
the relations of production in capitalist society; Marxist political thought of
the 1970s was an inspiration to the founders, many of whom had been mem-
bers of extreme left-wing parties. In the 1970s, these parties, small though
they were, considered themselv es the v anguard of a process of rev olutionary
social change that could bring an end to the capitalist system. They develo-
ped highly authoritarian structures, being convinced that only a small mino-
rity of party members was capable of fully understanding and interpreting
Marxist, Leninist,Trotskyist, or Maoist ideology. They would lead, and a
mass party would follow. The members w ere sent out to activate workers on
the shopfloor, and some abandoned their studies to become w orkers them-
selves in an effort toidentify more closely with thew orking cl ass, which they
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thought of as the revolutionary subject.
By the end of the 1970s, disillusioned by y ears of unsuccessful struggle,
persecuted by their bosses, and laughed at by their colleagues, they left these
parties. Others were expelled as deviants because they began to contest their
authoritarian and ev en repressive structures. Some of them returned to the
studies, some j oined the anti-authoritarianAlternative liste, and some parti-
cipated in the establishment of collectives. They emphasized the importance
of going beyond mere criticism of dominant capitalist society and also the
need to develop in practice a model for the transformation of society, trying
to combine their political ideas with a satisfactory work situation. As a reac-
tion their previous authoritarian expériences, they welcomed the sponta-
neous character of collectives that, at the same lime, fulfillecl the minimal
requirements for egalitarian cooperation, had no private ownership of the
means of production, and did not offer pay ment according to performance.
Though not actual founders of collectives, Herbie and Rolf are typical
examples of members w ho changed from the framework of a political party
to the more informai structure of collectives, where they hoped to find com-
mon ground on which to realise some of their ideas concerning society.
Now an ex-member of Oktoberdruck, Herbie spent teny ears as a member
of KB (Kommunistischer Bund), a conununist cadre organisation. When he
founded a branch of theKB in Flensburg in 1970, he was convinced that the
working class was the only power capable of ov erthrowing the " imperialism
of the West German state." He decided to leave his studies and work as a
repro-photographer in an ordinary printing shop, where he tried for four and
a half y ears to activate his colleagues on the shopfloor but without success.
After the "German Autumn" (Deutscher Herbst) of 1977 (the result of the
kidnapping of Schleyer, the president of the employ ers' association, by the
Red Brigade (RAF: Rote Armee Fraktion)), left-wing radicals became the
target of both popular and state persecution. Anti-conununist feeling g rew to
such an ex tent that Herbie w as compelled to leav e his job. He moved to Ber-
lin, joining the branch of theKB there, but slow ly realized that his notion of
the working class as a revolutionary force had been mistaken. The motiva-
tion w as gone, and he had tow ork as a repro-photographer simply to earn his
living.
When he became a member of Oktoberdruck, Herbie felt this decision
was a reconciliation of the ideas of his political pastwith a new lifestyle. His
political standpoint was reduced to two principles: not to exploit others, and
not to produce print for reactionary or fascist organisations. He wanted to
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work in a way he found agreeable, with people he liked, without imposing
this work-style on others.
For Rolf, who worked in the bicycle collective Fahrradaro, it had al -
ready become clear in 1972, w hile he w as a member of the KB, that he pre-
ferred tobeinvolved inpractical initiatives in thewardwherehelived, rather
than in abstract political discussions. He advised tenants on their rights and
lived in a housing community financedby the Senate of Berlin, occupied by
young people who had problems with their parents. These rather indepen-
dent activities did not always meet with the approval of those who repre-
sented the official party line. Rolf and his friends were expelled and readmit-
ted several limes when they refused to carry out political propaganda on the
shopfloor, preferring to place their main emphasis on political activity in the
ward (Stadtteilarbeit). In 1980, Rolf left the KB and joined theAlternative
Liste.
After sev en y ears as a social worker dependent on Senate money, Rolf ho-
ped to find in the bicycle collective more freedom to put his ideas into prac-
tice. Unlike Herbie, he did not lose faith in his previous convictions, which
were not as closely linked as Herbie' s to the official party line. However,
both lost their hope that industrial workers could become the driving force
for profound social change. For neither of them did their work in the collec-
tive constitute political activity as such. Rather, it was a satisfactory frame-
work that allowed Herbie to retreat from politics without too bad a con-
science, and Rolf to engage in political activities outside the collectivewhile
feeling that his ideas were also supported inside it.
The issue of whetherwork in a coll ectiv econstitutes political engagement
is heatedly debatedamongst members, w hose opinions range from strong af-
firmation to outright rejection.
We are just like an ordinary capitalist enterprise.... We try to survive in the
market, sometimes we do work for ordinary customers with whom we dis-
agree I have no hopes of changing society. I try tohelpsmall initiatives that
have the right ideas. It is thework itself Matis so important to us. It is 'creative'
because we carry out evely step of a given job ourselves. We are all fond of
eachother in oneway or another. We are like aceil, with no intention of form-
ing other cells in its own image. (Heinz, Graph Druckula, 12.9.1983)
The aim of work in acollective is tooffer an alternative to the society of waste.
Wewant to provideayardstick for change.... I don' twant to live on an island.
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I want to keep in touch with peoplewhose aim is to change society at otherle-
vels, such as thosewhofight for self-management forworkers." (Marita, Ok-
toberdruck, 13.7.1983)
ne political motivations of collectivists differ as widely as these two sta-
tements, made by members of two printing shops. The first regarded his job
as fulfilling an aim in itself because it satisfied his need for interesting and
varied professional work alongsideworkmates he liked. He regarded it nei-
ther as a stimulating example to be emulated nor as different in principle from
an ordinal.), business enterprise; for him, work in the collectiv e w as simply a
job, and he "made politics" at citizen' committees or by taking part in de-
monstrations in his free Lime. His view was that a collective is mainly good
for the collectivists themselves, and this view was widely shared by those
who did not represent their collectives in the outside world for example, by
writing newspaper articles or broadcasting.
Ille second statement tends to imply "any work in a project already as a
political action" ('Makow ski 1984:16). It corresponds to the image collec-
tive enterprises present in public, though fewer collectivists dare say now
that they are providing a yardstick for social change. Those who believed
that collective work had a political significance — either because it proposed
new relations of production as an alternative to the established onesor be-
cause it promoted an ecologically sound product — claimed, how ever, that
they did not see themselves as leaders in the process of social change. They
did notwant to repeat the mistakes of the 1970s, when left-wing party mem-
bers had tried to activateworkers by promoting themselves as the vanguard
of a forthcoming revolution. The idea of a consciousness-raising ideology,
which formerly held such a central position in propaganda and agitation, has
been abandoned in favour of "no ideology."
A member of the publishing collective STAT7buch summed up these
views:
Doing something concrete here and now, that is the practical orientation of
this movement.... Wewant to learnto give expression to opinions, hopes, de-
sires, information, goals, knowledge, and we no longer let others do this for
us. We oppose domination. We do notwant to have anyone in our power, and
we do not allow anybody to exercise power over us. (Jungle and Mûllert
1980:176)
Colleclivists referred to sets of ideals held in commonwhich they wanted
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others to share. But they consciously rejected any theory or system of
thought systematically impose(' on other people. In their work, they inten-
ded to experiment with different forms of cooperation, hoping to find solu-
tions that could point the way to a new society.
In fact, their concept of "no ideology" in the sense of ideas growing out of
practice corresponds to the quality Burawoy, following Althusser, attributes
to "ideology." He maintains that it is lived experience that produces ideo-
logy and not the other w ay around. Ideology is rooted in and expresses the ac-
tivities out of which it emerges (Burawoy 1979:18). In their striving to give
impetus to the creation of a new social order neither do they contradict Gram-
sci' s definition that qualifies historically grown ideologies as a "creation of
concrete phantasy which acts on the disperse(' and shatteredpeopl e to arouse
and organise its collective will" (Gramsci 1975:869).
The ideals they considered can already be found in the radical social uto-
pias of antiquity, such as the Sun Island of Jambulos where in a fabulous nat-
ural environment utopian society was organised according to collectivist
ideals: a life of peace and harmony, the abolition of private property and the
division of labour, and the regular rotation of tasks (Bloch, E 1982:568).
Many of the Berlin collectivists' ideas resembled Robert Owens' 19th cen-
tury thoughts about utopian communities. His beliefw as that small federated
communities w hose members were involved in establishing close human re-
lations without the division of labour, ev en between town and country, and
without bureaucracy would spread and change humanity (Bloch, E
1982:650).
The utopian communities of the past, such as New Harmony in Indiana,
the only Owenite community, or the religious community Oneida, founded
in 1848 by Noyes, were stimulated by politico-economic criticism of the es-
tablished social order but hel d the belief that major improvements could be-
come possible here and now and did not require major political upheavals
(Kanter 1972:62). Unlike these, the collectivists intended their example to
be a stimulus to radical political change. For them, the collective experiment
as such did not represent a major change in itself but simply pointed in the
right direction. Unlike those utopian communities, which either followed a
charismaticleader or strived to put intopractice a fixed set of pre-establ ished
ideas concerning the perfectinstitutional structure of the conunwii ty (Kanter
1972:6), the collectiv ists ocperimentedwith structures, constantly changing
them in order to move toward the desired result the "model collective" or
"concrete utopia. " This model should be as perfect as possible for the col le,c-
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tive developing it and adapted to its particular situation. Other collectives
were not intended to imitate it but to be stimulated by its example to develop
their own structure adapted to their own situation.
Four Ideal Types of Collectivist
Of the thirty-six collectivists who I interviewed concerning their political
histories, only six had no previous political experience at all. The others had
all participated in oneor more political organizations. They had beenorgani-
zed in parties of the extr eme left (ninepeopleinterviewed), in trade unions or
action groups on the shopfloor (sev en), in feminist groups (four), in environ-
mental politics (two), in university politics (six), andin student Christian as-
sociations (three). Some had been squatters (three), another had attended an
experimental school for adult pupils, and another was a political emigrant
from East Germany. Compared to other social groups, these people had a
very high lev el of political consciousness; they judged contemporary Ger-
man society more critically and were more ready to participate in political
actions to defend either their own or others' interests.
Nevertheless, not all collectivists were equally motivated when they
joined. Some had virtually no alternative, others were dissatisfi ed with their
previous work situations, y et others hoped to make a special contribution to a
more ecologically based society, and a few believed they were setting up a
model, a real utopia, that would prov ide an impetus for overall social
change.
The Aussteiger (Drop-out)
The German termAussteiger does not have the saine negative connotation as
its closest English translation, "drop-out." Aussteiger refers to someone
who consciously decides to opt out of a social system that he or she finds in-
supportable. For different reasons, Friedel, Conny, and Thomas all belon-
ged to this categmy They started to work in collectives because they found it
impossible to become integrated into the officiai labour market.
After working for ten y ears as a toolmaker in a West German enterprise,
Friedel came to Berlin to livewith his girlfriend and two children in a squat-
ters' house. He looked for a job but could not find work in the trade he had
learnecl. Employ ers turned him downbecause, with his long hair, helooked
too like " a guy w ho would bring too much disorder to the firm. " The only job
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he could find was as a toolmaker with Siemens , 3 but he was compelled to
leav e after a disagreementwithhis Yugoslav colleagues, w how ere offended
by his going to lunch with an unskilled l'urkish labourer w ho had far lower
status in the firm' s hierarchy than the skilled Yugoslav toolmakers. When
Friedel v isitedKoMet for the first lime, he was immediately offered a place.
In 1984, hewas still enthusiastic about w ork in the collectiv e and had no w ish
to return to a business enterprise.
I hate all thae s straight Here you can work much more freely and pleasur-
ably. If I produce a piece of work I know who ifs for and why I' m doing it
This is somethingyouwouldnot know under normal circumstances.... This is
no ordinary job here. You have to identify with it If you don't, you' d better
leave it alone. (Friedel, KoMet, 15.8.1984)
Conny w as a teacher w ho, whilst training, had been a member of a Maoist
student group. Shewas banned from her profession for tw o y ears because of
her political convictions. After taking her case to court, the banw as revoked,
but she was only able to find temporal) , jobs and final ly became unemployed
after a disagreement with the director of her school. In 1983, she was living
in a communal household (Wohngemeinschaft), separated from her hus-
band, but raising their child jointly with him. She worked in the Fahrrad-
Miro, as she said, partly for fun and partly out of necessity.
I got the job purely by chance. I was unemployed when I met Ulrike, whom I
knew from the FahrradBüro self-help day, in a pub. I asked her whether by
any chance they had a shortage of young talent, and she said they needed two
more people. So I decided to have a go. My dream has always beentobe a mo-
tor mechanic, not because of the cars but because of the technical aspects.
Thaes something awomanis not supposed to learn about, either at home or at,
school, w hile ie s the done thing for a boy of fifteento talce apart his pistons and
cylinders himself. I enjoy fiddling about with my hands, but I am not at all
keen on getting involved in any big political debates here. (Conny, Fahrrad-
Büro, 17.1.1984)
Thomas started work as a printer with Oktoberdruckbecause he could not
find any other printing job after finishing his traineeship. After slowly ac-
quiring some w ork experience in the collectiv e, heleft for a better pay ing job
in an ordinary enterprise. In an interview in 1983, he said:
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I got the job here through two people from the printers' trade union, Andrea
and Donald, 4 when I was unemployed after finishing my apprenticeship....
The real advantage here is notsomuchthework itself, because to a certain ex-
tent you have towork much longer hours underworseconditions than in an or-
dinary job. The actual advantage is ffiat you' re notworking for other people,
you have the final say regarding your own work.... If I eventually make a
change, it will be for technical reasons, because I want to get to know other,
bigger tnachinery, which we do not have in the collectives. (Thomas, Okto-
berdruck, 13.7.1983)
Friedel, Conny, and Thomas dropped out of the system of regular em-
ployment either because of a lack of formai qualifications and sufficient
work experience or because of conflictw ith the established authorities. They
turned to work in collectives because the criteria for recruitment there re-
ceiv e different emphases, with personal sympathy and the capacity to work
independently being considered more important than formol qualifications
or previous experience. Indeed, the fact that a prospective collectivist had
been in opposition to authority and held strong individualistic opinions con-
cerning work-style and aims was a welcome characteristic.
In an economic situation of increasing unempl oy ment, ordinary firms and
the State as an employerhav e aw ide choice — ev en among qualifiedworkers
— and tend to select and keep those workers w ho seem most loyal to the em-
ployers' interests. With a scarcity of work, even among experienced work-
ers, young people and the inexperienced have the greatest difficulty getting
started in the careers of their choice.
In Britain, this situation hasled to the establishment of state-sponsoredco-
operatives to provide employment, especially for unskilled and inexperi-
enced young people. The encouragement of cooperatives by the CDA (Co-
operative Development Agency) is a feature of the even more stringent la-
bour situation in this country. How ever, in Berlin, genuine need and lack of
alternatives is only one, and possibly the weakest, motive for joining a col-
lective. Only a small minority of collectivists have actually been unem-
ployed, and even those w ho have beenso involuntarily still tend to possess a
better education and higher qualifications than the average unemployed
young perron in Germany. For the latter, the collective is scarcely a viable
alternative as they lack the minimal qualifications for joining an established
collective and al so the minimal capital for setting up a new one. The situation
was different in Britain in the beginning of the 1980s when central or, more
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usually, local authorities provided state-sponsored cooperatives with initial
fixed and mov able capital and advised members on their operati on. The s ub-
sequent structure of thesecooperativ es depended to a large ex tent on the poli-
tical orientation of their sponsors and adv isors, ranging from common ow n-
ership with equal salaries to strongly hierarchical cooperatives. In Berlin,
collectives depended mainly on their members for their initial financing, and
the members therefore determined the organisational structure.
The members whojoined a collectiv e mai nly because they were unable to
find any other job are often pragmatic about the work. They try to avoid
conflicts, have an aversion to long discussions, and support efforts to i n-
crease pay and reduce hours. For them, collectivework does notembody any
message for social change but, rather a solution to personal problems.
The Dissatisfied Worker
Wolfgang, Noppe, and Donald joined collectives because they were dissa-
tisfied with the monotony of their previous work situations.
Wolfgang, a skilled toolmaker w ith ten years' experience and a member
of the Soci al Democratic Party (S PD), left his job in an ordinary fi rm because
he wanted to care for his small child w hile his wife worked full-time in her
own hairdressing business. He criticized his former working conditions,
rnaintaining that everything — from the clrawings to the planning of the step-
by-step production — had been imposed on him.
I did not get on very well with my colleagues, because they were mostly much
older and had the usual political convictions. I often quarrelled with them.
The foreman and the boss interfered in my work. They wanted to impose their
own ideas about how to do it. I woul d begiven a ready-made draw i ng and a fi-
nished construction, and I was more or I ess told what order to do everything
in. (Wolfgang, KoMet, 15.8.1984)
When his childw as old enough to go to nursery school, Wolfgang joi ned Ko-
Met, which one of his former colleagues had co-founded, because of the i n-
dependence it allowed and the possibility it offered of acquiring new skills.
Noppe had worked as a toolmaker for sev en years in the same fïrmwhere
he served his apprenticeship, which he began when he was fi fteen. Origi-
nally from a working-class background, he became a member of a shopfloor
action group (Betriebsgruppe), independent of the trade unions, set up by
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former university students who had become workers in order to advance the
class struggle. When the action group w as dissolved, following the loss of
most of its members through dismiss al or return to university, Noppe left the
enterprise as he fel t relationships with his remaining colleagues hadbecome
increasingly dull.
I wanted to leave straight after my apprenticeship. Then I got involved in this
action group. When that fizzled outIwas no longer keen on working in a firm
where I had a secure job but where the social aspects were increasingly dull.
After that I repeatedly stayedaway fromwork on the pretext of being ill. The
days when I couldnotbring myself evento go towork became more and more
frequent, althoughtheworkwas easy andwehad alotof breaks. Finally Iwent
away on holiday, and from there I sent in my notice. (Noppe, KoMet,
8.8.1984)
Through acquaintances in his political activities, Noppe heard about the es-
tablishment of a toolmalting collective, KoMet, and joined. In 1984, hewas
the last of KoMee s founders still to be working there. He enjoyed the com-
pany of the other members, the independence he had in dealing with techni-
cal problems, and the fact that he could gain insights into the administrative
functionings of the enterprise.
Donald w as, in 1983, Oktoberdruck' s most experienced printer. Before
joining he hadworked for many y ears as the second printer on thelarge press
where he had served his apprenticeship. Bored by this very limited job, fed
up with the hierarchical organisation of the w orlc, he left to join a collective.
I quit because of the total control, and the hierarchical division of labour be-
tw een firstand second printer .... and I was almostalways secondprinter. On
the rare occasions when I w as first printer, therewas always somebody tfying
to land me in a mess. And at some point I' d had enough. (Donald, Oktober-
druck,14.7 .1983)
Donald said hewas satisfied as his new job included five limes the number of
tasks he hadbeen allowed to carry out in the large printing firm, with its high
lev el of division of labour. He increasingly participated in the processes of
decision making for the w hole collective and also pl anned to gain insight into
the production aspects of the repro-mounting department °
Wolfgang, Noppe, and Donald were experienced and qualified workers
who could easily have found jobs in an ordinary enterprise that would have
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paid them twice as much as they were earning in their collectives. How ev er,
they decided to leave their secure jobs and work in collectives instead. For
them, this decision meant sacrificing a certain amount of material comfort
and even accepting longer working hours.
Most collectivists do not have such heavy financial obligations as their
counterparts in industry , though, who may hav edependent families and may
be repaying loans on cars and houses. Generally, the lov ers or spouses of col-
lectivists do not depend financially on their partner, and both contribute to
providing for eventual children.
When speaking of their previous work situations, Wolfgang, Noppe, and
Donald described them as monotonous, constraining, and lacking in any
possibility of gai ning an ov erview of the entire productive process and of the
functioning of the firm as a w hole. They said they had been unable to relate to
their work, as every step had been precisely prescribed for them. When they
returned home in the evenings, they had tried to forget as quickly as possible
what they had done during the worki ng day. . In spi te of this, they hadbeen i n-
terested in the technical requirements of their work and had wished to I earn
more about them but had found it impossible to satisfy their curiosity and ini-
tiative.
They became aw are of an alternative through friends and acquaintances
who were already working in collectives or who knew of them. Although
some of them had participated in left-w ing political groups — Noppe, for in-
stance, on the shopfloor and Donald in theyouthorganisation of the printers'
trade union — their decision to join a col 1 ectiv ew as an individual one that di d
not meet with their col leagues' approv al.
Trade unionists generally denounce collective enterprises as capitalist
firms under collective covers. They accuse collectivists of self-exploitation
and of lacking solidarity with employed workers because they pay them-
selves wages below the agreed scale and often work unpaid overtime, the-
reby entering into " unfair" competition with those fighting for higher w ag es
and shorter hours in business enterprises. For the trade unions, intercom-
pany agreements on wage rates and hours are considered to be a success be-
cause they strengthen the unity of the labour-force, w hereas the independent
policy of collectives would weaken their position if they made a significant
impact on the labour market.
Only a minority of trade unionists support the idea of workers' self-man-
agement, w hich touches on the crucial issue of workers' control ov er the pro-
duction process. This minority is now starting to have an increasingly in-
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tense exchange with members of collectives and worker-managed enter-
prises. The leading union figures in theDaimler Benz shopfloor group, Pla-
kat-Gruppe — well known for their commitment toworkers' control and the
conversion of their output from military equipment to socially useful prod-
ucts — were even excluded from the Industrial Union of Metalworkers in the
surnmer of 1984.
Skilled industrial workers who join collectives, and even those who take
ov er their run-dow n finns and try to continue them as self-manageciconcerns
(such as the Voith workers in Bremen), are still the rare exception. The large
majority of industrial workers believes that the issues of the quai ity of work
and control ov er the production process haveto take second place to the prob-
lems of increasing unemployment and diminishing purchasing power. The
few worker-managed firms in West Germany still have a very good reputa-
lion among collectivisas, although few of them believe that their own firm
could become an alternative for most ordinary workers.
Wolfgang, Noppe, and Donald were privileged compared to the average
worker as they possessed qualifications that were still in demand on the la-
bour market, while their personal situations allowed them to liv e in rea-
sonable comfort on a relativ ely low income.
The Ecologist
This type of collectivist is motivated by a particular concern for the ecologi-
cal destruction of the env ironment and for the deterioration of personal rela-
tionships in large cities like Berlin.
Ulrikeworked as a teacher for four y ears, while she w as still very young.
She hated her job because she felt that she was not given the opportunity to
teach her pupils anything useful and that they were fawning in order to get
good marks. At the age of twenty -six, she left teaching and joined the Fahr-
radBüro in order to learn a useful technical skill and to be with people who
"do something instead of just talking." She was convinced she was doing
more meaningful work by helping topromote a sensible means of transporta-
tion and its conscious use.
It is very important thatwe all work in the bicycle shopbecausewe are conv in-
ced that the bike is the right means of transport and that its use improves the
quality of life. None of us would sell cars or motorbikes. We, or radier I, stand
by this work. I think it makes sense. In a normal bikeshop people are only
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concerned with selling. We also have to make our living from this work, but
we want more than that (Ulrike, FahrradBüro, 16.12.1983)
Ulrike taught customers and pupils at ev ening classes how to repair their cy-
cles themselves and fought hard against the development of power relations-
hips w ithin the collectiv e. " Cooperation should be based on friendship" was
her conviction.
Mathias had a degree in environmental technology andw as very active on
citizens' action committees for environmental politics. During his studies,
he started to oppose the role of the type of engineer who, like a worker on an
assembly line, invents new technologies without ever questioning their uti-
lity or their effects upon the people who would use them.
The utility of technology is not questioried by the people who produce it For
example, you can produce a bike that is excellent to ride, or one that sells very
well, or one that is manufacturedvery easily from the point of view of process
engineering. These are the different aims to which the technology is subordi-
nated, and the actual riding of the bike ranks last (Mathias, FahrradBüro,
22.5.1984)
Mathias was convinced that the development of a technology that was com-
prehensible to those who would use it and that protected the environment
would revolutionize the engineering sciences. Al though for him work in the
FahrradBüro was only a transitional job while he prepared a research proj-
ect, he was interested in the combination of technology and environmental
politics that it offered. According to him, the bicycle could raire the critical
consciousness of its owner, impelling him or her to exert pressure on the
manufacturera to produce machines that could be easily repaired. He was
conscious, however, that in the interim they remained dependent on mass
production and could only choose from the output of this.
During his studies of German language and politiés, Bernhard partici-
pated in the same citizens' action committee as the founders of the Fahrrad-
Büro but joined the collective only after it had been running for a y ear and
could pay its members an income. At that time, he considered it a "natural
continuation" of their concept of trafficpolitics, which radical ly opposed the
use of cars in the inner city.
We came together in opposition to the highway, trying to develop a different
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concept of traffic politics, and thebikewaspartof that ... Wedid not have any
direct effect, butwe clid influencecertainthings: change in theway of thinlcing
about the importance of the bicycle, abouta different type of traffic politics.
Today all this is no longer current in theFahrradBüro, and also ithas become
rather superfluous because there are plenty of other traffic initiatives. (Bern-
hard, FahrradBüro, 19.1. 1984)
Bernhard felt nostalgie as he thought of the first y eats of the collectiv ew hen,
as he said, strong common interests and sympathy united its members, a
common basis he now missed.
Ulrike, Mathias, and Bernhard had limited political concern, which fo-
cused on the protection of the environment. They were not organised as part
of any political party with the aim of overall social change but participated in
citizens' action committees that denounced and opposed specific ecological
problems. Nev ertheless, they bel iev ed the causes of theseprobl emswere es-
cal ating and the reason for the destruction of the env ironment by man hirnself
lay in large scale industrialisation and its use of a technology that has grown
bey ond the human scale. Small-scale local initiatives woul d make it possible
to re-establish a conscious exchangebetweenpeople and their environnent
These collectivists tried to influence their customers to become more
conscious of the environment in their daily liv es. They told them about the
advantages of cycling instead of motoring and encouraged them to learn to
repair instead of throwing things aw ay. Members ofBaubiiro, a coll ectiv eof
construction engineers, explained to their clients the danger of chemicals
used in the building trade, while members of Wuseltronick suggested sys-
tems of decentralized energy production and reduced consumption.
How ever, the primat), intention of all these people was to create a differ-
ent environment for themselves, establish satisfactory personal relation-
ships at their places of work, and then extend these to their clients. The intel-
lectuals among the ecologists had sufferedbecause during and after their stu-
dies they had been unable to apply in practice their ideas about society, and,
therefore, they cherished the opportunity to actually develop a lifesty 1 e about
which they had speculated in theory .
Tite Revolutionaty Utopian
These collectivists are probably the ones with not only the most radical but
also the most utopian convictions. Their intention in setting up collectives
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was to establish models for new relations of production with a view toward
bringing about fundamental social changes.
Fritz, w ho for years had been a member of a Trotskyist organisation,
abandoned his studies of urbanism in order to train as a toolmaker and work
in industry. 13y the end of his apprenticeship in a mail toolmaking firm, he
had revised his conviction that " the working class was bound to be the revo-
lutionary subject" thatwas going to transform society. Instead, hewantedto
corne doser to his ideal of a free society by setting up a self-managed enter-
prise.
In 1981, during an early phase of the collectiveKoMet, he w rote about his
concept of self-management:
Self-management is the opposite of a representativemodel and itis incompat-
ible in its essence with any other form of dominion. It is the basis of a free so-
cial order in which everybody owns the possibility and capacity — but is also
confrontedwith the need — to take responsible decisions about his own inter-
ests and those of the social domains by whichhe is affected (Fritz, KoMet, Fe-
bruary 1981)
For Fritz, towork in a collectiv e meant to experiment here and now with this
future social system. The collectiv e w as to become a model that would give
impetus to those outside it and would receive criticism and incentives in re-
turn.
Several years later, he came to realise that the equal sharing of responsi-
bililies notwork in his collective and that itw as he himselfw ho took more
decisions and carried out more of the disagreeable jobs than any other mem-
ber.
This joint has bunn me out. Very often I bore the brunt of certain jobs, and I
did them because nobody elsewould. 'This was certainly a mistalce, but I had
no choice. Also it was usually me who had to be responsible for the problems
in front of the customers. I have to get out of here. (Fritz, KoMet, 13.8 1984)
Maritaw as trained as a chemist and decided after several years of work to
complete her A-Levels (Abitur) at a self-managed experimental school for
adult pupils in the Mehringhof. Here, at " the centre of alternative activity,"
she became familiar with collectives. After working for ayear in several dif-
ferent enterprises to get back into contact with ordinary people, she started
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work with Oktoberdruck as a bookkeeper. For her, collective work meant
opposing the dominant social system with an alternative mode of coop-
eration based on equality. The model developing in the collective, she
thought, could become a y ardstick for change that woul d incite larger parts
of the population working in small- and medium-sized enterprises to strive
toward self-managed forms of production.
Uweworked for several y ears as an urban planner in parts of West Berlin
that have acute housing problems. Simultaneously with his official job, he
participated in citizens' action committees for better housing and advised
tenants on their rights. The contradictions betw een the official planning poli-
cies and his political convictions made him leave and search for work in a
more practical trade.
He became one of the founders of KoMet, although he w as not a qualified
metalworker. He wanted the collective to become a model for decentralised
and non-hierarchical production that could be extended to larger sectors of
industry.
I am in favour of an economy where the quality of theproductplays a more im-
portant role. Where good quality products are cared for, instead of shoddy
goods that are soon thrown away. I am in favour of an artisan-style mode of
production, maybe not that different ev en from the medieval guild system,
where quality was monitored and competition lùnited ... I have not thoughtso
much about how to influence the relationship between production and
consumption, but what I do know is that I reject any form of compulsion."
(Uwe, KoMet, 17.5.1988)
The new social order Uwe wanted to initiate was to be the opposite of a
synchronized society andw as to consist of individuals with equal rights who
could fully develop their differences.
Fritz, Marita, and Uwe thought that a radical change had to take place in
the existing social structure. They used the word "revolution" to designate
this change, although they no longer meant it in the Marxian sense, namely,
through the revolutionary power of the working class. They aspired to bring
about this change themselves. Their concrete plan for change w as limited to
one aspect of the social order that they considered crucial: working together
in a self-determined way. In their efforts to conceive what they called a
" concrete utopia, " they wanted to show that different relations of production
were not only feasible but already operational in the collectiv e, w hichw as to
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become a model for the future.
The different ways in which we direct our attempts make them like a model.
We have to display our endeavours in public to show the possibili des of orga-
nising htunaneworking and living conditions, and to get new impetus for our
own discussions, widening our views beyond the limited scope of "the
scene." I consider it very important to demonstrate the practical functioning
of these new forms and to show not only the new quai ity of these attempts but
also the ensuing difficulties. (Fritz, KoMet, February 1981)
Colleclivists w ho share this far-reaching motivation tend to be influential
figures in the collectiv e, if not among its founders. They often regard collec-
tivework as the hub of their liv es, and sometimes as a substitute for their pre-
vious political activities. They are ready to sacrifice a successful career in
business because they believe in the principle of collectives. They are
conscious that their utopia cannot develop in isolation because the enterprise
is ùnbedded in the larger economy, but they tend to attribute its success or
failure to the strenght or weakness and lev el of commitment of the members,
rather than to external economic contraints.
The four ideal types outlined here are not mutually exclusive. Some col-
lectivists could fit into more than one category, while others formerly be-
longed to one but flow fit into another. Fritz, for example, lost confidence in
the "revolutionary" role of collectives and ultimately viewed the work sim-
ply in terms of his own position. However, the four ideal types are useful in
exemplifying the four basic categories of motive, which occur repeatedly in
collective enterprises and which explain some of the tensions that arise bet-
ween members with very different aspirations and expectations.
Generational Turnover and Wearing Out of Utopian Ideals
The decision to work in a collective implies the choice of a certain lifestyle.
Incomes are extremely low: the average monthly income of a mal eworker in
the German metal industry in 1983 was about DM 2,650 gross, which is
about DM 2,000 net (Statistisches Jahrbuch, 1984), while the average
monthly income of a col lectivist at the same timew as between DM 1,150 and
DM 1,250 net 5. So on joining a collective, members must adapt their stan-
dard and style of living accordingly. Most collectivists lived in communal
households (Wohngemeinschaften), where expenses for food, heating, and
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rent w ere shared, and they had few externat obligations. At the time when I
conducted my interviews, no collectiv ist, to my knowledge, had to help sup-
port elderly parents, few were married, and any children were provided for
by both parents.
The senne of allegiance to the collective, and the motives for working
there, differed between older and younger members. The large majority of
cases studied in 1984 comprisedolder collectivists, between 30 and 35 y ears
old. Theyounger members, thosebetw een 22 and 26 y ears ol d, represented a
maximum of 25 percent of the total number. The age group betw een 26 and
30 y cars w as almost unrepresented The average ag ew as 32 y ears. Expl ana-
lions for this striking age gap can be only tentative, as my sample does not
pennit definite answ ers to this question, but the data point in the follow ing di-
rection.
The older members grew up and were educated during the 1960 s, in a pe-
riod when established authority was being strongly questioned. These and-
authoritarian ideals were then introduced into the collectives. A large per-
centage of the members left socially v alued professions, such as teaching or
research, or better paid jobs, for example, in toolmaking or printing. Their
choke of the collective style of work was motivated by criticism of estab-
lished work situations, by a more or less well-developed political analysis
and by some prev ious professional experiences.
The y oung er collectiv ists, on the other hand, are part of the " baby -boom"
generation, bornbetween 1959 and 1965, w hich is now seriously affectedby
increasing youth unemployment that blocks their access to a professional ca-
reer. The job in the collectiv ew as often the only one they coul d find after fin-
ishing their apprenticeships, and they often joined a collective without ha-
ving a clear picture of the work situation involved.
I w ould hy pothesize that the 26 to 30 y ear-ol d group, w hich w as so under-
represented in collective enterprises, was too y oung to hav e been influenced
by the upheav als of the 1960s student mov ements and t000ld to hav ebeen se-
riously affected by the current youth unemployment crisis.
Collective ideals were mostly upheld by the older members, w ho stimu-
latexl the others. The younger members did not have equally pronounced po-
litical intentions; far younger than the founders, they were still trying to find
their political and professional orientation and took w ork in a collective as a
starting point only. Otto and Thomas, for instance, whowere in their proba-
tionary period w hen I conductext my fieldwork, had heard of KoMet through
an article in the journal Der Spiegel and had moved from West Germany to
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Berlin expressly to obtain jobs there. Otto had difficulty finding work in his
profession as a tooltnakerbecause the employ ers in his native rural arca refu-
sed to consider him because he was a conscientious objector. Otto and Tho-
mas found it exciting to work with KoMet and thought it quite normal that
there should be some members who had greater experience than others and
sotoldthemwhattodo. "There areno bosses, therearejustsomepeoplewho
know more than others and its natural that we should listen to them," com-
mented Thomas on the authority debate.
In the demanding building-up phase, the cohesion of the collective group
depended to a large extent on the personalities who upheld utopian ideals.
When this idealism weakened, differences among members tended to ap-
pear, though the areas of conflict did not necessarily coincide with the ideal
types described earlier. When material conditions did notimproveconsider-
ably, despite sacrifices of rime and money, increasing consumption needs
became a crucial point of conflict.
The lifestyle of some of the older members changed over Lime. They en-
tered into stable relationships, had children, and therefore began to expe-
rience higher consumption demands. Some of them al so fel t the need to take
up a socially recognized career. The turnover in membership accentuated
the differences between generations of collectivists and between different
political backgrounds. Responding to the attitude of the younger members
and the changes in the developmental cycle of the older ones, the structures
of collectives became characterised I ess by political idealism and more by a
pragmatic self-consolidation.
Gunter (1982:379), analysing the replacement of ideas of utopian, " phan-
tastic," socialism, after the first ten years of the Russian October Revolu-
tion, with "Scientific Socialism," calls this process the "wearing out of uto-
pias" (Utopieverschkif3). Fie attributes the decline of utopian thought to an
"eschatological delay, the "postponing of the expected communist condi-
tion" (Gunter 1982:378). Utopian dreams of ideal social and state institu-
tions, of communism in production and consumption, were replaced by an
enthusiasm for scientific work organisation, the Russian version of Tayl or-
ism (Gunter, 1982:382). In the Berlin collectives, the "wearing out of uto-
pias" led to a stronger preoccupation with the systematization of the structu-
res of production, and the creation of associations, networks, and organisa-
tions to defend the economic interests of collective enterprises. The cohesion
and continuity of these enterprises is increasingly maintained by these struc-
tures rather than by common utopian ideals.
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Notes
1.STA7Twerke, derived from the word Stadtwerke (municipal services);
statt, however, means " instead."
2. In order to complete this outline of the pol itics of Die Grünen and theA/-
ternative Liste, it must be mentioned that they follow a policy of Third World
development, which questions consumption habits in industrialized coun-
tries. They are also in favour ofleaving NATO as they regret the logic of mili-
tary blocks and strongly support the peace movement.
3. A large West German corporation producing machines electrical and
electronic equipment
4. In 1983, also members of Oktoberdruck
5. A female worker in the metal industry earned DM 1,944 gross, a male
print worker DM 3,000 gross and a female print worker DM 2,016 gross per
month in 1983 (Statistisches Jahrbuch 1984) plus holiday payment, paid
overtime, and a thirteenth monthly salary.
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Political Consumer-Producer Relations
The creation of alternative economic networks — optimists would call it a
"counter economy" — is not only one of the political aims of most members
of collectives, it is also an economic necessity. One of thebasic political aims
sharedby most collectivists is to transform the anonymous money and com-
modity transactions of the capitalist system into personal relationships be-
tw een individuals. They wish to sharpen the critical attitude of consumers to-
wardtheproductthey arepurchasing and theway itwas produced. Their uto-
pian ideal would be an economy where producers and consumers share the
same interests and act in a complementary way. The inherent opposition of
the capitalist market econony — with, on one side, consumers wanting high
quality and 1 ow prices and, on the other, manufacturers striving for high pro-
fits — should be able to meet in a consensus without passing through the
mechanisms of competition.
Alternative Forms of Financing
Most of thepioneering collective enterprises started in 1977 or 1978 with al-
most no initial capital. Members' friends and acquaintances helped with
their personal savings to cover the most pressing capital needs, and many of
the founders contributed all their own savings — and sometimes even a le-
gacy — in order to set up the enterprise. Almost none started by having a
long -term bank ban or a credit line. The first machines the collectivists used
were second- or even third-hand, discarded by innovative business enter-
prises and often more than ten years ol d. This outdated technological equip-
ment gave the enterprises a considerable handicap in getting started, and the
members had to compensate by accepting low pay and long working hours.
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Al most all the ol der collectivisas reinvested in its entirety the money that w as
made during the fi rst one or two y ears, w hil e themselves subsisting on unem-
ploy ment benefits or student grants.
The only ban available to set up an enterprise that cannot give surety of a
reasonable amount of initial capital is the ERP (European Recovery Pro-
gramme) credit sy stem. This is intended to encourage enterpreneurs to set up
businesses in economically and g eog raphical ly di s adv antaged areas, such as
West Berlin and the border regions with Fast Germany. The ERP credit sys-
tem, which draw s on financial funds from the Marshall Plan, is accorded to
individual enterpreneurs w ho are starting a business that promises tobe pro-
fitable. Small enterprises asking for this form of credit should have the legal
status of a GbR (Gesellschaft bürgerlichen Reclus or partnership) as the cre-
dit has to be taken up at the lev el of personal responsibility of the enterpre-
neur.
Collectives applying for ERP credit, as KoMet and Wuseltronickdid, had
to put forward two of their members as "entrepreneurs" and " ow ners" of the
enterprise. This formai arrangement did not cause many problems for Wu-
seltronick, asthe me,mbers in w hose names the creditw as acquired remained
with the collectiv e until after the money had been repaid. F or KoMet , how ev -
er, problems arose when both members w ho had been named as the formai
borrowers left the collective after one and two y ears respectively — one of
them, Hans-Christian, after a disagreement. He threatened to dissociate
himself from the credit arrangement, thereby ruining the enterprise, unless
he was paid DM 10,000 compensation. The collective had no choice but to
comply with this.
Ne tzw erk
Finding alternative forms of financing, or gaining access to bank loans, has
been a concern for collectivists and their sympathisers since 1977 and 1978,
the y ears marking the commencement of many collective enterprises. In
1978, an alternative fund, Netzwerlç w as set up to support alternative activ i-
des that were not assisted by state money and to prov ide pay ment for the pol i-
tical and social activities of teachers subject to a political dismissal from the
civil service.
Since its foundation in 1978 until 1984 alone, Netzwerkhas distributed no
less than DM 2.5 million in bans and contributions to a w ide range of proj-
ects. These range from the engineers' collective WuseltronicktoTurkish im-
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migrant newspapers; from art exhibitions to the Grey Panthers, a radical ini-
tiative for old people. Most of the contributors to the fund are relatively w ell-
off academics and those in liberal professions who have agreed to make a
monthly contribution corresponding to one percent of their income
(STATIbuch3 1984:716).
Only one y ear after its foundation, the alternative fund came under heavy
attack from contributors and recipients alike. The advisory board' choosing
the projects to be supported was accused of bureaucratisation and of losing
contact with the those who contributed to and those who profited from the
scheme. Representatives of alternative projects, and in particular the pro-
ductive collectives, wanted Netzwerk to become a coordinating institution
for collectives, in which only projects that were themselves eligible to be
sponsored made the decisions concerning applications. The majority of
Netzwerk sponsors, on the contrary, wanted to keep control over the pur-
poses for which their money was used and wanted direct contact with the
projects they were choosing to sponsor. The first general meeting of Netz-
werk contributors was attended by several hundred people and evoked hea-
ted debates. The active involvement of contributors and projects has lesse-
ned considerably since then. WhileNetzwerk had 3,630 paying members in
December 1982, membership had fallen to 2,066 by December 1987 (Netz-
werleurdbrief 2.5 1988).
The amount of money Netzwerkcanoffer toproductiv e collectiv es is g en-
erally insufficient for their capital needs. Since the sommer of 1983, when a
group of six female members of collective enterprises attempted — unsuc-
cessfully — to g et theniselv es electedto replace the acting managing commit-
tee and to make Netzwerk an instrument of the collective enterprises, the col-
lectives have lost interest and turned for financial help and advice predorni-
nantly to the alternative advisory office STAlTwerke. In August 1987, ho-
wev er, Netzwerk established its own advisory service for self-managed en-
terprises.
STATTwerke: Direct Credit Procurement
STATTwerke emerged out of an initiativ eby students of the econornic, politi-
cal, and social sciences at the Free Univ ersity of Berlin, who had participated
in the compilation of the first Stattbuch, the alternative directoty for Berlin.
Since the autumn of 1982, they have organised courses in bookkeeping and
business management for members of collective enterprises, and since
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STATTwerke hooth at the Frankfurt Collectives Fair. Marlene, one of the
founding members, is counseling a potential new collectivist (photo by author).
1983, they have acted as médiators betwecn prie ate sources of crcdit and col-
lectives. In May 1984, they alrcady had offers of DM 1.1 million, of which
more than DM 250, 000 was al located to col 1 ectiv e enterprises. Up to Aug ust
1985, they hadprovided DM 1.5 million for coll ectiv es, including shops and
agricultural, service, and housing enterprises. In the meantime, howcvcr,
the initiative was prohibited by the federal supervisory board for credit
(BAK: Bundesaufsichtsamt fur das Kreditwesen) because itwas acting as an
"investment business. -
Credit procurementwas ai mcd atcreiiting a direct link betwecn sources of
credit and collectives in need of finance, thus overcoming the anony mi ty of
ordinary banking transactions. In actuality, it attcmpted to institutionalise
direct political support to collectives by means of low-interest crcdit from
friends and supporters. The aim was di fficul t to realize, though, as only 25
percent of the credi tors I iv ed in Berlin, w here 50 percent of the collectives in
nee-d of credit were concentrated. The procedure for mcdiating credit put
great emphasis on persona! choice. The potential crcditors fillcd out a ques-
tionnaire in which they detailed the financial conditions under which they
would give credit and the type of collective they would prefer to support.
Creditors seemed to prefer financing ecological farrns and traditional
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handicrafts as Michael, a member of STATTwerke, pointed out "They still
fol low the cliché that collectives shoul d exclusively practise ecological agri-
culture and unalienated manual labour." Most creditors sponsored the col-
lectives that STA7Twerke proposed, therefore it was ultimately the
STA7Twerke members w ho determined the criteria according towhich cred-
it was provided. For credit of less than DM 50,000, STA7Twerke invited
members of the collectives needing loans to attend an informai discussion in
order to find out " intuitively" whether or not they wereorganised as a collec-
tive. Only if higher credit was requested w as the legal charter of the collec-
tive concerned checked to prevent ordinary enterprises profiting from the
extremely low interest rates (3 to 6 percent) that the creditors werewilling to
accept. "Neutralisation" of collective capital was tobe as secure as possible,
so that individual members of collectives could not exploit the goodwill of
their creditors for their own private gain. STATTwerke usually took only one
percent of the sum provided, to cover its costs. Michael feared, however,
that STAITwerke might deteriorate into a mere service agency if the collecti-
ves did not participate more fully in its decision-making processes.
This type of credit-giving created privileged access to cheap capital re-
sources for the collective enterprises. The creditors voluntarily forewent a
large proportion of the interestthey woul d have receiv ed if they had taken out
long-term savings agreements with an ordinary bank. How ever, the political
ambition that underlay the initiatives of STA7Twerke went further than the
procurement of cheap credit for collectives:
Itwould be possible to develop a completely new system of finance, through
which the creditor would keep direct control over the use thatwas made of his
money. Such a method of finance could approach the political goal of abolish-
ing alienation. Decisions about bans would be made according to people' s
preferences concerning the specific products their borrowers were going to
make and the system of organisation of production they would adopt. In this
way, individual preferences would have a much stronger influence on the
market allocation of resources than is possible throughpurchasing decisions
alone. Itwould be interesting to know whether preferences revealed by lend-
ing decisions are different from those revealed by purchasing. Whether, for
instance, the sanie people who give credit to an ecological bakety would eat
"King Corn" bread, or whether people who support bicycles as a sensible
means of transport would give money to a metal-working collective that pro-
chices moulds for the car industry. (Michael, STATrwerke, 16.5 1984)
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In fact, Ulrike, a dedicated member of the FahrradBüro, gave DM
10,000 from her personal savings as credit to KoMet, which produced,
among other things, moulds for the car industry. She decided to supportKo-
Met because of its collective organisation of production, despite the fact that
it did not manufacture ecological products although, as we will see later, it
was unsuccessfully striving to do this.
The Ôkobank
The next step in the creation of an alternative economic infrastructure was
the establishmentof an alternativ ebank, the Ôkobank. The ideaw as born out
of a boycott campaign against batiks involved in arms deals and in trade w ith
South Africa. At the alternative fair in Frankfurt in the summer of 1984, an
association called "Friends and Sponsors of the Ôkobank" (Freunde und
Fôrderer der Ôkobanke.V.)w as charged with the task of raising the neces-
sary initial capital. When the bank opened for business al most four years la-
ter, on 30 April 1988, more than 12,000 associates of the cooperative bank
had raised the initial capital of DM 7.5 million (TAZ 2.5. 1988).
The bank' s foundationw as preceededby intense discussion among those
involved in the alternative scene who questioned its principl es. The activists
of the Ôkobank association confronted the staff of professional bankers w ho
were to rtm the banlc. White the former wanted a self-managed decentralised
bankwith democratic structures, a true" instrument of a counter-economy ,"
the latter had to build up a structure according to strict German banking law,
which implied for ex ampl e that thebank manager hadto hav e the ultimate au-
thority . The Federal Supervisory Boardfor Credit (BAK)authorised the ope-
ning of the bank on the condition that the total volume of credit transactions
was restricted to three times the equity capital (whereas in ordinary banks it
can be up to eighteen times the equity capital). The established cooperative
banks, members of the national Association of Cooperative Raiffeisen
Banks (Bundesverbandder Raiffeisen Banken), w ere even more skeptical to-
ward the newcomers than the BAK was and will not allow them to become
members of their deposit protection fund until they have proved ov er several
years that they intend to be serions bankers. Since Raiffeisen founded, in
1864, the first cooperative bank, theHeddesdorfer Darlehenskassen,to sa-
feguard the existence of peasants and small producers in the face of growing
industrialisation, cooperativebanks in Germany have becomewell-establis-
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hed but increasingly inflexible.
The special feature of the altemativ e bank, which distinguishes it from all
other cooperative and ordinary banks, is the creation of structures that allow
the investors a say in the use towhich their money will beput The bank offers
specific long-terni savings policies for financing predetermined sectors of
the alternative economy and culture. The investor can give priority, for in-
stance, towomen' s projects, projects for the protection of the environment,
or those set upby the handicapped, and their money will beused accordingly .
An advisory board, comprised people involved in the alternative scene,
work out the details for these particular savings arrangements.
The objective of the bank is to became an instrument in the hands of politi-
cally motivated investors w ho w ant to promote an alternative economy and
culture. In this perspective, the inv estors are cal led on todecidewhether they
are w illing to receive a lower rate of interest on their long-term sav ings. For
thew ealthy supporters of an" alternative economy," this bankwill probably
only become a secondary deposit for their long- term savings, to be used as
credit volume for alternative projects. In its building-up phase, the bank
needs dependable borrow ers and cannot run the risk of financing vanguard
projects with no security. The bank' s alternative principles depend, in fact,
upon the "renunciation of interests" (Zinsverzicht) in order that it may ev en-
tually be able also to assist financially w eaker proj ects and collective enter-
prises. Ordinary firms will begiven credit at the normal interest rate as long
as they do not produce goods (for instance for nuclear power stations or ar-
mements) that contradict the ecological principles of the bank (Contraste
April 1988:8).
Party and State Money: The Ôkofond
Most members of collectives regard it as essential that collective enterprises
remain independent from state funding so that their economic destiny does
not depend upon the grace or disgrace of the government in power. In 1983,
however, the Social Democratic party (SPD) and the party Die Grünen for-
med a coalition gov ernment in Hess en and set up a fund of DM 7 . 2 million for
the y ear 1984 to further" alternative economic funds." A rush for this money
became imminent.
To avoid Pierce competition between collective enterprises for the small
amount of resources to be distributed, a committee of twelverepresentativ es
from all over Hessen w as formed to discuss w ith the deputies of Die Grünen
halshs 00373687 (2009-04-07)
56 	 Consumer-Producer Relations
the use that should be made of the money. The members of the committee
agreed that no new jobs should becreated as long as some of the existing ones
were still without social security payment and financed by unemployment
money. Conflicts arase, though, as to whether the money should be shared
with cultural and social projects, and whether it should be distributed in the
form of grants or bans.
Members of collectives in South Hessen, who had in the meantime foun-
ded a union to represent their interests, insisted that absolute priority should
be giv en to productive collectives and that the money should be used for de-
veloping ecological products, initiating credit with low interest rates, and
helping build up the advisory activities of the union. As the collectives from
North Hessen disagreed with this, the conunittee' s discussions became in-
creasingly irreconciliable, and no request for money was clealt with before
the 1984 fiscal year ended on 5 December (Bergmann, 1984:11). Die
Grünen, how ever, threatened to cease cooperation with the Social Demo-
crats in Nov ember 1984, and the alternativ e fund w as seriously endangered.
Itw as savedonly because ev entually the two parti es decided to continue their
alliance for a further two y ears.
In the towns of Düsseldorf, Erlangen, Nürnberg, and Bremen, where Die
Grünen formed part of the local govenunents, special funds were set up ei-
ther for " alternative projects" in general, including cultural andsocial initia-
tives, or for encouraging the creation of jobs on the local market, reg ardless
of whether the enterprises were collectives or not. In applications for these
public funds, the regional Netzwerke often play ed the role of intermediary
between the public authorities and the collectives, a role that to some ex tent
revived the activities of the Netzwerke, which had diminished considerably.
In Berlin, the new Senate formed by a coalition of the Social Democratic
party and theAlternative Liste in February 1989 contributed DM 10 million
to a credit guarantee association set up by STATTwerke, which assumed lia-
bility for private and bank bans to collective enterprises. This association,
which had also received DM 1 million from the Protestant church and ERP-
countersecurities, was one of the cornerstones for securing "Direct Credit
Procurement. "
The structures of collective finance, confusing as they tnight appear to the
external observer, all have several common characteristics: in particular,
they rely on the commitmentof political supporters, and they try to makecol-
lectiv es as independent as possible from state and bank intervention. Espe-
cially in this last respect, alternative collectives distinguished themselves
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quite clearly from cooperatives in Britain, which depended in the beginning
of the 1980s for financial support mostly on the state-funded Cooperative
Development Agencies (CDA). Nascent British cooperatives applied
through the regional CDA for founding and equipment grants, the lev el of
which depended upon the sympathy of the regional authorities towards coop-
erativ e ventures and upon the number of jobs they would create. In 1982, for
example, a toy-malcing cooperativ e in Lambeth receiv ed 13, 783 Pound Ster-
ling to set up an enterprise with sev en workers. 2 The CDAs gave advice on
the financial set-up and on the legal charter. Depending upon the political
orientation of the agency, this advice pushed cooperatives toward adopting
hierarchical or strictly egalitarian structures. As a "sensible occupation for
young people on the dole," cooperatives in Britain were ev en advocated by
the Thatcher government. They also fitted in w ell w ith the Conserv ativ e ide-
ology of "workers having a stake in business" — profit-sharing was seen as
the best incentive to work (Wajcman, u. p.: 6).
In a socialist economy such as Yugoslavia, it was the rule that
labour-managed enterprises w ereinitiated and encourageclby goy emmental
bodies, which determined the organisational form and decreed that property
in capital and machinery must be socialised. Before 1965, a Yugoslav firm
had to pay 60 percent of its income to government agencies, which then dis-
tributed it as credit and subsidies to the enterprises they wished to encourage
(Comisso 1979:73). After 1965, this tax was reduced to 30 percent, and the
autonomy of the firms increased considerably as they now had to bear die
consequences of their business decisions in the form of profits and fosses
(Comisso 1979:74). As a consequence, tensions arose between the planned
and market elements of the Yugoslav economy. As the capital: labour ratio
began to vary considerably from firm to firm, the incomes they could offer
also differed. Skilled workers were attracted by the wealthy firms, whereas
the poorer ones lost out in die competition. The weaker firms, which were
not competitive in the market, claimed state protection, w hile the more suc-
cessful ones demanded greater market freedom, but at the same iime also
tried to profit from state support (Comisso 1979: 213).
The role of the state in respect to investment is subject to debate among
theoreticians writing about labour-managed firms. Criticizing the actual
Yugoslav labour-managed economy, Vanek sees an egalitarian political and
economic system compromised by the increasing differences between finns
and regions. He w ants investments to be entirely financed from outside (Va-
nek 1977:172). Enterprises should contribute to a national fund, which
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would then set up new firms, equilibrate the capital-labour ratio in the natio-
nal economy, and free the enterprises from the obligation to reconcile div er-
ging interests with new investments.
More cautious in their assessmentof external financing by banks and gov-
errunent authorities, Eger and Weise (1978: 168), warn thatlabour-managed
enterprises might lose their self-detennination. While the w orkers are temp-
ted to shuffle off some of the capital risks to the Tenders, the credit-giv ers in
turnw ant to keep control ov er the economic rentability of the enterprise. The
firm is often obliged to submit to control mechanisms that interfere with its
interna! organisation. The British women's cooperative at Fakenham, for
instance, w as at first sponsored through bans from Scott Barber Coopera-
tiv e Association on condition that a male director be employed (Wajcman
1983: 64).
Technological Standards and Competition
The degree to which collectives accept innovation and accumulation as "nat-
urel" laws of the capitalist market, which they must follow if they are to sur-
vive rather than ignoring the logic of the market altogether, can be used to
differentiate collective enterprises and their market strategies.
In discussions between members of collectives with a low level of invest-
ment and those with a high one, the members of the "poorer" collectives
readily daim that they are following the purer line because they make fewer
concessions to the capitalist market and do not accumulate capital. Members
of the" wealthier" collectives usually reply that not to repl ace ol d machinery
means running down the enterprise.
Collectives like Oktoberdruck, KoMet, and Wuseltronick set out to com-
pete on the open market with other business enterprises. Oktoberdruck, in
particular, made large investments to raise the lev el of the technology to that
of their competitors, and is now trying to enlarge its circle of customers to
make the machines pay for themselves. Collectives like agitdruck,
Contraste, and many others prefer to produce for a circle of politically inspi-
redcustomers. They do not inv est in new machines and therefore have fewer
fixed costs. Without holding money in reserve, they basically live "from
hand to mouth."
In the spring of 1984, at one of the bordkreis 3
 (the weekly meetings of
Berlin collectives), the different standpoints were put forward in a heated
discussion. Members of collectives had corne together to discuss a request
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from theAlternative liste tooutline their economic interests in, and political
standpoints on, an economic programme for West Berlin. A controversy
arose over the question of Berlin subsidies (Berlinzulagen), subsidies of 30
percent granted to Berlin enterprises if they invested in new machiner) , .
Members of financially weak collectives demanded that these subsidies
should be abolished, as they favoured only those enterprises capable of
buying new machines and placed at a disadvantage enterprises like their
own, which bought exclusively second-hand equipment. They denounced
this law as being a typical offshoot of the society of consumption, which sub-
sidized the throwing away of old machines that still worked and coul d stillbe
used. They argued that encouraging inv estment in more modern technol ogy
would only lead to rationalizing still more jobs out of existence and deman-
ded that the subsidies for modern technology should be replaced by money
for each new job created.
The better-funded collectives, and Oktoberdruck in particular, which
were regularly replacing their machines as soon as they became outmoded,
judged these subsidies to be important for any Berlin enterprise. The subsi-
dies conferred advantages that w.ere badly needed if a Berlin concernwanted
to compete in the West German market. Their argument w as strictly in tenus
of market-logic, a logic the poorer collectives fundamentally contested
The discussion developed into a clash of principlei. Referring to the ideo-
logical quarrels inside the party Die Grünen, the conflict was expressed in
terrils of "fundamentalists" against "realists." The fundamentalist current
of the party, grouped around Rudolf Bahro, call ed for a radical change in so-
cial and economic structures without any compromise with the "System." It
called for consumption abstinence and a radical opposition to the squander-
ing of resources. The realists argued that change w as only possible progres-
sively and only if they managed to survive in the " System, " thereby encour-
aging the population with practical examples of successful change.
Two Opposing Business Strategks
The split of agitdruck in 1974 is probably the most striking case of a collec-
tive being divided over the question of competing on the open market. The
split created two independent enterprises, which have followed entirely op-
posite business strategies for fourteen y cars.
Ev en in 1972, the members of the small printing col lectiv eagitdruckwere
divided in their attitude toward inv estrnents. Two members w ho w ere study -
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ing printing engineering, Marlis and Constantin, wantedtheenterpriseto ac-
cept more orders for printing books and to switch from the occasional pro-
duction of leaflets, booklets, and small newspapers to a more regular work-
style. They were investing more time and energy than any of their col-
leagues, for the other members did not regard printing as their career but ba-
sed their professional prospects on their tmiversity education. For the latter,
on the contrary, the printing of left-wing literature turned away by business
printing shops, and the unpaid work for the political groups they were sup-
porting, meant a contribution to the political struggle, not a job to earn a liv-
ing. Furthermore, the collective charter established that priority was to be
giv en to the members' studies. Members who were taking examinations
continued to be paidw ithout being obliged to work, and the usual work week
was 20 hours.
When, in 1972, at the insistence of Marlis and Constantin, a second-hand
R20 printing press was purchased for DM 20, 000, the pressure of work in-
creased. The student members, w ho had initially obj ected to titis investment,
were especially critical, saying that the incoming orders were becoming
more commercial and that the production process was being subdivided. As
most of the members worked part-time, the coordination of larger orders
was difficult. Work on orders was started by some members, who had the
relevant instructions direct from the customer, but had to be fmished by
others, w ho did not The re.sultw as low quality products and a stressful work
situation.
Nevertheless, a y ear later Constantin insisted on a fresh investment in a
new and more powerful printing press worth DM 125, 000. In a paper which
he presented to the collective in the spring of 1973, he explainecl his reasons:
Work in a collective is also work under capitalist conditions, as it means pro-
ducing for the market. Because of the constant technological progress of our
competitors, it is nec,essary to replace old machinery in order to survive. The
socialist elements inagitdruckarehmited to the printing of material for pol iti-
cal propaganda and to a collective method of production and appropriation of
the surplus. As a result, market mechanisms cannotbenegjected, as left-wing
customers go to capitalist printing firms if they are cheaper.
Constantin felt hew as wasting a great deal of timeproducing commercial
orders on the old, slow machines, and he w as ready to put in a period of liard
work to pay off the investment in new machinery. How ever, his argument
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did not meet with the approv al of the other members. When he realized his
inability to convince them, he and Marlis ordered the new machine behind
their backs. This breach of collective conventions was answered by exclu-
sion. Marlis and Constantin had to leave, talcing with them the new machine
and the accompanying financial obligations.
Printing as a Political Contribution: Agitdruck
For the part sixte-en years, agitdruckhas continued to existwithout changing
its attitude toward investments. All revenues from the enterprise are passed
on directly to the members without setting aside any reserv es for the replace-
ment of machiner), . The collective survived in a market-niche, printing
mainly propaganda material for left-wing and, later, ecologist customers,
who did not expect high quality products. Only a few members w ere capable
of producing reasonably good quality output on the old printing presses;
none hadprofessional training, and in addition, the old machines were mal-
functioning.
The collectiv ewould probably not hav e survived at allhad it not become a
victim of persecution in a 1978 political campaign. Having printed an ex-
terne left-wing new spaper, infobug, which ex amined the use of violence in
political action, the four printers were sent to prison for eight months. Their
sentence was heav ily criticized in liberal and left-wing circl es, and the pers e-
cution of agitdruckbecame know n throughoutEurope as an ex ampleof West
German censorship. Its case was supported by the Russell Tribunal, and
large contributions were collected to continue the enterprise w hile the prin-
ters w ere in prison. In the meantime, the collective w as run by former mem-
bers who came back to help out. From the money collected, a new printing
press was purchased, and the collective was for months well supplied with
orders from left-wing publishers.
The ties of agit-members to "their" collective were marked by a great
sense of generosity. A former member of agitdruck, Sabine, who had wor-
ked w ith the collectiv e from 1972 to 1975, came back in 1978 to keep up pro-
duction w hile the agitdruck printers were in prison. She worked for a y ear
without taking any money from the collective, living  off unemploy ment ben-
efits, and ev en gave her signature as responsible for the bill for the new print-
ing press.
Following the 1978 crisis and the subsequent period of relative economic
success, no major improvements were made to the enterprise' s technical
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equipment. Members who suggested the need for further investments were
accused of " Constantinism," meaning putting the economic interests of the
enterprise before its political ones. The majority s611 regarded their work
there as a temporary occupation and did not want to be burdened with the fi-
nancial obligations that would be incurred by purchasing new equipment.
Those who wanted to make a career out of printing did not stay long, and
those who remained were unskilled, so that the economic situation was fre-
quently unstable.h only improved during large political campaigns, such as
that against the population census of 1983/84, w hen the campaign organisors
had a large part of their material printed by agitdruck.
Since the end of the 1970s, agitdruckmembers hav eceased to div ide their
time between work and study. In 1984, they were working full-time for a
monthly salary of DM 1,000 net, about DM 300 less than the Oktoberdruck
printers earned. Despite this change, the business strategy remained basi-
cally the same.
Competing on the Open Market: Oktoberdruck
The investment policier of Oktoberdruckwere influenced over the years by
its founder, Constantin. From 1974 to 1978, he, togetherw ith his friend Die-
ter, was theonly associateofthecompany. The central coreof threefounders
— the third being Marlis, who did not have the format status of associate —
made the investment decisions, although sometimes up to twenty -four peo-
ple worked in the enterprise. The other workers were treated like ordinary
employées and were paid salaries as per tariff. They were mainly members
of the Trotskyist group TID, which Oktoberdruck supported with cheap
printing faciales.
In 1975, the enterprisepurchased an Al two-colour, or perfecting, Miller
printingpress for DM 250,000. This purchase heavily indebted the collec-
tive as it did not possess any financial resources of its own. It w as helped,
though, by the 32.5 percent Berlin subsidy. From 1976 to 1977, the order in-
flow was excellent, as Oktoberdruckwas printing the local newspapers
and Tip, and the feminist journal Courage. The owners had to employ pro-
fessional printers who knew how to operate theMiller press, which was run
in shifts to make it pay its way. The enterprise was flourishing with the
growth of the newspapers but was spending too much on salaries as the num-
ber of workers w as constantly increasing. But in 1977 the newspaper Tip had
become so large that its organisera decided to switch to a printing shop with
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roll offset. Oktoberdruckthereby lost one of its most important customers at
a point when its financial obligations exceeded its reserv es. However, the
other newspaper, Zitty, filled the gap with its own grow th, and the order in-
flow remained gond until the financial insolvency of June 1979, as a result of
which the firm had to be entirely restructured.
The present Oktoberdruckcollective started in 1980 from the ruins of the
old one. Only part of the newspaper.aty remained a customer of the new col-
lective, which disposed of the advanced technological equipment of the for-
mer enterprise and of a rather secure circle of customers. Constantin stayed
the nominal owner of theMiller printingpress and all the equipment that the
collective rented from him, this rent allowing him to repay the outstanding
debts. As it was worlcing with professional machinery and had indirectly ta-
ken over the financial obligations, the collective had right from the start to
adopt a professional work-style. At the end of 1981, it purchased a smaller
two-colour G70 printingpress in its own narre, which w as of the same tech-
nological standard as the Miller press. A new Miller press w as purchased in
exchange for the older one and remained Constantin' s property. . New mem-
bers were chosen from among professional printers; two shifts at theMiller
press were maintained; and the standards of quality were set comparatively
high.
Olctoberdruck' s customers came from much wider circles than those of
agitdruck. Among them were publishers issuing photobooks and artprints,
which required high quality printing. Ev en the left-wing publishers beg an
putting greater emphasis on aesthetic criteria as the market for purely politi-
cal literature became narrower. Oktoberdruck competed directly for their
customers with ordinary business firms. For this purpose two members, Ma-
rita and Donald, went in Cttober 1983 to the annual Frankfurt bookfair.
They returned home with new contacts with prospective customers and the
firm conviction that continuous adv ertisement w as necessary in order to sur-
vive.
The Trademark: Creating a Market Niche
The specific links members of collectives establishw ith their al ternativ e cus-
tomers go beyond mere economic exchange. Favours and services, and the
pursuit of cortunon political aims, make these relationships multilayered and
long-term, approaching what Blau called " social exchange," character-
ized by unspecific obligations that " involv es the principle that one person
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"Could you please pay this Lime within three or four months! We are starving! "
does another a fav our and w hile there is a g eneral expectation of some future
return its exact nature is definitely not stipulated in advance... Only social
exchange tends to engender feelings of personal obligation, gratitude and
trust that purely economic exchange as such does not." (Blau 1964:91)
While contemporary market transactions are dominated by depersonal-
ized economic relations, the collective enterprises build their market stra-
tegy upon the reintroduction of values of utility and morality. In offering
trustworthy product information, special repair services, and toleration for
delay in payment, collective practice is not var) , different from the customer
service of certain stnall modernbusiness enterprises. The difference, how e-
ver, lies in the common politie,alaim of collectives and their politically moti-
vated customers to create mutually supportive relationships in order to pro-
mote the production of socially and ecologically useful items and to favour
collective structures of production.
To reduce competition and form a conunon stand against business enter-
prises that may intrude into their market niche, collectives form unions and
are planning to agree upon a collectiv e label. Collectives of the same branch,
whose potential customers look for the serv ices of a" collectiv e" for political
reasons, have a far greater need to form unions and delimit their identity by
using trademarks than collectiv es producing for ordinary customers and bu-
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siness enterprises.
Only a few months after their separation, agitdruck and Oktoberdruck
ceased competing w ith one another and agreed to cooperate. Four new print-
ing collectives have since been founded, and Oktoberdruck is one of those
equipped with the highest technology. For all these printing collectives, po-
litically motivated customers were, to a greater or fesser extent, the basis of
their clientele, since some of the radical 1 eft-w ing publishers hav e al so taken
to producing artbooks and novels. For printing collectives like agitdruck,
there still seems to be more "value" in printing a leafl et fora political group
with which they sympathize than in producing a commercial book. Printing
collectives like Oktoberdruck, however, seem to have developed a more
professional pride in the perfect completion of a difficult order. Oktober-
druck' s circle of customers is courted, too, not only by business enterprises
but also by one of the new collectives, Bloch und Partner.
When Bloch und Partner, with their high-quality machinery, started to
become a serious threat to Oktoberdruck, both groups decided that regular
meetings of all six Berlin printing collectives should be cal led to convert la-
tent competition into cooperation. In the first sessions in 1983, they com-
pared prices, turnover, and results and tried to ascertain the advantages or
dis adv antages of their respectiv e org anis ational forms. Itw as concluded that
each woul d send customers they were unable to serve to one of the other col-
lectives. They decided to make advantageous purchases in common and to
keep each other informed about opportunities tobuy second-hand machinery
from bankrupt firms.
However, a conflict arose in the surnmer of 1983 after Constantin heard of
a bankrupt screen-printing enterprise that was for sale at an extremely low
price. He tried to find people w il ling to take it ov er as a collectiv e but metw ith
resistance from the only other screenprinting collective in Berlin, Graph
Druckula, which dreaded a competitor and wished to buy the rundow n enter-
prise' s powerful screen-printing machine for itself. Without consulting
Graph Druckula any further, Constantin found six unemployed printers,
with littl e experience in screen-printing, who w ere willing to work together
without having previously known one another. Constantin organised the
purchase of the firm with money from the leasing society (see chapter 5).
The new collective, akut, became the first to be foundedlargely on the ini-
tiative of an outsider. However, the attempt almost failed when one of the
most experienced members left it. Hidden tensions with Graph Druckula
continued until the new collective turned to it for help and advice. Graph
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Druckula then realised that akut was addressing a rather different circle of
customers, as it w as printing on much larger formats. It then readily offered
to check their screen-printing machine and to adv ise them on the purchase of
colours and papers.
When Oktoberdruck proposed to introduce a label for all printed goods
produced collectively, relationships between the collectives became
strained. Tite Oktoberdruck printers hoped that this label would encourage
publishers with left-wing customers sympathetic toward collectives to give
them preference when placing orders. How ev er, the collective Bloch und
Partner objected that they might losecustomers — instead of gaining more —
if they had to produce under the same label as agitdruck, which was know n
for its low quality output They argued that products from alternative enter-
prises shouldbe of high quality in order to prove that collectives were able to
produce as good if notbetter quality output than ordinary firms. The discus-
sion about the label for collective products reached an impasse as agitdruck,
the oldest printing collective, could not be excluded.
The number of printing collectives inWestBerlin is still sufficiently small
so they do not inhiba each other seriously in the market and are able to turn
their latent competition into cooperation. The situation is more sev ere, how-
ev er, among thecollectivewholegrainbakeries. The firstones w ere founded
in the raid-seventies by people wanting to promote healthfoods, and espe-
cially wholegrains, as a first step toward a more natural and healthy life-
style. The bakety collectives multiplied considerably in the 1980s, and their
products were increasingly imitated by ordinal) , noncollective bakeries.
The result is an ov ererowdedmarketwhere each new bakery collectiv eis felt
as a threat to the existing ones.
In January 1985, the five bicycle collectives in Berlin, together with a
number of West Gennan bicycle collectives, founded a union that organises
regular meetings and common wholesale facilities. 13y buying bicycles in
larger quantities, they are able to obtainbetter conditions from the manufac-
turers and to be more successful in their own local markets, where they have
to competew ith a dense network of ordinary cycleshops. Some of the bicy cl e
collectives were activ ely involv ed in traffic politics, w hich brought them the
sympathies of ecologist circles and a stock of regular customers.
For the members of theFahrradBüro, thecustomers w ere their central in-
terest, and the political aim of their work w as to educate them in traffic poli-
tics, transmitting a critical attitude toward the product and a basic knowledge
of the technology they were buying. Apart from the more politically aware
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customers, the people w ho preferred to buy the more expensiv e cy cl es in the
FahrradBuro, instead of going to the cheaper department stores, w ere w ell-
off, middle-class customers who esteemed the repairs service and honest ad-
vice available. They created a relationship of diffuse commitment and reci-
procal obligation still typical of some traditional handicraft and neighbou-
rhood industries that follow the maxim: "Honesty is the best policy" (Fox
1974 :157).
To help familiarise their customers with the simple technology of theirbi-
cycles, the collectiv egav e them the opportunity to use the repair shop and its
tools free of charge once aw eek and to repair their bicycles under the instruc-
tion of a collectivist The members hoped their customers would develop a
preference for goods and spare parts that coul d be repaired, instead of hav ing
to be thrown away at the slightest defect.
Starting with thebicycle, anew consciousness coul d develop, anew approach
to technology; wewant to encourage a new stratum of buyerswho arevety cri-
tical in their purchases andwho might influence the developmentof a different
technology. So thatwecanpressurethewholesaler tosell, for instance, adjus-
table pedals instead of the non-4 ustable ones, ta pressure in turn the manu-
facturers, so that they at least make repairable parts. Another collective in the
Waldemarstrasse held the principle of selling only good locks, because they
took the view that bad locks were mere deceit Now some customers want
cheap locks, and I don't know whether I should relieve them of the responsi-
bility for their purchase and spoonfeed them each time with information, or
whether I should give it to them only if they ask. Information is also part of the
self-help day, however, we don't get paid for giving information in this so-
ciety. ( Mathias, FahrradBüro, 22.5.1984)
Themembers of theFahrradBüro explained that they w eretry ing tomake
an active contribution toward a criticism of "the society of waste" by repai-
ring bicycles, or their parts, w hich other shops w ould notbe willing to under-
take. They did this despite the fact that it is much more profitableto sell an en-
tirely new rear wheel than to spend two hours repairing its hubspindle. The
department stores in the ward profitted from this attitude. As it is unprofita-
ble for them to maintain a service section, they send their customers to the
FahrradBiiro to have their carelessly treated, low -quality cycles repaired,
and they afterwards refund the customers for the cost of the repairs. The col-
lectivisas have to cope with the dilemma of, on the one hand, refusing to be
exploited and, on the other, not wanting to turf' away a customer with a bro-
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ken cycle.
There is no doubt that we repair bikes soldby specialized dealers. But it's get-
ting problematic with the department stores and svithEduscho. 4 None of us is
really consistent in that respect. Even Bernhard takes in the repairs if the cus-
tomer stands in the shop with tears in his eyes. (Ulrike, FahrradBüro,
16.12.1983)
This attitude stands in striking contrast to what Gouldner regarded as one
of the specific features of economic exchange.
Contempt for sentimentality is the hardening of the self to endure isolation in
order that one' s market options should not be pre-empted. (Gouldner
1971:387)
The special non-economic relationship between customers and collectivists
is two-sided. Not only do the customers support collectives ev en if they are
slightly more expensive or slow er in filling an order, but thecollectiv ists al so
feel personally responsible for their customers, in a way similar to good tra-
ditional craftshops, which still have a personal relationship with their clien-
tele and take pride in what they make or self.
Producing for Ordinary Customers
There is no clear-cut boundary between customers who are politically moti-
vated and those w ho are not Most collectiv es serv eboth, though they gener-
ally prefer to produce for the" alternative market" mostrecent dev elop-
ments have brought into existence collectives that coyly hide their identity
behind an entirely neutral naine so as not to prejudice their chances among
ordinary customers. The printing collective Bloch und Partner is an exam-
ple. Instead of choosing aprovocative naine like its fellow collectives Okto-
berdruck or agitdruck, or a flamboyant one like Graph Druckula (derived
from the famous vampire, Graf Dracula), it selected the completely neutral
Bloch und Partners, which appears in every classified directory just like any
ordinary enterprise.
Another example is the newly founded cooperative for wind-energy and
electronics, whichgroups together Wuseltronickand three other collectiv es.
After long discussions, they decided to give themselves the conventional
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name Eutek, derived from the Greek meaning "beautiful technology, "
which stands in striking contrast to the name Wuseltronick, derived from wu-
seln ("fiddle," "fumble around" ) and electronics. The new name — well
designed to encourage respectable customers — promptly raised criticism
among the other collectives working with Wuseltronick in the Mehringhof.
They believed that the prefix " eu-" had been misused far too often in naming
Nazi institutions fora collective to include it in its name. Furthermore, tech-
nology was not beautiful in itself but often quite the opposite. The coopera-
tive accepted the criticism and promised to find another name. They fmally
decided upon die neutral marne Gerzossenschaft Berliner Ingenieurskollek-
tive (Cooperative of Berlin Engineers' Collectives).
There is no explicit rule about the customers collectives are supposed to
work for, but there is a firm tacit agreement that they should notproduce any
military equipment nor output for the police force or the prison service. Ko-
Met lost its most important customer in 1981 because they refused to build
the mould for shaping the housing of a police walkie-talkie. Wuseltronick,
how ev er, entered in 1984 into negotiations with Messerschmidt Bôlkow
Blohm (MBB), then the largest West German armaments combine, when it
was approached by them to develop a power transmission system between a
diesel engine and a windpow erpl ant for one of its subsidiary companies. The
collective decided, with reservations, that they w oul d enter into the deal only
for the sum of DM 400,000 — far higher than their usual rate — and only if
they remained the owners of the expertise. The contrast would have filled
their order book for the coming y ear, but ultimately it failed because the par-
ent company refused to pay such a high price.
13y negotiating with MBB, Wuseltronick viol ated one of the fundamental
principles of alternative production. Although the product they were asked
to develop w as an ecological one, it meant transferring skills and expertise to
a firm that w as following " ruthless capitalistbusiness strategies, " including
arms sales. However, instead of refusing the deal outright, they asked an ex-
cessive price. Being politically opposed to their business partners, they w an-
te(' to make as much money as possible out of them, asking, as itwere, apol i-
tically motivated surcharge. They also justified their decision with the ar-
gument that the product itself was not harmful. They predicted that the pro-
duction of wind-powered plants was not going to be profitable for MBB and
that it w oul d therefore not be able to transfer returns from this production to
other, harmful ones. They did not treatMBB as an ordinary business partner
for, when the parent company turned down the high price accepted by the
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subsidiary company, the collectivists refuser' to modify the amount asked.
Wuseltronick finally developed the power transmission system in coopera-
tion with the German car manufacturer Volkswagen and sponsored by the
Federal Ministry of Science and Technology (BMFT. Bundesninisterium
fiir Forschung und Technologie) and by the Senate of West Berlin. Accor-
ding to Eberhard of Wuseltronick,it w as the long negotiations w ithMBB that
had attracted the interest of the sponsors.
Nevertheless, when other collectives came to know of this, Wuseltronick
was severely criticised, and the collectives working on the sanie floor in the
Mehringhof called a meeting to discuss their business activities. Wuseltro-
nick'smembersjustified their reactions by saying that they had acquiredv a-
luabl e experience from their negotiations withMBB. They stressed that cer-
tainbusiness decisions had tobe takenby the members as abody becausethey
alone had to accept the consequences of these decisions. They also argued
that it was difficult to draw the line between rejectable and acceptable pro-
duction. Eberhard even maintained that " all productive activities inside the
sy stem were stuck in its filth. " For the future, they w ere unw Ming to agree to
disclose their business deals beforehand but prornised to discuss and explain
them afterwards.
This did not cause the expected degree of trouble. Those collectiv ists w ho
had corne to severely criticize Wuseltronick and to lead them back to the
"straight and narrow" were disarmed by feelings of helplessness, as they
were able to offer no alternative market strategy. Only three y ears earlier,
KoMet's production of tools for the making of crown-caps stirred up opposi-
tion in alternative circles; but in the meantime, the collectivists became more
aware of the problems of having to survive in a market situation and seem
more wary of criticising each other.
Toolmaking collectives like KoMet cannot choose their customers ac-
cording to whether or not they produce ecologically sound goods. The mar-
ket for industrial tools is narrow, and many West Berlin toolmaking firms
have had to close down in recent y ears. Al thoughKoMet members dreamt of
their own " useful" products, in the meantime they made cutting tools for ma-
chines that produced 200 plastic containers per hour, or moulds for the tail-
lights of cars. One of the few customers w ithw hose products they coul d iden-
tify was Mirotec, a firm manufacturing dialysis instruments.
Business firms came to KoMet because the toolmakers w ere fast and flexi-
ble in the execution of orders and willing to put in some overtime to attract
and to keep promising customers. The businessmen seemed to enjoy being
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treated in a more informai way . It was not only the " alternative" clients who
were usedto addressing the collectivists by the informai "Du" and w ho were
on first name terrils with them. Some of the "bourgeois" customers felt at
ease in the collective and enjoyedbeing show n the machinety or hav ing a cof-
fee in the kitchen. Some of theKoMet customers w how ere employ ed in w ell-
paid positions in business came to relive their ownleft-wing parts and admir-
ed nostalgically the collective forms of work. They became the most faithful
and comfortable customers a collective could have.
The dilemma in dealing with ordinary business firms lies, for some col-
lectives, in the fact that, ev end they do a reasonable job for w hich they can be
proud, this is then used for ends with which they dis agree. Thewoodworking
collective, Moabit, for instance, renovated an old building in Kreuzberg for
a building society. . The joiners enjoyed the task of preserving the oldwooden
structures, but they were upset about the building society' s speculations,
which would increase the rents on these premises to such an extent that the
old tenants would be unable to remain in the flats.
Conclusion
Collectives have to balance their ideological aims carefully against econom-
ic profitability. Some collective enterprises, like agitdruck and theFahrrad-
Miro, managed to attract a stable circle of loyal customers, which protected
them to a large extent from market pressures. Others, such as KoMet, had to
rely on ordinary customers for their economic surviv al. Most other collecti-
ves tried to maintain a market-niche of "alternative" customers as their se-
cure basis and open up toward ordinary clients to increase their profitability
They follow a similar economic strategy to the Merina of Madagascar,
whose strategies for finding cooperators for agricultural tasks were analysed
by Bloch (Bloch, M., 1973:83-85). TheMerina use the labour of kinsmen as
a secure labour force in reserve but try to engage as many nonkinsmen as pos-
sible to cultivate the fields. They can make a larger profit by manipulating
these short-term contracta, but they try to uphold primarily the more stable
and reliable kinship lies. 'The same is truc for collectives, which have to keep
up the moral links of political commitment if they want to be certain of relia-
ble financial help from political supporters and of a stable circle of "alterna-
tive" customers. One of the basic principles upholding this morality is that
the profits of collective enterprises cannot be individually appropriated.
The nineteenth century theoreticians writing on the economic behaviour
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of cooperativ es agreed that their ultimate interest is to maximise the returns
of their enterprises at the disadvantage of the consumers and that this ten-
dency can only be restrained by putting them into competition with one an-
other (Webb-Potter 1893:136; Oppenheimer 1922:131). The experiences
of Berlin collectives contradict this assumption at first sight How ever, Ber-
lin collectives are still a small minority among enterprises of their trade, and
they rely on cooperation between each other and on support from politically
motivated customers for their surv iv al on the market On the other hand, the
experience of the Yugoslavian economy, where labour-managed enterpri-
ses are dominant, show ed that competition became critical and led to  ex-
treme inequalities and tensions when the government released its control
over interna! business decisions (Comisso 1979:74).
Notes
1.Composed of five representatives of projects, five electedcontributors,
and Pive contributors chosen randomly.
2.Malcolm, Hackney CDA personal communication.
3.Lundla-eis is the informai meeting of members of collectives, whkh or-
ganised national meetings and fairs and initiated the collective bulletin con-
traste. It w as started by collectivists w ho had participated in an international
meeting of alternative projects in Lund (Sweden).
4.FAIscho is achainof coffee shops thatsoldextremely cheap bicycles for
a few months to promote their coffee; customers had to assemble these cycles
themselves.
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Investment and Consumption
Collective property — machinery and equipment — should not belong to in-
div idual members of collectives as their marketablegoods but shoul d be used
and controlled by them only as long as they work in the enterprise. If they
leave, ev en after y cars of work, they are not allowed to take with them any
share in the "neutralised" (neutralisiert: not attributed to any owner) com-
pany capital, which should be exclusively used for production. This w as the
principle decided upon by most collectives at their foundation.
In building up the enterprise, maintaining and increasing its capital and
improving the technological standard of thé equipment, all members have to
forego earnings that would hav ebeen spent on immediate consumption. The
capitalist opposition between capital and labour expresses itself as the oppo-
sition between investment and consumption. Tensions arise between those
members whose aim is to expand and build up the enterprise and thosewho
want a decent salary now and do not care so much about investments for the
future.
This contradiction appears in all labour-managed enterprises inw hich the
equipment and capital funds cannotbecome the priv ateproperty of the mem-
bers but is " productiveproperty" whichcanbe usedbut not sold. If an inv est-
ment is tobeentirely self-financed, capital for new purchases has tobe accu-
mulated by members w ho may then have left the enterprise by the time the
new equipment is bought The readiness to forego personal spending for col-
lective accumulation differs considerably, depending on personal commit-
ment, consumption habits, and the length of time a person expects to remain
in the enterprise.
Over the y ears, some collective enterprises have acquired considerable
wealth through the efforts of their members. Some are now worth several
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hundred thousand German marks, a sum which is not great for a medium-
sized firm but which represents many limes what any of the members has
ever privately owned. Problems of private appropriation arise when mem-
bers leave the collective to become reintegrated into the dominant economy
and its logic of private ownership.
Legal Forms of Collective Property
"Abolition," "neutralisation," and "socialisation" of property were fre-
quently used concepts among collectivists — who owned hardly anything —
and among intellectuals — who sympathised with the idea of an alternative
economy. One of the latter, Marlene ICück, defines neutralised property as
"no title to property at all, neither individual nor collective. The enterprise
belongs to itself and the staff holds it in trust" (Kück 1985:23). In the begin-
ning, the few resources possessedby enterprises w ere not generally cl aimed
as the private property of any individual. The accepted principle was that
" the owner is any onew ho w orks here. " This principle, how ev er, was not se-
cured by any corresponding legal form in the German legislation applicable
to enterprises. Most collectiv es, therefore, were set upwith one or more for-
mal owners, in the conviction that the principle of " socialised" property
wouldbe respected. A deep-rooted suspicion of the existing leg al system and
the rejection of "bourgeois laws" made collectivists think of legal forms as
administrative chicanery.
The first model projectto dev elop tsuly socialisedproperty was Mehring-
hof, a complex of old factory buildings in Kreuzberg. It was bought in 1978
for DM 2 million to become a centre for alternative activities. Today, Meh-
ringhofhouses thirty-eightproj ects, ranging from a school for adults, a thea-
te, and a printing collective to the electronics collective, Wuseltronick. The
money for thepurchasewas donatedanonymously by wealthy sympathisera.
Mehringhoftook the legal form of a company with limited liability (GmbH);
it did not belong to named owners and was managed by the assembly of te-
nants, whopaid rent to the society for the maintenance of the buildings. The
tenants made common decisions about the admittance of new tenants, rent in-
creases, and joint maintenance work.
Although the productive collectives admired Mehringhof s model, they
wereunable to irnitate it as they had no donated initial capital. Most of the col-
lectiv es startedwith almost no initial capital at all. They went through a slow
process of accumulation, having to rely on small gifts and bans from friends
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and relatives. They used second- or third-hand machinery and compensated
for their lack of capital by investing their own unpaid labour. Most coul d not
obtainordinary bank loans as they were unable to offer sufficient g uarantees.
Neither w ere they able tochoose the legal form of a company withlimited lia-
bility (GmbH Gesellschaft mit beschrânkter Haftutig), as to do so minimum
equity capital cover of DM 50,000 is required. The most widespread legal
form taken by collectives was that of GbR (Gesellschaft bürgerlichen
Rechts), the society of civil law.' For this, no initial capital had to be raised
but all associates had to use their private property as a guarantee. Associates
of societies of civil law had the legal status of employees, had no social insur-
ance, and had their incomes taxed at the same high rate as company profits.
Because of these disadvantages, generally only one or two of the members
became associates. They were the format owners, financially responsible,
while the others had the status of employees.
Although in most collectives all members initially agreed that this legal
arrangement would be simply a formality — everybody was paid the same
net w ag e and thereforefelt themselv es to be equal owners of the enterprise —
the real legal owners had more effectivepow er than other members and often
fel t more responsible for the enterprise and its financial success. To a large
extent, they were the informai spokesmen and initiators, more at ease in dea-
ling with other organisations. The legal status of owners not only reinforced
their position as informai leaders, but sometimes led to them transforming
the collective into their own private enterprise. The short history of alterna-
tive enterprises is full of examples of formai owners becoming the actual
ones. Describing aconflictoverproperty in aWest Gennancommunity, Jar-
chow and Klugmann (1980:35) review the problem: "The conflict made ob-
vious to the others that the community had been built on personal feelings —
and therefore, in the case of conflict, built on sand. When feelings and rel a-
tionships no longer coincided as in the past, somebody had to go — and it
would not have been the owner."
Many of the present collectives have learned from the negative experi-
ences of their predecessors, and accord greater importance to the legal form
they adopt. Some collectives have now changed their legal status to that of a
society of limited liability. With this status, all members can become asso-
ciates as well as employees, and this legal form prov ides a certain protection
of company property against the individual daims of associates while also
protecting the individual members against outside daims in die event of the
enterprise' s financial collapse. Special clauses can be inserted into the char-
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ter that make unanimity or athree-quarters majority necessary to dissolve the
company. But, as the whole charter can be changed, these clauses cannot
protect the property of the collective once and for all from privatisation.
Unlike British legislation, West German law does not tnake provision for
protecting from private appropriation enterprises that are not privately ow-
ned. The 1 egal backup thel3erlin collectives w ish to achiev e, to guarantee de-
mocratic decision-making and " socialised" property, exists in Britain in the
legal form of " common ownership cooperative," introduced by the Labour
Government in 1976 (Industrial Common Ownership Act, 1976, Chapter
78). This prescribes that the enterprise is w holly owned and controlled by its
workforce. Outsiders are not allowed to own a share in the firm. Each mem-
ber has one vote and one share worth one pound only. Cooperativ e property
cannot be acquired for personal gain, and if the enterprise is sol d the money
has to go to a charity. Although ev en this legal form does not provide a com-
plete guarantee against private appropriation — members can, for example,
decide to pay each other such high salaries that the cooperative capital is used
up — it protects the collective principles if the majority of the members re-
mains dedicated to them.
Theleg al form in Germany that cornes clos est to the Bri tish common ow n-
ership cooperatives, the Genossenschaft, 2 has been increasingly adapted to
the form of a shareholding company (Aktiengesellschaft). In the Genossens-
chaft, provisions can be made so that each member, the minimum being sev -
en, has only one vote in the general meeting of the shareholders, conse-
quently a leaving member cannot take out more than his or her nominal
share. How ever, the amendment to the legal form of Genossenschaften in
1973 included the possibility both of a plural vote and of paying interest on in-
v ested capital. The general meeting of shareholders lost its authority to issue
directives, and the autonomy of the ex ecutiv e boardw as reinforced in a man-
ner similar to that of a shareholding company (Flieger 1984:258). Theselast
two legal conditions have proved incompatible with the democratic princi-
ples of collective enterprises. The attempts of most collectives to have their
democratic charters accepted by the cooperative union (Getiossenschafts-
verband) were rejected because they had accorded overriding authority to
the general meeting.
The cooperative unions, the senior organisations grouping all Genos-
senschaften, are today dominatedby the largeGenossenschaften, such as the
cooperative banks Raiffeisen and Volksbanken and the cooperative retail
chain Konsum, which function in a similar way to ordinary shareholding
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companies. They are notv ery interested in the integration of small, econom-
ically weak members with radically left-wing views. They are afraid of lo-
sing their reputation for respectability and therefore examine very closely
the viability of every enterprise wishing to become a Genossenschaft (Flie-
ger 1984:259). Numerous newly founded collectives have been unable to
overcome this resistance.
However, the beginnings of the cooperative movement in Germany were
much more radical. In the nineteenth century, Genossenschaften were con-
sidered one of the past achievements and present pillars of the labour move-
ment. Although at the end of the century they were discarded by the social ist
party as irrelevant for furthering radical social change, a few continued to
exist in a more or less pure form until the National Socialisas came to power
and eliminated them. The y ears of Nazi rule destroy ed the structures and tra-
ditions of the cooperative movements. Some consumer cooperatives were
founded after thewar, but they nev er g ained the same political importance as
the earlier ones, although they were economically successful.
The cooperative movement in Germany started in the nineteenth century
on a very small scale and was seriously undercapitalized. However, as Op-
penheimer (1922:71) points out, the small size of the Genossenschaften w as
an important factor in their success. Small groups with fewer than twelve
members lasted longer and were less caught up in the "iron law of transfor-
mation" into capitalist enterprises (Oppenheimer 1922:64). Many Genos-
senschaften developed slow ly into associations of entrepreneurs, as the sha-
ring out of profits was exclusively linked to capital shares, not to work per-
formance. If a member left, he or she could still remain an associate, or even
sell his or her share for a higher price. So after a few years of fluctuating
workforce membership, many shares were held by people no longer wor-
king in the enterprise. If the Genossenschaft became affluent and able to pay
a high dividend on its shares, the members became reluctant to div ide the
profit between more associates and therefore restricted access to the shares
by employing wage-labour instead. Less profitable Genossenschaften, on
the other hand, had many members but few of themw ere actually producing;
in addition, they employed a few wage-labourers.
In both developments, the capital became dissociated from the labour.
The surplus produced by the members and nonmembers who were actually
working in the enterprise was largely taken by nonworking associates. This
emergence of new capitalists is what Oppenheimer (1922:16) means by the
" iron I aw of transformation," suggesting that the cooperativ e mov ement had
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done nothing tobetter the lot of workers as aw hole. In 1892, of the seventeen
German Genossenschaft, only one had kept its ideal form with all the wor-
kers as shareholders and all the shareholders workers. Oppenheimer
(1922: 163) proposed thatworking in a Genossenschaft shouldbeclosely lin-
ked to being an associate, so that shares in the profit should be distributed ac-
cording to the work done and not according to the capital brought in.
The present collectives in West Berlin are structured in the way that Op-
penheimer would have approved of. They follow the principle that every-
body w ho works in the enterprise must become an associate and loses his
right of ownership if he stops working . Capital brought in does not" work. "
It is not remuneratedbutpaidbackwith simple bank interest As no formal le-
gal structure exists to embody these aims, collectives have startedto experi-
ment with complicated legal constructions, such as leasing societies, asso-
ciations acting as holdings for societies of limited liability, Genossenschaf-
ten, composed of several collective enterprises.
The collective daily new spaper die tageszeitung, for instance, consists of
four societies of limitedliability, al I ofwhose capital is controlledby an asso-
ciation of trustees composed of the permanent working members and of peo-
ple w ho w ork occasionally for. the new spaper. The relatively high initial cap-
ital needed to start a daily newspaper was raised through donations, collec-
tions, and later, by subscription; this is now considered" socialised" proper-
ty, which means that it does not belong to anybody. The actual working
members do not own it; they manage the finances but cannot sell the newspa-
per or any part of itw ithout the consent of the association. Thew eak points of
the structure, how ev er, are the societies of limited liability, some members
of which have to be shareholding associates. They might be able to daim
their purely nominal share as private property if they contested this in court.
According to the collectiv e' s accountant, fortunately, nobody had ever
thought of this possibility, let alone attempted to put it into practice.
To protect the property — machiner), and equipment — from financial
breakdowns and private takeover bids, members of the alternative advisory
office STA7Twerke , together with Fritz of KoMet and Constantin of Okto-
berdruck, founded a collective leasing society in 1983. Collectives can be-
corne members by donating their machiner), to the society or by purchasing
new machines through it. After a probatory period, the collectives then lose
direct property rights over their machines but can still decide to replace them
with new ones. The maintenance of old machines and the purchase of new
ones is fmanced by the leasing rates paid by members to the society.
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Members must respect certain organisational principles: they are not al-
lowed to employ wage labour, they should not have hierarchical structures
within the collective, etc. Breach of collectiv e conv entions, such as attempts
to privatise collectiveproperty, entails the confiscati on of the inv ested assets
without compensation. Up to 1988, only two collectives had joined the leas-
ing society, one because of serious financial difficulties and the other to fi-
nance the machinery it needed to get started. Not even the collectives to
which the initiators belonged, KoMet and Oktoberdruck, had become mem-
bers, as they feared the extra administrative work involved when serving on
theboard of the leasing society and the possibil ity of losing control over their
property.
West German business legislation protects the capital and its holders.
Ev en if in a shareholding company, the owner of shares no longer personally
takes part in the decisions of the enterprise; his interests are upheld by law
and the almost impersonal capital shares are " served" with dividends. The
law prescribes that the ultimate responsibility for and control over the enter-
prise lies w iththosew ho ow n it. Most collectiv ists, on the other hand, w ant to
"neutralise" the property of the means of production and give control over
the enterprise to those w ho work in it If the primary aim of law in capitalist
society is to "protect the sanctity of individual life and the sanctity of pro-
perty, " as Leach (1977:32) has pointed out, and if the most important goal of
collective agreements is toprotect the basic equality of the different individ-
uals and to abolish property as capital and as an instrurnent oflabour, then the
two systems of values are contradictory. As Leach (1977:29) w rote, "For-
mol law presupposes the existence of a degree of public consensus which
does not in fact exist " Al though collectives do not move outside the law, as
do the terrorists in Leach' s example, they =mot protect their interests and
values entirely by means of the legal system controlled by the state.
As Pospisil (1971:101) has pointed out, several legal systems can coexist
within a single society and complement, supplement, or conflict with each
other. If collectivists attempt to secure their concept of "neutralised" pro-
perty against the dominant social and leg al practice, they act on a differentle-
gal level. They can efforce their concept of property inside the subgroup
composed of collectives and of their political supporters. But the sanctions
they can use are "jurai" and not" legal" ones — to use Radcliff-Brow n' s dis-
tinction (1952:205-211). Whereas the dominant West German law can be
enforced by a tribunal backed by a monopoly of force, the ultimate coercive
means a collective can employ against a deviant member is his or her exclu-
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sion from the group and exposure to ridicule and criticism in the alternative
scene. When members break entirely with the collective ethos, they can
switch bock to the legal lev el . They can then try to impose the dominant social
concept of private property through the courts, claiming that part of the col-
lective property should be paid out to them individually.
The most conunon attitude, how ev er, is to regard the enterpri se' s produc-
tive property as " neutralised," and therefore inalienable, and to allow for
personal and alienableproperty in the members' private domains. Discuss-
ing the legal principle of inalienability of land and tools in early Roman law,
Goody (1962:301) found a similar distinction between inalienable produc-
tive resources and alienable consumer goods. He pointed out that linked to
land were certain political rights: the right to compose the domestic group
and rights in residence that went further than the simple economic aspect of
securing a liv elihood (Goody 1962:298). The inalienability of the collective
machines and c apital has a similar political importance. Acoll ectiv e is reg ar-
ded by its members as a "free enclave" inside the capitalist system, where
they can experiment with economic and social relations that contradict the
dominant social and political order. Or, as Andrea of Oktoberdruck put it:
"The selling of a collective enterprise is a political mi stake, it means giving
an enterprise bock to the " sy stem" that has been conquered for the peopl e ac-
tually producing." But, as private property is maintained in the domain of
domestic consumption, tensions about the priv ate or collective allocation of
resources arise.
Immediate Expenditure Versus Long -Term Investment
Most collective enterprises are undercapitalised; they have few financial re-
sources as reserv es. As labour in a collective is not remunerated at a market-
detennined w age rate but is dependent on the residual of income ov er ex pen-
diture — as the economists Ireland and Law point out (1982:2) — a new in-
vestment in machinery or equipment often hos the immediate cons equence of
reducing for months or y ears the money av ai I able for immediate distribution
as individual income. To uphold product quality and productivity, old ma-
chines have to be replaced from time to time, as the capacity to compensate
for low productivity rates with longer working hours is limited. Members
are generally aw are of this di l ernma, though not alw ays prepared to sacrifice
part of their income or to work increased hours to pay for a new machine.
"Self-exploitation" became a term not infrequently used in political di scus-
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sions among collectivists. The question was repeatedly raised: if collecti-
vists are certainly not being exploitedby a capitalistw ho w ould benefit from
the surplus they produce, are they not exploiting themselves by ov er-
working? The tension between those members willing to invest and those re-
luctant to do so splits collectives, and the outcomes of thesestruggles differ-
entiate enterprises that invest a great deal from those that do not.
The readiness of individual members to engage in long-term investment
depends on a large variety of factors, from material constraints, the number
of their dependents, and their consumption habits to moral and political
considerations. Investrnents may beto the advantage of those members who
expect to stay with the collective long enough to profit from the new invest-
ment and increase the quality of their products. Members who intend to stay
for only a short finie, howev et must renounce a part of their income for the
sake of future investmens from which they will not profit, as any leaving
member cannot take "his" part of the accumulated capital with }lira
Level of Payout
Numerous collectives started out with their members receiving no pay at all
for the first one or twoyears, or alternatively, being paid according to need,
which meant that the scarce resources were giv en in preference to the most
needy. Most members subsisted on unemployment benefits or student
grants. After the first building-up phase was accomplished, the lev el of pay
was generally set at DM 1,000 to DM 1,200 net, 3 a sum surprisingly similar
in most Berlin collectives in 1983. This was little more than students with
state grants had at their disposai (the maximum rate in 1983 being DM 750)
and was certainly less than a qualifiedworker with a previous income of DM
2,200 net would have received in his first y ear of unemployment, when his
benefits would have amounted top between DM 1,500 and DM 1,700. Most
established collectives paid social and pension insurance for their members
and made allowances of between DM 100 and DM 400 for childcare.
In spite of their cornparatively low incomes, most collectivists were able
to live quitecomfortably. When they joined, they w ereoften at the beginning
of a settled professional and private life and had few obligations and low de-
mands as consumers. Most were content to own a high-quality stereo sys-
tem, a secondhand tel ev ision, and an oldw ashing machine. A few had a sec-
ondhand car, the cost of which they sometimes shared with another perron.
They liked to travel far but without spending a great deal on comfort In the
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early years, many members lived in communal households with four or five
other people. In the last couple of y ears, however, this tendency has started to
reverse. Collectivists now tend to live alone or with one other perron. But
ev en in these smaller setups the costs of housing can still be comparatively
low because many large low-standard apartments in old buildings still exist
in West Berlin. A three-room apartmentw ith coal heatingcostsbetween DM
280 and DM 350 per month.
For most of the founding members, work in the collective has been an in-
termediary phase between youth and adulthood. As their lifestyle has
changed over the last few y cars, as they became engaged in stable rel ations-
hips, had children, and developed higher consumption needs, they have tur-
ned to more financially rewarding occupations.
Contrat), to the public image, which often conveys the impression of as-
ceticism, members of Berlin collectives enjoy living well and surround
themselves from time to time with an aura of extravagance. During my field-
work with Oktoberdruck in the summer of 1983, all the members appeared
one evening dressed up in tangodresses and evening suits to sip cocktails and
celebrate the completion of a large order that had demanded a good deal of
overtime. The national congresses in Berlin, Wintertage, have featured an
exquisite cocktail bar; however, a certain distance became obvious betw een
the personal style of the " decadent" Berliners and their West German col-
leagues, who are not on the same lev el of fashion.
Collectives attempt to satisfy consumption needs collectively rather than
paying out a little more ex tra money tomembers indiv idually . Wuseltroniclç
for instance, bought a sailboat on the Wannsee that can be used by members
or friends. Oktoberdruck discussed repeatedly whether they should buy or
rent aweekend houle in West Germany. To renew energy after a long period
of hard work, the construction engineers' collectiv e, Baubüro, gave each of
its members half an houe s massage per week and increased the budget for
collective lunches instead of paying out this money to the members indivi-
dually. .
Contrary to the Kibbutz analysed by Talmon (1972:211), where ascetic
ideals w ere emphasizedtojustify the reinvestment of resources into thecom-
munity and where " the ultimate disintegration of the ascetic ideal... deals a
death blow to the principle of collective consumption" (Talmon 1972:208),
asceticism is a v alue no collectiv istwould support. Lest (pl easure), Lustprin-
zip (pleasureprinciple), and Bockhaben (being keen on something) are fre-
quently used expressions. Consumption should be one of the pleasures of life
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and shoul d become neither a compulsive behaviour nor a prohibited one. No
member is ridiculed or criticised if she or he puts all her or his money into
buying an expensive motorcycle or photographic equipment. Ev en those
members w ho eventually leavebecausethey cannot satisfy their w ants on the
collective salary are treated with understanding, provided they do not daim
part of the collective property as their own.
Readiness Io Invest
When they engage in a new investment, members of collectives have differ-
ent criteria than those of the managers or shareholders of a limited company.
Their shares in the enterprise do not appear on the stock exchange. It is not the
increase in market value that concems members of collectives, as the shares
they hol d in the firmg enerally do not grow with the firm' s capital. Their déci-
sions are determined by the amount of time they expect to stay with the col-
lective and the amount of money they must forego as far as immediate spend-
ing is concemed. The economist Gui (1981:46) compared investment déci-
sions in w orker-managed firms in g eneral w ith those in business enterprises:
"Aprofitablecalculation for the (labour managed) firm as such, based on the
comparisonbetw een the rate of retum and thecost of capital, is inadequate...
The flow of per capitadistributable income must be consideredinstead of the
cash flow of the firm. " The degree towhich members can liv e on low pay dif-
fers widely, depending on family obligations and consumption habits, but
the w illingness to inv est does not depend on material reasons alone. Iris  do-
sely linked to the ideological outlook of the member.
Members who are more ideologically motivated are either in favour of
saving capital for the enterprise or, conversely, they want their collective to
avoid entirely the " capitalistic logic of accumulation" and refuse to follow
y.
 systematic investment strategy. The willingness to inv est is loaded with
different moral significance according to the overall ideological line the col-
lectiv e is following. As I pointed out in the previous chapter, collectives and
their members can be divided into two groups in ternis of the political role
they see for themselves in the capitalist system they all reject. The first is not
to engage in any compromise with the" system" in order not to be corrupted
by it, which means not following its logic of capital accumulation and invest-
ment. The second is to expand collective enterprises into the" system," thus
undennining it and transfonning it through a" mushroom effect." The moral
valueattributedto the foregoing of immediatespending in favour of accumu-
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lotion is different in the two cases. A member advocating investments in the
first type of collective may be accused of behaving like a small-time entre-
preneur, whereas, in the second type, an enterprising collectivist with a
"Protestant Ethic" has a much more positive image. He is considered an
idealistic member who has the collective interests at heart.
Members who are in favour of accumulation often set the economic inter-
ests of the firmbefore their priv ate interests. Significantly, they are g eneral-
ly also the ones who have very few private corrunitments. 'They hardly ever
cornplain about the lev el of their individual income. nese members contra-
dict all theories about investmentbehaviour inlabour-managedfirms as they
arew illing to forego immediate consumption in favour of building up the en-
terprise, ev en if they only expect to be there for a short time. In 1984, Fritz of
KoMet, for instance, actively supported further inv estments, although itw as
clear hewas going to leav e in a few months. He did not profit in any sense, ei-
ther through a higher incarne or through a shore in property paidoutwhen he
left. The idealistic members are inspired by the conviction that it is morally
and politically right to promote collective enterprises. The only return they
may receiv e in the long mn is that their economic behaviour has contributed
to giving future generations of collectiv ists thechance to work in a self-deter-
mined way.
Their strategy, though, is not always in favour of new investment, as the
conflict between Fritz and Noppe of KoMet shows. Fritz continued to argue
in favour of new investments, even when hewas sure that he would be leav-
ing nine months later, whereas, Noppe wanted the collective to handle its
money very carefully, payback its debts, and not acquire new ones. Both
were equally dedicated to their collective but not equally disposed to take
risks. As their colleague Hanne put it:
Fritz thinks that a sort of pioneer spirit and attraction to risks is necessaty for
collectivework. Noppe, on thecontrary, seems to regard thecollective rather
as a friendly society that gets money from somewhere and is muddling along
by keeping costs low. He prefers to solveproblems with discipline rather than
by a courageous decision that ùnplies the risk of falling flat on one' s face.
(Hanne, KoMet, 8.8.1984)
The hesitation to take rislcs w ith investments is a theme that appears repeated-
ly in almost ev ery collective. The members are often called upon to sig n per-
sonal guarantees for the purchase of a new machine when the sum involved
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far exceeds any thing they hav eev er handl ed or possessedbefore. New mem-
bers, especially, fear the financial obligations that could result from a wrong
investment. Some members of longer standing, however, react much more
cold bloodedly. They maintain that they own little private property of any
importance that could be seized in the event of a financial disaster. Nev erthe-
less, their readiness to investis hindered by those of their fellow members
who have more interest in immediate spending.
The departure of the printer Thomas from Oktoberdruck in August 1984
was clearly motivated by immediate financial interests. When he returned
from holidays in July, he discovered that the rest of the collective had abol-
ished the recently introduced holiday payment and was considering the pur-
chase of a typesetting computer instead. Some members calcul ated that this
investment would mean roughly DM 120 less per month for each worker.
Thomas felt cheated and decided to take a better pay ing job in a business en-
terprise. He had acquired enough experience to work as a skilled printer and
to earn twice the income Oktoberdruck could offer; his new job paid DM
2,800 gross plus holiday pay and a thirteenth month' s salary.
}Es departure was felt as a great loss. When he announced that he was
going to leave the collective for a w ell-paidjob, the group w as assembled for
lunch in the large kitchen. The first reaction was oppressive silence. Then
Moni, the woman printer, started crying and her colleague, Donald, de-
clared that no more notices would be accepted. He w as desperate because he
had becomewell-adapted to Thomas, working with him in alternating shifts
on the largeMiller press, and he could not stand the ides of getting used to a
new colleague. The other members complained bitterly, saying that Tho-
mas' s leaving would shake the group, when it had just been consolidated.
Thomas' s dilemma corresponds to what Nutzinger (1975:188) analysed
as the distinction between individually owned and non-owned assets by
members of labour-managed enterprises. From an individual' s point of
view, there is a choice between individual savings (in owned assets) and the
giv ing of part of his or her current income for the firm' s inv estment " The lat-
ter, however, is collectively owned and since it is irreversible for varions
reasons, only the future returns accrue to the workers w hile the initial outlay
and hence the individual' s share of it gets lost" (Nutzinger 1975:188). In the
Berlin collectiv es, the transfer of individually owned assets tocollectiv e pro-
perty passes through a reduction of the indiv idual salaries decided by a majo-
rity at the plenary meeting of members. The self-financed investment affects
the different groups in differentways, according to their consumption needs
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and their expected stay in the enterprise. The financing of investments
throug h credits can allev iate some of the conflicts inv olv ed in creating res er-
v es (Eger and Weise 1978:162). The credit makes it possible for those mem-
bers who pay back the credit also to profit from improved working condi-
tions, and perhaps shorterworking hours, or from higherincomes. Theideal
case how ever, that inv estment returns increase so fastworkers do not hav eto
forego some of their immediate spendings, only occurs in a very favourable
market situation.
Most Oktoberdruck members are cl osely involv ed in the inv estments they
make. They sign personal securities to guarantee the enterprise' s credits and
renounce part of their income when important investments are made. Some
of the skilled printers, especially, seem to enjoy the acquisition of new ma-
chines. They identify closely with the machine on which they w orle, and it is
part of their professional pride to work on a printingpress that is technologi-
cally up to date. When the collective decided, in the summer of 1984, to re-
place the A3 GTO printingpress with a new machine, the printers studied ca-
talogues for weeks, visited the manufacturers, and discussed at length the
technological adv antages the new machine would be able to offer.
The new technology often makes production less timeconsuming and the
collective more competitive with other firms. According to Nutzinger
(1975:187), labour-managed enterprises follow a different investment logic
than capitalist ones. White the latter inv est according to expected profit, the
former take the expected increase of their income per working unit as the
main decision criterion. As a consequence, the labour-managed firms show
a tendency toward lavour-saving devices and might even omit profit-
increasing decisions if they also mean an increase in the number of workers
beyond a certain point.
In Oktoberdruck, the lavour-saving effect of new investments was heat-
edly debated. In 1984, the majority of members reached the conclusion that
they would prefer to reduce their working hours, rather than refrain from
employing new members. For others, how ever, needing a higher income,
this was a reason to leave the collective. As Herbie, the father of a young
daughter, put it
If I am putting money acide from my income to invest in a machine, I want to
seethebenefitofitoneday. I don' thavethis printing job as ahobby. Thework
hereisn't really that exciting, and one can' t find such complete satisfaction in
it that money loses its importance. (Herbie, Oktoberdruck, 19.4.1984).
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In the final months of his membership, he wanted tighter controls on effi-
ciency and the introduction of compensation for peoplew ho leave according
to the number of years worked in the collective. He finally left for a job that
would pay him twice as much. Nevertheless, he continued to keep in close
contactwith the group, came to lunch regularly, and seemed to miss the w ork
atmosphere.
The two service collectives, FahrradBüro and Wuseltronick, do not hav e
the same problems conceming investments in expensive machinery as the
production collectives, KoMet and Oktoberdruck. For the engineers' collec-
tive, Wuseltronick, their "capital" consists of scientific and technological
know-how, which they have slow ly accumulated with the help of several re-
search grants from the Technical University and the Senate of Berlin. They
developed an original electronic measurement technology and, without any
financial aid, produced the prototype of a small windmill. The departure of
any member who participated in important research work and acquired in-
sights other members did not share meant a substantial loss for the enter-
prise.
The investments of the bicycle collective, FahrradBüro, consisted
mainly in the slow accumulation of stocks Of merchandise and of a few spe-
cialised tools for repairs. The collectiviste attempted to balance their ac-
counts of profit and loss in such a way that the resultw as zero at the end of the
year, so that they did not have to pay any profit tax. They tried to adj ust the
wages paid throughout the year to the presumed profit or loss; but in most
years, the profits ex ceeded the loss es so they either had to inv est in some new
item of equipment, such as a new carpet for the shop, or elle pay tax.
High Demands on Idealism
As members of collectives have to forego voluntarily part of their individual
income to finance inv es tments from w hich they can only profit col 1 ectiv ely if
they stay long enough, the temptation is great to consume the firm' s capital
instead of inv esting it or to try to reappropriate part of itpriv ately when 1 eav -
ing. Only a strong commitment to the collective can make members go be-
yond the realisation of these immediate individual interests.
Private Appropriation
Leaving the collective without a penny, thankful for the pl easant time they
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were allowed to spend with their fellow members, impressed by the impor-
tant experiences they were able to enjoy by managing their works themsel-
ves: this is the correct attitude expected from a leaving member. In fact, most
do leave like that and continue to feel attached to "their" collective, which
they hav e helped to build up. Ev en if they do decide to take a j ob with an ordi-
nary enterprise, they continue to uphol d the ideals they shared w ith their col-
lective. Sometimes they even become the fiercest defenders of the collective
cause, more radical in their views than their former colleagues w ho still work
in collectives. In 1984, for instance, most of the activists of the Lundkreis
were ex-collectivists, living on unemployment benefits or doing casual
work. It seems that bonds of friendship and the feeling of doing something
politically sensible hold them together.
However, there are also those members who have left after a row, disillu-
sioned about the ideals with which they started. They feel, like Hans-Chris-
tian of KoMet, that the collective exploited their labour power by making
them work harder than they had ever done before, and for a pittance. Like
Helmut of Olctoberdruck, they despise the chaos and lack of organisation of
their fellow members and accuse them of irresponsibility. They feel, like
Michael of theFahrradaro, that their colleagues prev ented them frombuil-
ding up a dynamic and successful enterprise. As they stopped identifying
with the collective, they wanted their sacrifice of time and money to be re-
paid. Their previous idealism can easily tum into the most complete egoism
once they decide to break with the collective. Some of them daim, like Mi-
chael of the FahrradBüro, "We have never been a collective," and ask to be
paid their nominal share.
When these members prepare to leave, they turn from the logic of collec-
tive sharing to thatof individual appropriation. They often feel acutely disap-
pointed by the collective lifestyle and daim that the idea of mutual support
was only an illusion. Their interests turn to assuring their own material fu-
ture. Oftenwithout a secure job to go to, or intending to build up their own en-
terprise, they are tempted to daim part of the capital they have helped to ac-
cumulate. Members who were associates of a society of common law, and
agreed to guarantee the enterprisew ith their personal property without even
the cover of social insurance, feel particularly deprived.
In the first year, the founders of the FahrradBüro could not take any in-
come out of the shop, and in the second y ear a research grant for a project on
trek politics started to split the group. A conflictwith external members of
the research group caused one collectivist to leave entirely and another,
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Klaus, to retreat into the shop. New members joined the bicycle business,
and Michael was the only collectivist to continue with the research proj e,ct
He increasingly withdrew from the daily tasks of the shop. A conflict broke
out when he proposed to separate the office completely from the shop and
claimed a higher incarne corresponding to his academic degree. When the
others refused, he decided to leave, demanding compensation for the first
years when he had helped build up the collective without eaming any thing.
Klaus then claimed even higher compensation, as he hadworked for most of
the time in the shop.
As the conflict appeared insoluble, they agreed to call in an arbitrator in-
stead of talcing the 'natter to court They chose Gerd Behrens, the tax adv isor
for most collectives at that time. Behrens counselled them to pay compensa-
tion to Klaus and Michael in small installments and to change the legal form
of the collective to a company of I imited liability (GmbH). Michael left, fol-
low ed a few months later by Klaus, to take up jobs in the profe,ssions they had
studied. About ayear later, they ceased to cl aim their monthly compensation
installments.
The official legislation — as stated abov e — supports the cl aims of depart-
ing members against the collective so it is not infrequent that formerly united
collectivists, with radical views about "corrupt bourgeois society," find
themselves opposing each other in "bourgeois" courts, each party defended
by a well-known, left-wing lawyer. However, attempts are made to replace
law courts with arbitration committees composed of members of other col-
lectives chosen by both litigant parties. The arbitrators are generally com-
mitted to the collective ideals and attempt to find solutions that will satisfy
both parties.
As we saw earlier, in 1981 an arbitration committee composed of four
members of collectives awarded Hans-Christian compensation of DM
10,000 upon leaving KoMet, conditional on his building up another collec-
tive enterprise. This sum represented a considerable loss for the young col-
lective, but it was less than Hans-Christian coul d have obtained in a court of
law. Although strained for a couple of years, his relationship with KoMet
was not entirely sev ered, and later the two enterprises ev en cooperated occa-
sionally.
The setting up of arbitration committees in West Germany is done on the
private initiative of the collectivists. In cases of conflict, a body not pre-
viously involved, possibly composed of members of another collective, is
nonnally called in. Arbitation committees can only be effective if both liti-
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gant parties recognise their authority. The solution the committee attempts
to find does not always have legal backing under West German law but is
based on the assumption that the members still share the same basic set of val-
ues. Once agreed upon, the committee has legal authority.
The ultimate sanction that remains is to expose the member not adhering
to the collective values to the gossip of the " scene." As E L Peters
(1972:157) lias pointed out, gossip as a means of upholding a sy stem of moral
values can only be effectiv e if there is a certain density of relationships. In his
example, this was found in a Lebanese village — a small locality — and
among people who were social equals. In the present case, the place w here
gossip circulates and reflects a certain set of values is the Berlin collective
" scene. " Members who work or once worked in collectives, as well as some
of their customers, are often more or less acquainted. They go to the same
parties and share certain leisure activities in common. Sometimes close
friendships develop, sometimes deep hostilities.
In the" scene, " people gossip about Constantin still owning most of Okto-
berdruck' s machines, about tensions between ol d and new members of Wu-
seltronick, about agitdruck going banIcrupt and about Gisela of KoMet hav-
ing a baby. Sometimes the information transmitted concems serions mat-
ters, sometimes it is very vague or ev en fal se, but it mirrors acertaincommon
concern. If a collectivist suddenly breaks with the sharéd values of the
"scene," lie often loses not only his job but also more important components
of his social environment as well.
The latter happened to Helmut, an influential member of Oktoberdruck,
when he attempted to persuade his colleagues to sell the enterprise. At a
meeting of the collective, when he w as asked to justify his idea, he aclinitted
that he wanted the proceeds from the sale of Oktoberdruck to be distributed
among the members. He argued that most members intended to leave sooner
or later and would not thenbe able to take any thing with them. All the machi-
nes, for which they had worked for years, would either fall into the hands of
Constantin, who they suspected of having the greatest staying power of them
all, or would become the property of new people, who would be able to sell
them at their leisure. In order to prevent this, the collectivists should change
the charter of the enterprise and either allow for the existence of sleeping
partners or facilitate the sale of the printing shop by abolishing the clause sti-
pulating that the veto of a single associate is sufficient to prevent the dissolu-
tion of the limited company. Helmut w as supported by two members, Udo
and Amrai, who wereworking with him in the montage section — his " dis-
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ciples," as the others called them. For the rest, however, he had become an
enemy who they had to rid themselves of.
Division of Collective Property
While individual attempts to appropriate privately part of the collective
property are generally fought off by the majority of the members, a division
of the collective becomes almost inevitable if a large proportion of the mem-
bers becomes dissatisfiedwith the I evel of income and the performance of the
groupand strives toward higher investments. Payment according to perfor-
mance and private situes in the enterprise are generally the daims put for-
ward by the group wanting to split off from the main collective.
In a conflict in 1985 that opposed Hans and Bernhard of the FahrradBüro
to the rest of the collective, ev en an arbitration committee was unable to
reach a compromise. Hans had become increasingly dissatisfiedwithhis low
income and the unw illingness of his colleagues to ex pand the enterpriseinto a
wholesale business. He wanted the collective to be organised according to
the criteria of modern management; this led him to despise the democratic
spirit of his fellow members and, together with his colleague Bernhard, he
increasingly jeopardized all collective decision-inaking. In the end, he cl ai-
med that the enterprise shouldbe split At the same time, however, he tried to
maintain his image as a dedicated collectivist in front of the other collectives
organised in the union of bicycle collectives. Only when he did not turn up at
the meeting of the arbitration committee, composed of members of bicycle
collectives, did it become clear to them that Hans no longer respected the ba-
sic principles. He and Bernhard employed a lawyer and claimed 50 percent
of the stock of merchandise plus 10 percent of the aimai turnover of the en-
terprise, which amounted to DM 110,000. Although the driving force be-
hind the conflict w as obviously Hans, Bernhardwillingly ag reed w i th his ar-
guments as he w as in desperate need of money. Together with friends, he had
bought a run-down house in Kreuzberg, which he was renovating himself
with the partial help of Senate subsidies. The income from the collective was
insufficient to support himself, hischild, and his girl friend, a studentw ho re-
ceiv ed only a small contribution from her parents toward her expenses.
The other members reacted only hesitantly to this dev elopment. Although
the tensions with Hans slowly increased, each lime they were taken by sur-
prise when the conflict reached the next stage. Accepting the logic of collec-
tive cooperation and reluctant to fall back upon legal means, they realized
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only very 1 ate that Hans hadbegun to think in different tenns and w as not pre-
pared to listen to any argument that appealed to his commitment to the group.
They offered Hans and Bernhard DM 55, 000 if they would 1 eav e, but the tw o
continued to daim DM 110,000, a sum which the others fel t would ruin the
enterprise. To show Hans and Bernhard how ridiculously high they felt their
daims to be, they offered to leav e themselv es, 1 eav ing the enterprise to Hans
and Bernhard, if the latter would pay them such a sum. To their surprise,
Hans and Bernhard agreed to titis deal and offered to pay the other members
off with DM 90,000. Tired of the arguments and squabbl es, the collectiv ists
accepted. They then opened a new bicycle collective, velophil, in the part of
the tocan where they livecl, which proved very successful.
Since 1985, Hans and Bernhard have continued to run the FahrradBüro,
trying very hard topolish up their image as an al ternativ e bicy cl e shop, which
was seriously tarnished as a result of several articles in die tageszeitung and
in the collective newspaper contraste, which criticised their role in the con-
flict. Hans wanted to found aFahrradBüro association that wouldbecome a
forum for discussions about traffic politics. As Norbert, a critical former
member, put it "ibis would give an ideological gloss to Hans' s noncollec-
tiv e in order not to put off customers from the alternative scene."
Another conflict over property in a collective, which I witnessed, hap-
pened along siinilar lines. In May 1988, the toolmaking collective KoMet
was divided into two camps after y ears of conflict about low collective per-
formance, minimal income, and insufficient financial reserv es for renov a-
ting the capital in machinery. The division followed the lines of social origin
and educational standard of the members. Those eager to introduce a " noti-
ceable connection between work-effort and pay or working Lime" were the
most dynamic elements of the enterprise; most had a high school education
and were self-confident enough to take on difficult orders and improve their
technical skiffs. By the spring of 1988, all of them were preparing for the
master' s diploma (Meisterprüfung) and had already passed the oral exami-
nation. The other group consisted of skilled workers who had corne from or-
dinary toolmaking firms to joinKoMet and were not attempting to achieve a
higher standard of professional qualification by passing the master' s dip-
loma. Strongly opposed to the principle of performance and to priv ate shares
in the enterprise, they affirmed thatKoMet was "a collective of workers and
nota team of entrepreneurs. "
The more enterprising members criticised the fact that large parts of the
work results " disappeared into a big black hole" instead of being available
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for investments and salaries. Long hours were spent in the enterprise w ithout
increasing the overall result: in 1986, 42 percent of all working hours had
been unproductive. In order to achieve a transparence between work-effort
and pay, they claimed that the work groups cooperating on one order shoul d
be paid according to the result of that order, or rather, according to their per-
formance as a group, and that members should be giv en the possibility of ac-
quiring personal shares in the capital of the enterprise in order to encourage
their w illingness to inv est Justify ing their dev iance from the collectiveprin-
ciples, they wrote in 1988:
The perseverance of a concept which evolved out of a political euphoria
means economically for the enterprise and personally for the members a
standstill of the projectKoMet.... We have tobecome able towork under self-
managed structures and earn an appropriate income.
The members of the other group claimed the protection of the collective
principles. They insisted that unequal capacities should not lead to internai
hierarchies, and even less to different salaries. Strongly committed to the
idea of the collective as a refuge from the capitalist logic of production, they
maintained in 1988:
KoMet and its structure offers one of the few possibilities for workers to break
out of their social role in the process of production and to work in a sel f-deter-
minedway. For this purposeKoMet put machines at their disposai that are not
in the hands of entrepreneurs. They are not the private property of anybody
and therefore de facto expropriated. This is theprimary condition for offering
to the worker the pcssibility of self-detertnined work in a coll ective .... He or
she just does not have DM 20, 000 in his or her pockettobuy a stake in somew-
here.
The separation of the two groups within KoMet — the "old concept"
group and the "new concept" group as they called themselves — raised great
interest in Berlin alternative circles. In January 1988, a public discussion
was held in theKoMet workshop where the two disputing parties expounded
their different views. The case was followed by the alternative newspapers
die tageszeitwig, contraste, and Netzwerkrundbrief. The "old concept"
group hoped to win public support for their defense of the initial ideals of an
alternative work-style and applied to the arbitration committee to be accep-
ted as the only ones to have legitimate control over the collective property.
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After years of debate in alternative circles about efficiency, collectiv e finan-
cing, and investment, how ev er, public opinion was no longer unanimously
in favour of the initial "pure" collective concept. kwas starting to admit that
itwas difficult to live on DM 1,000 per month and that collectiv ists wanted to
see financial returns for years of work-effort. The arbitration committee de-
cided accordingly and divided the collectiveproperty into two equal halv es.
Compensation
Granting compensation to departing members has been a hotly debated issue
in almost all the collectives I know — as a possible solution to ease the ten-
sions when members leave and te give them greater material security in the
transition period. Some members bel iev e that if members know they will re-
ceiv e a proportion of the accumulated capital when they leave, they will be
more w illing to invest Compensation for the number of years worked may
also induce members te stay longer.
Labour-managed enterprises, especially in Yugoslavia, have acquired
experience in granting compensation according to years worked. This com-
pensation, if substantial, often led te a depletion in liquid assets if the mobili-
ty of members was great. As Vanek (1977:176) has pointed out, the current
practice of granting shares in proportion to the contribution to the firm coun-
ted in y ears worked could also seriously undermine the equality betweenold
members and newcomers. In labour-managed enterprises where members
acquired private shares in the firm' s property, shares tended to increase in
value until they became so expensive that itwas almost impossible for new
members to join the enterprise. The members of the Plywood Cooperativ e in
the United States (Gunn 1980:397), for instance — adopting a sy stem of pri-
vate shares — invested large parts of their income but also increasingly em-
ploy ed wage-labourers — the dev elopment denounced by Oppenheimer as
the" iron I aw of transformation" of a cooperative into a capital ist enterprise,
as discussed earlier (Oppenheimer 1922:64).
The form of compensation Berlin collectives choose to pay out, and the
amount they arewilling to g iv e, depends upon the form of property and on the
financial situation of the enterprise. The printing collective Bloch und Part-
ner allocated shares in the property to each member according to the number
of years worked and the amount of personal capital invested. In September
1983, Peter, who had worked in the enterprise for two years and had made
the initial investinent, owned 35 percent; Andreas, who joined a few months
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later, 30 percent; his mother, who worked there for six months and had
brought in some capital, 25 percent; and Dagmar, who had worked for six
months, 10 percent 'The proportions change w ith new members joining and
the number of years worked so that, provided no outside capital is introdu-
ceci, after ten years the amount Dagmar will ownwill not differ greatly from
the amount Peter will then hold. Each owner can take out his share in the pro-
perty when he leaves, and Andreas hopes that hewill ev en have accumulated
enough capital by the age of thirty-five to be able to stop working entirely.
Collectives that have already experienced the comings and goings of
many members and have fought to keep the enterprise' s capital out of grasp-
ing hands, find Bloch und Partner' s attitude toward property deceptive and
dangerous. For not only would the enterprise collapse entirely if Peter and
Andreas left with their shares but the attitude toward work changes because
of the individual interest of members in accumulation. As one of Bloch und
Partner' s new members, Sabine, put it: "In the collective, the spirit of the
young entrepreneur is dominant. Everybody works as well and as fast as pos-
sible on good new machines." Other printing collectives admire Bloch und
Partner for their work efficiency but criticise them for their speculation on
increasing private shares in capital, regarding them as having taken the first
step toward becoming an ordinary enterprise. The founders of Bloch und
Partner agree with this assessment. They do not regard work in a collective
as a political action but simply as a profitable business that is not exploiting
anybody and is "the fruit of our own hands' labour."
Contrary to Bloch und Partner, which started off with a strong sense of
personal property, Wuseltronickw as initially based on an equally strong ides
of collectiveproperty, and only gradually developed an awareness of the fact
that not all its members were inclined to give up the notion of private proper-
ty. From 1977 to 1981, the group had five members who pool al all their pri-
vate savings and rev enues and inv ested this in the enterprise, taking out of the
collective money-chest whatever they needed for consumption. From 1981
to 1983, the situationchangedwhen new members joined. To close thegap in
financial commitment and status between old members and newcomers, it
was suggested that the new members should also put their private savings
into the collective fund.
Differences arose between new members like Alex, who had savings of
DM 30,000 but w as afraid to inv est them as they would be lost to him and to
the collective in the ev ent of mismanagement, and those w ho had nothing and
were in favour of the neutralisation of the capital. At a full meeting in March
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1983, members discussed how to compensate the contributors of private
capital by allowing members to take out money when leaving. They conside-
red the introduction of compensation depending on they ears of membership,
the amount of capital put in, and the current value of the enterprise. The pri-
vate elements in the company' s capital, contributed by individual members,
were to be slowly reduced by deducting a negative interest from them until
only the collective property remained. The compensation members receiv ed
would then depend exclusively on the years worked and the financial situa-
tion of the enterprise.
However, members like Alex cl aimed they did not have sufficient confi-
dence in the work-style of their colleagues to be certain their money would
not be squandered. Handing ov er his priv ate capital to the collective might in
the end mean that, due to inefficiency or financial catastrophe, hewoul d find
himself with a low income and no property. He therefore insisted on giving
his money as a loan. The idealistically minded Reiner, on the contrary, con-
tributed all his privateproperty at the foundation of the collective and intend-
ed to add a recent inheritance as well. He thought it natural that in difficult
times individual interests should take second place, that members should
take smaller incomes and receive low er compensation. He maintained that
the main aim was to establish an original work environment, not to increase
the amount of capital members could individually appropriate.
The issue of compensation remained purely hypothetical until the spring
of 1984, when Hansi decided to set up an independent research unit in his
house in West Gennany. When he left, he tookwith him part of the electronic
equipment, together with compensation in cash for the number of years
worked. It became obvious, however, that if every member was to be com-
pensatecl so generously and w as to have the right to take away the project he
or she was working on, the collective would collapse after the departure of
only a few more members. As a matter of fact, Wuseltronick' s prosperity de-
pended less on financial reserves than on the maintenance of the intellectual
capital and.therefore on keeping membership stable.
To inhiba private appropriation of expertise and capital in equipment,
Wuseltronick has sine founded a Genossenschaft, together with two other
collectives, that holds the property of all equipment needed for production.
Each member of Wuseltronick had to become an associate of the Genossen-
schaft and had to signa restraint clause prohibiting the private use of collec-
tive expertise.
Responding to the preoccupations of a growing number of members, the
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issue of providing security for old age and of raising children began tobe tak-
en seriously after having been merely hypothetical for y ears. The members
of Wuseltronick renounced their idealistic model of collective property, of
income according to need, and admitted the possibility of private accumula-
tion. A private life assurance, held by the collective, was opened for each
member, the money to be paid out when a member left and in the meantime
serving the enterprise as a security.
Wuseltronickis the first West Berlin collectiv e to pl an a collectiv e pension
fund. It is planning to invest the money accumulated in fixed property, that
is, in housing and production space. Other collectives such as Oktober druck
became interested in the model, as the pensions they can expert will be a
small percentage of their present income and w oul d be below the minimum
subsistence level. In the last two or three years, more influence has been ac-
quired by members advocating the granting of compensation and emphasiz-
ing the importance of providing greater fmancial security.
Conclusion
The form of property is what distinguishes collectives from business enter-
prises. How ever, the answer to the question " To whom does the collective
belong?" is contradictory . Formally and 1 eg ally , the enterprise is the proper-
ty of theworking members. In practice, they arenot allowedto sell it; they in-
crease the capital but should not decrease it It is not a capital ist owner of the
enterprise who extracts the surplus produced by the collectivist, but it is the
enterprise itself that builds up its capital from the supplementary unpaid ef-
fort expendedby the members. Investment is only profitable for members as
long as mernbership is stable and if they have a long-terni expectancy towork
in the enterprise. As they forego any right of ownership when leaving, they
have little interest in financing the creation of new workpl aces.
The initial idea — that col lectiv eproperty woul d be at the equal disposai of
an and that evetybody wouldfeel similarly inclined to invest his or her work-
ing power to maintain and increase it — was based on the assumption that
membership would be stable. It did not give consideration to changes in per-
sonal situation nor to the actuality of members leaving. After a couple of
years, al most all collectives had experienced enormous changes in member-
ship and most had to realize that the priority of their members had shifted to-
ward private and individual interests. Idealistic sacrifice of time and money
became rare, especially when members were faced with family obligations,
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with grow ing older, or w ith a return to the dominant labour market. Collecti-
ves have only recently started to adapt to these changes by accounting finan-
cially for the contributions made by members.
Notes
1. The corresponding legal form in Britain is the partnership.
2. In the following section, I am referring to Genassenschaften when' talk
about German cooperatives which have the legal form of an e. G. (eingetra-
gene Genossenschaft). The term "cooperatives" refers to the British exam-
ple.
3. "Net" means that taxes and insurance are already deducted.
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Self-Management
Because of their complexity, planning and decision-making are the central
problems of collective organisations. Collective decisions should be made
by consensus, and ideally require the active participation of all members,
w ho are expected to readily assume responsibility fora large number of deci-
sions that may go beyond the range of their professional experience.
The structures of decision-making and planning developed by different
collectives are experimental and constantly changing. As with the entire col-
lective organisation, these structures must be regarded as part of a dynamic
process that display s a certain pattern but I ittl e predictability . The decision-
makers, the criteria of decisions, and the topics to be decided upon change
constantly w ith thecoming and going of members and w ith changes in the po-
litical outlook of the enterprise.
Collectivists maintain that their primary objective is not to provide for
maximal profitability within the enterprise but to develop an anti-authoritar-
ian, nonhierarchical framework for the realization of their ideals. The" tra-
ditional" separation between administrators, planners, and coordinators on
the one hand and ex ecutors on the other must be replacedby "the col I ectiv e, "
which both takes the decisions and executes them. However, they are aw are
that the effort to realize titis ideal can only be a compromise within the sur-
rounding economic contraints, as their informai spontaneous structures of
decision-making are confronted with the strictly hierarchical business orga-
nisations of their competitors.
Non-Directive Planning
In business enterprises, the manager mediates between the pressures of the
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market, the demands of the capital ow ners, and the requirements of the actual
producers. To those inside the firm, he transmits external pressures in the
form of instructions and advice, and he camouflages internai inadequacies
from the external observer or customer through negotiation and diplomacy.
The w orkers are expectedto ex ecute his instructions to the letter but in return
are not held responsible for any mistake in his planning. The manager in turn
has to act in accordancewith the ultimate interests of the capital holders and
has to justify the success or failure of his decisions to the owner — if he is not
himself the ow ner — or to the board of shareholders. His rote is to balance the
pressures from market and capital holders against the needs and satisfaction
of the w orkers in order to keep the lev el of profit and capital to be reinvested
as high as possible.
In West Gennan industry, , the tensions between capital holders andwork-
ers have been attenuated through the institution of workers' codetennina-
tion. On the supervisory boards of the steel and mining industries, half the
delegates, and on the boards of all other joint stock companies, one-third of
the delegates, are workers' representatives.' This, how ev er, does not mean
direct participation by ordinal) , workers in the company' s decisions. As the
representatives, once elected, are no longer fonnally accountable to thew or-
kers, a de facto separation occurs between the professional workers' repre-
sentatives and the workers themselves (Heinrich 1981:83). In practice, the
ordinary workers are badly informed concerning the politics of the board,
and their representatives, on becoming board members, must respect the
company' s trade secrets.
In the labour-managed economy of Yugoslavia, where in theow the
workers' council detennined the politics of their enterprise, itwas in practice
controlled by the organisational pyramid; workers had latte influence on the
management decisions. Since 1965, three parallel institutional structures
have coexisted. First, was the structure of self-management represented by
an elected workers' council. All workers could in theory be elected to the
council, though in practice the highly skilled and skilled workers w ere ov er-
represented (Comisso 1979:56). Second, was the type of organisation that
was strictly hierarchical and headed by an elected director. Third, was the
enterprise branches of the socio-political organisations, which represented
larger social interests as opposed to those of the enterprise (Comisso
1979:146). Thesethreeparallel structures interacted Theworkers' council,
together with the socio-political organisations, appointed the director, w ho
then had ul timate authority ov er the organisation of work. The management,
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on the other hand, used the political influence of theworkers' council and ac-
tually led it in pressuring government authorities when the enterprise found
market conditions unfavourable (Comisso 1979:182).
Workers' councils and the el ected or appointed hierarchy of management
often stand in a contradictory relationship toward one another. While the
elected director must justify the success or failure of his business politics to
the working members, the workers in turn are expected to obey his instruc-
tions regarding the organisation of their work. Nevertheless, if his business
politics fail, the workers may drive him out.
The nineteenth century Genossenschaft, described by Oppenheimer
(1922:61), employed a director who w as more highly paid than the other
workers and w ho formally managed the enterprise. The full members of the
Genossenschaft controlled him through their vote on the board of coope-
rants. Bis position w as often not vely strong, as he could be dismissed at any
moment and often served as scapegoat for all the external pressures.
Gunn describes a similar contradiction between directory authority and
democratic self-management structures in the case of the Plywood coopera-
tiv es in the United States. The director w as " hired and fired" by the people he
had to coordinate and could notbecome a member. He was employed for the
tank without being granted real power (Gunn 1980:395). A director from
outside often does not identify sufficiently with the firm. The workers, hav -
ing delegated their administrative tasks to him or her, lose effective control
over the enterprise, as happened in the case of the Fakenham cooperative in
Britain. There, a director, appointed by the creditor Scott Barber Associa-
tion, mismanaged the enterprise w hile the women members were left unin-
formed of the financial situation (Wajcman 1983:64-67).
The particularity of the Berlin collectives lies in the fact that they do not
possess a manager or directorw ho fulfills the functions of mediator or coor-
dinator. In the collective, the members themselves must ex ecute the déci-
sions they make and must bear the consequences of their own management.
As they are themselv es the owners, they do not hav e to justify the profitabil
ty of their self-management, but they experience its consequences in the
amount of income they receive at the end of the month and the number of
hours they mustwork per day. Pressures from the sun -ounding economy im-
pinge directly on the individual collectivist, as each should take equal part in
representing the enterprise externally and in the internai organising of tanks.
Like ordinal), business enterprises, the collective bas to maintain good
public relations and present a favourable image of itself to its circles of pro-
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spectiv e customers in order to guarantee an adequate flow of orders. Custo-
mers from the alternative scene also need to be catered to. Customers from
business enterprises need extra reassurance that collectives produce like or-
dinary firms, respecting time limas and producing good quality work. The-
refore, tow ard the outsi dew orl d, the collectiv e pl anners have to perform the
role of an ordinary business partner who creates a feeling of security for the
customer. Ev en if members reject the principles of competition from an
ideological standpoint, the collective as an enterpriseoperating in the market
must react to compe.titors, adjust its prices, and offer special services if it
wants to keep ordinary customers as w ell as those from the alternative scene.
Internally, collectivists must plan the time needed for the completion of
orders, distribute the tasks among members, purchase materials, and cal-
culate prices. They have to discover who among them is able and ready to
complete which task and to redistribute tasks if any member prov es incapa-
ble of finishing on time. The structures of planning are variable and flexible.
Planning is done at meetings, as a routine j ob in the office, at coffee breaks by
members w ho cooperate closely , and by individual mernbers w ho find them-
selv es, deliberately or not, in a situation where they have to decide alone
whether to accept an order, lower the usual price, and the like.
The two tools of collective planning are the w eeldy meeting and the of-
fice. To schematise these tw o institutions, one coul d designate the meeting as
the " legislature, " which determines the rules and principles of organisation
and makes the political decisions that may effect ev en as small a detail as the
purchase of Nicaraguan coffee for the kitchen. The office could be designa-
ted the "administration," which makes the routine decisions within the
norms set by the meeting and sees that the running of the collective respects
the law s and rules s et out for enterprises operating under West Germanl egis -
lation.
Most collectiv es meet once aweek outside of working hours to discuss the
ev ents of the pastweek and to plan the tasks for the corning one. The Oktober-
druck collectivists assembled on Monday evenings from 6 p. m. to about 10
p. m. around a few bottles of wine in the large kitchen or, in summer, on the
law n of a nearby park. At one meeting, topics as diverse as the organisation
of holidays, job rotation, reduction of working hours, lev el of income, and
the employment of cleaning women were discussed. The members of the
FahrradBuro closed their shop on Tuesdays and met for breakfast from 10
a. m. to 2 p. m. in the small office. They discussed the ordering of stock, the fi-
nancial situation, and the integration of new members; one member kept a re-
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cord of the topics discussed. KoMet and Wuseltronickmembers met twice a
week, once formally in the collective kitchen to discuss business and a se-
cond time in the flat of one of the members to talk more informally about per-
sonal matters. Depending on the problems at stake, the mood of the mem-
bers, and the weather outside meetings can bevery informai and relaxed, or
strictly organised with lists of topics to be discussed.
The Office
While the role of the meeting is equally central in all the collectives I know, ,
the position of the office v aries considerably, according to size, age, and or-
ganisational structure. Oktoberdruck, for instance, started off with an office
space separated from theprinting presses by tw o book shelv es, and today has
a separate office, wheretwo peopleworkpennanently , and a roomto receive
customers. Oktoberdruck and the other three ex amples are larger collectiv es
with a more crucial administrative section and a separate office, whereas the
srnaller collectives withonly four to six members tend to carry out the admin-
istra& e taslcs in the midst of the production space. It is the belief of most col
lectiv ists that the office should not take a central and dominant position.
Their ideal is that all the members should become capable of replacing each
other in the office. How this ideal is realized in practice v aries considerably,
though, from one collective to another. Oktoberdruck and Wuseltronickhad
full-thne office jobs, which were hardly ever rotated. In the KoMet collec-
tive, the office job w as part-time and rotated half y early; while theFahrrad-
Büro rotated the task daily — but at the time of my fieldw ork w as employing a
specialist to bring the books back into order.
Most of the orders are accepted by the members who work in the office.
Only for the more important orders are they supposed to consult the whole
collective, the smaller ones being decided without further consultation.
Some collectives, like KoMet, try to locate the task of caring for customers
away from the office, in the hands of the producing members who are each
then permanently responsible fora certain number of customers. But as the
responsible members cannot themselves ex ecute all the orders they take in,
they are thereforeonly replacing the office in its mediatory fonction. KoMet
members who had spent y ears as skilled w orkers in business industry were
much less at ease in taking part in the management tasks and in reprŒenting
the enterprise ontside thanwere their colleaguesw ho had a univ ersity educa-
tion and were trained to represent themselves and chers.
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When customers are dealt with by the members working in the office, the of-
fice plays the role of mediator between the producing members and market
pressures. Complaints about mistakes made by the printers and repro-mon-
teurs of Oktoberdruck, for instance, firstpass through the office and are then
transmitted to the members concemed. Members working in the office often
compl ain about the strain involv ed in calming dow n the customers on the one
hand and criticising their reluctant coll eagues on the other. The relationship
of the other Oktoberdruckmembers toward those in the office is ambiguous.
Although the printers daim that they feel much greater responsibility for
their work in the collective than they did in their previous employment, they
still do not like to negotiate with a customer abouta misprinted order. They
can go into fits of despair, refuse to eat lunch, and work until late at night if
they make a mistake, but they will not accept criticism from the office.
In one instance, the office put the w rong paper size for the reprint of a song
book onto the printers' worksheet. The printers ordered the paper, and,
working the ev ening shift, Thomas started to print the order. He only reali-
zedlater, when he folded the printed sheet to check the print, that itw as some
millimeters too small. He left a note waming Donald, who w as to continue
the task in the moming. Donald measured the paper again, decided that itw as
big enough, and continued the printing. When Thomas arriv ed at lunch time,
the whole sertes had by then been misprinted and had to be throw n away.
In the conflict that followed, Marita and Helmut, who worked in the of-
fice, criticised the printers for not consulting them if there w as any doubt
about the paper size. The printers in turn accused the office of carelessness in
the taking of new orders; they were supposed to know, or to look up, what
sort of paper w as required for the reprint. Neither side w as willing to accept
responsibility for the mistake. The printers argued as if the members in the
office were their instructors, whose advice they were executing to the letter,
although in fact they had acted independently, Thomas deciding of his own
accord to stop production and Donald to continue it. Marita and Helmut, on
the other hand, refused to accept responsibility for something about which
they had not been consulted.
As thecustomers feel personally at e,asewiththecollectivists, they are tol-
erant of minor shortcomings in planning and small delays in the executionof
their orders. How ever, more serions mistakes and longer delays are treated
more and more severely. Customers from the " Alternative Scene" also in-
creasingly expect a higher professional standard in the execution of their or-
ders and threaten collectiv es w ith daims for damages. As a necessary conse-
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quence, collective planning now shows signs of increased professionalisa-
tion and greater routine. All collectives I know have introduced an increa-
sing number of more elaboratework-plans. These are large charts, on w hich
the distribution of tasks tomachinery and people is markedby means of stnall
coloured cards. In this way, each collectivist can see the results of the plan-
ning. Short-term planning has become a routine occupation, even if the reali-
sation of the plan is not always perfect.
Much more time consuming are the discussions that involve long-term
planning for economic development. Discussions about a new investment
often continue for months and may only bebrought to a conclusion because a
"lobby" raises the topic time and again, eventually wearing down its oppo-
nents. Making new investments, lowering or increasing income, limiting
working hours — these pose considerable difficulties because most collecti-
vists either have problems understanding business accountancy or do not
want to become involved in something the logic of which contradicts their
own principles. As mentioned earlier, collectivists daim to want to abolish
the economic category of pure economic performance expressed in the max-
imisation of profit Classic accountancy wouldbeopposed to what they wish
to achieve. According to Weber' s classic definition, "accounting in tenns of
money is the specific means of rational, economic provision. " Itallows for
the valuation of all the means of achieving a productivepurpose, an estima-
tion of net profits to be gained from al temativ e 1 ines of economic action, ape-
riodic comparison of all thegoods and other assets controlled by an economic
unit, an estimate and the verification of receipts and expenditure, and the
orientation of provision for consumption (Weber 1964:186-7).
Collectivists often feel ambiguous towards if not boredby, accountancy.
They refuse to argue from the point of view of the economic logic of the en-
terprise alone. In the early phases of collectives, members' reactions to ac-
counting w ere similar to that tŒv ard legal forms. They didnot take it serious-
ly and therefore did not keep the accounts correctly, considering them mere-
ly a chicanery of the capitalist economy.
However, one or two years, at the latent, after the collective enterprises
were established, they had to deliver detailed tax declarations. Some had to
copewith temporal), insolv encies, which meant that members received their
pay weeks or monthslate, or not at all. Members realised that they must up-
date the accounts of the pastyears and maintain them more or less in order if
they wanted the enterprise to survive. However, they were still far from
doing this in order to maximise their economic performance.
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In an economic unit that is explicitly not performance oriented, w here w ork-
effort plays no roue and time spent a minor one, accountancy is quite a para-
dox. On the one hand, members of collectives daim that they refuse to have
their economic actions detennined by the net profit that could be gained; on
the other hand, they w ant to maintain a stable lev el of income — and possibly
raise it — and form reserves for investments. Like every other enterprise,
they have to pay taxes regularly and, of course, have a strong interest in
paying as hâle tax as possible. For this purpose, skilled accountancy is ne-
cessary ; expert bookkeeping bas an undeniable advantage and is ev en a good
defense against external economic pressures.
Most collectivisas, like Boule, who was for y ears the accountant for the
newspaper die tageszeitung, have corne to regard as a political necessity the
possession of booklceeping skills by eachcollectiv ist In a paper hepresented
to the collective at a meeting, he advocated the " anarchist accountant":
Since time inummorial accountants have been regarded with suspicion by
those for whom they sorted out reality. Nevertheless, they received gratitude
for their efforts as long as they didnot distribute the material reality too much
to their own advantage. Peoplewerewilling to pay them tribute in order not to
take responsibility for reality themselves — just as one treats one' s mother and
father with respect because they try to take care of the insecurities of life for
the yotmg person.... Occasionally accountants were chased away... because
they hadreserved themostagreeablepart of reality for themselves and had un-
learned to estimate the disagreeable part they distributed.... However, ever
new generations of bookkeepers tookmaterial reality — and thereby freedom
— out of the bands of their fellow-men Anarchy is the only possibility to
make sure that we all become booklceepers who prevent materi al reality from
being divided and rule of one over others from emerging. (Unter Geiern
1982:88).
A computer printout from the tax advisor once monthly, with all the figures
neatly lined up, is not sufficient to clarify the connection between work per-
formance and results achieved. Older members, especially thoseworking in
the office, are in a more informed position and may have considerable in-
fluence on planning, using the knowledge they have acquired. Most mem-
bers are conscious of this problem and try at least to prev ent those colleagues
who are in conflict with the majority from taking over the office job. When
Helmut in the Oktoberdruck office was opposed to most of his colleagues,
they obj ected to a friend of his taking ov er the second office job because they
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felt threatened by this accumulation of power.
Other collectives such as KoMet tried to rotate the office job every six to
twelve months, to give every member the chance to understand the admini-
strative proceedings. For manyKoMet members, this meant obtaining an in-
sight into mechanisms fromwhich they had been excludedwhileworking as
dependent workers in ordinary industry. As Noppe put it:
For the first lime I was able to realize how capital ists deal with one another,
how their personal and business quarrels have to take second place to their
cornillon interest in money. (Noppe,, KoMet, 8.8.1984)
How ev er, the high turnov er in membership made it impossible to g enera-
lise the administrative expertise. In 1984, only two of the elev en KoMet
members had actually worked in the office, and the principle of rotation w as
beginning to be questioned. Members complained of the waste of limend
money involved in introducing yet another member to theworkings of the of-
fice.
Even those members who have worked in the office are not always clear
about how the accounts operate, and if they do understand they are usually in-
capable of passing on their understanding to the others. In the autumn of
1984, KoMet was considering the question of looking fora professional ac-
countant who would be able to make the books more comprehensible for all
members and relate the income received each month more closely to the re-
sults. 'The members hoped that they would then be able to participate more
equally in the process of planning.
Some collectives, like Oktoberdruck and the BaUbüro, have introduced
microcomputers to facilitate accounting and the writing of standard letters.
Others, 1 ike Wuseltronick, which makes ex tensiv e use of computers in its en-
gineering projects, rejects their use for administrative purposes. Wuseltro-
nick members maintain that the use of computers for accounting and business
correspondence detaches the members from the intrinsic content of these ac-
tivities and restricts their overview (Wuseltronick-Kollektiv 1984:34). The
general tendency among collectiv es, how ever, seetns tobetow ard favouring
computers as a means of presenting clearly outlinedbalancesheets to the col-
lective and increasing the clarity of the accounts.
Even clear accounts, those that go a long way toward putting the results
within everybody's grasp, do not necessarily succeed. The accountant for
the largest collective in Berlin, the newspaper die tageszeitung, which had
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120 members in 1984, said that he spent most of his lime trying to develop
new w ay s of making the accounts more intelligible to ev ety one. He drew dia-
grams and wrote page after page about the financial situation and the mea-
sures needing tobe taken. But although his colleagues are now capable of un-
derstanding his financial statements, they often still do not bother to read
them. Theonly time w hen he can be sure of making his fmancial concerns un-
derstood is in a state of emergency and imminent financial crisis. Even if the
basic political decisions of the enterprise are made in the meeting, the de
facto economic development is for a large part influenced by the office ad-
ministrating the finances.
The lack of involvement in administrative matters and the reluctance to
assume responsibility for difficult negotiations cannot be explained simply
by a lack of persona' commitment to the collective experiment. Newcomers
and younger members often feel overwhelmed by the double obligation of
administration and ex ecution. They are not sufficiently secure to make deci-
sions that could decide the destiny of the entire enterprise, especially if they
are still struggling with the basic requirements of production. Work plan-
ning not infrequently becomes aproblem of competence. As in theory all the
members should feel responsible for all the taslcs, the dilemma arises that so-
metimes nobody feels responsibleatall . The desire to take into cons ideration
the opinions of all members, in view of their different lev els of experience
and willingness to take risks, becomes an important cost factor for the enter-
prise.
Discipline
Work planning in the coll ectiv e is based on a high 1 ev el of mutual understand-
ing among all its members and can only be efficient if everybody feels re-
sponsible for the enterprise and if the common decisions are ex ecuted volun-
tarily. External pressure is replacedby self-discipline. Usually itis assumed
that everybody gives his or her best, according to his or her individual capa-
bilities . This type of relationshipcomes close tow hatFox calls " high trustre-
lations, " based on the" assumption that commitment includes effort and ap-
plication being freely offered rather than measured calculatively against a
specific return. " Fox found thatw here relationships of this kind w ereprev a-
lent in an enterprise they included freedom from close supervision, open net-
works of interaction and communication, emphasis on problem solving
through mutual adj ustment, and the handling of disagreements on the basis
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of "worlcing through" in the light of shared goals (Fox 1974:77). The opposi-
tes on the scale are low trust relations, characterised by closely checked and
monitored work where small indulgencies are eliminated (Fox 1974:107).
Control mechanisms and sanctions are used to enforce conformity.
Working as a repro-monteur w ith Oktoberdruck, Herbie moved from the
usual relationship of high trust v is-à-v is colleagues to one of low trust when,
in a personal conflict, he w as accused by the other members in his section of
being careless and of w asting a great deal of material by making unnecessary
mistakes. As he felt w rongly accused, he collected all the material wasted in
the section over a five-w eek period and presented the full meeting with an
analysis proving he was responsible for the w aste to no greater degree than
were any of his colleagues.
Criticisms of work-style are often formulated in tenus of " commitment,"
rather than in ternis of performance or efficiency. The judgement of work-
style and personal relations are closely intertwined, as a single member' s
lack of goodwill may cause the entire system to crumble. If a member fre-
quently arrives late or spoils materials, he or sheis accused of exploiting fel-
low members and of lacking conunitrnent to the collective. If members have
serions personal problems with colleagues, they often express their hostility
through criticism of other members' work-styles. Members responsible for
delays or shortcomings in production are expected to admit to their mistakes
informally and to show concern. The other members then generally will not
criticize them but, instead, may pity their misfortune or joke about their
clumsiness.
Only in very serions cases, andw hen the same mistake occurs repeatedly, ,
will the member be criticised for his lack of responsibility. According to Jar-
chow and Klugmann (1980:118), collectives have a strong belief in the po-
wer of self-regulation that can, how ever, turn into open aggression if it is dis -
appointed. ne absence of formai obligations makes it difficult to tackle
conflicts at an early stage.
Acomparison between the attitudes tow ard conflicts in British conununes
and Berlin collectives leads to some interesting observations. As Abrams
and McCullough (1976:200-201) explain, the members of British commu-
nes felt fundamentally threatened by disputes over tools, household tasks,
and consumable abjects. 'They point out that the more people relate to one
another as "whole persons," the more at risk they are of endangering their
personal relationships by conflicts over practical matters. The members of
Berlin collectives also engage in their small and large conflicts in a very per-
halshs 00373687 (2009-04-07)
110 Self-Management
sonal way, but they sometimes maintain that conflicts are aproof of creative
and developing human relationships, that they are in a way inevitable and in
their ultimate outcome often positive. Both attitudes toward conflicts seem
extraordinary. Members of British communes overemphasize the need for
harmony, the Berlin collectivists the need for open conflict Neither seems
yet to have found an equilibrium.
The fonns of control and coercion frequently used in business enterprises
— such as refusing a day off when an employee requests one, relegating him
or her to a low er position, notgranting an increase in salary — w ouldcontra-
dict the collective principle of fundamental equality and are never used.
Members who are dissatisfied with a colleague often feel they do not have
any concrete means at hand to compel him or her to improve their work. The
only form of punishment they use is as personal as the way in which criti-
cisms are expressed. If a member does not submit to a minimum of collective
discipline and constantly jeopardizes the production planning, his or her col-
leagues may start toostracise the offender. They refuse to speakto him or ask
his advice andwill not help him in his taslcs. If thesemeasures are ineffective
and the recalcitrant member continues to lead " a parasite' s existence," the
other members may resort to the ultimate means of punislunent — exclusion
from the collective.
Exclusion occurs extremely rarely and only if the member in conflict has
obviously ceased to identify with the collective. Most collectives require a
majority of three-quarters or a unanimous decision to exclude one of their
members, a procedure I witnessed only once during my two years of field-
work.
Compromise and No Decision
"The great disadvantage I see in collectiv ework is thatyou have to talk about
everything far too mach all the time." This is how Friedel, a member ofKo-
Met, secs the difficulties of collective decision making.
Trying to analyse the interminable discussions and the mechanisms of de-
cision making I witnessed during innumerable collective meetings, I not
only started to agree with Friedel, I also realised that the most frequent result
of these discussions w as the absence of decision. Are collectiv es sorackedby
conflict that they carnet reach any agreement? Do they consist of people
without strongw ills or opinions w ho are incapable of making up their minds?
How then do they survive as a group?
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Just as apolitical party or an academic department may have internai factions
but must present a united front toward the outside world, so collectives are
built on abasie persona' consensus of all members. Most of the decision-ma-
king processes I witnessed were not long or complicatedbecause of irrecon-
ciliable conflicts; instead, the complication lay in the fact that maximum
unity of opinion had to be reached T he ideas of the individualistic members
had tobe reconciled in order to guarantee their loyality to the w hole. For titis
purpose, long debate and failure to decide may sometimes be more appro-
priate than a rapid, clear-cut decision. The decision-making processes of
collective meetings fit into the three categories of unauthoritative decision-
making distinguished by Kuper (1971:21)in his studies of the political insti-
tutions of acephalous societies. Ibis first category represents the complete
failures debated at lengthwithout any resolution; the second, represents ce-
remonial decisions that in fact had already been taken beforehand; and the
third, represents the ambiguous decisions that make action impossible until a
further, more clear-cut decision is taken. As we shall see, collectives in fact
practice all these three types.
Most controversial are those decisions that make obvions the contradic-
tions between ideals and practice. Often the proposais of the more idealisti-
cally minded members are not rej ectedoutright but, at the same lime, are not
supported if they go against the more pragrnatic interests of the tnajority. Ac-
tual decisions, then, become vety difficult, if not impossible, to make.
When Marita, Oktoberdruck' s bookkeeper, wanted to push through the
decision that the collectiv e should cease to employ women on a part-time ba-
sis to do the cooking and cleaning , she met the passiv e and sil ent resistence of
the other, mostly male, members. Although she brought up titis point at
every meeting for w eelcs, noclear-cutdecisionwas made. Sheboycottedthe
conunon hot lunches and spokewith each member individually in order to re-
cruit supporters. Although most of the male members agreed in principle
that each member should do all the tasks and that no wage-labour should be
employed simply to free them from the more unpleasant chores, they did not
relish the idea of cooking for twelve people once a fortnight or of working
lace on Friday evenings to clean the workshop.
At the first meeting I witnessed, Marita presented the group with a cal-
culation proving that they were spending DM 1,200 per month on part-time
female wage-labour, a sum that would allow them to integrate another full
member into the collective and rotate the unpopular tasks among them all.
She underlined her financial statement with the moral daim that these wo-
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men were working under appalling "precapitalist" conditions, without so-
cial security and without the right to participate in the collectiv e decision ma-
king. Her argumentprovoked interminable discussions. Itw as neither rej ec-
ted outright nor fully accepted. Only Helmut, w ho fora long time had filled
the role of opinion leader, obj ected openly to her proposai and accus coi her of
being unrealistic and moralising. He claimed that nobody would carry out
these tasks properly if he or she w as notpaid expressly to do so and therefore
fel t under an obligation. Only afterw eeks of discussion did a solution present
itself, and it w as from outside. Some of the women previously employed to
do the cooking founded a mobil e coll ectiv e canteen thatprovided sev eral col-
lectives with hot lunches white having the st tus of an independent collecti-
ve.
Decision-making processes rarely lead to clear-cut solutions but radier
end in compromise. Hardly ev er do the members actually vote on a decision,
as they are conscious of the dangers of majority decisions in conflict situa-
tions. A majority decision leav es a minority of members dissatisfied and,
therefore, threatens the unity of the collective. Repeated majority decisions
with a stable minority lead, in the long run, to factions inside the group and
hence to instability and fluctuating membership. Only unanimous decisions
and unanimously accepted compromises are capable of maintaining the
unity of the collective. Although differences of opinion among members are
frequent, the general understanding is that compromise is always possible
and that the points of view of all members must be respected.
'Mis attitude appears very clearly in a conflict Iwitnessed in the summer
of 1984. KoMet was div ided ov er the question of w hether a former member,
Michael, a friend of Noppe and the declared enemy of Fritz, should be al-
low ed to use the collective' s machinery for a few days toprepare some tools
for a dev elopment project in Nicaragua.
During the lunch towhich Michael was inv ited to discuss the question, Oi-
sela and Nappe did most of the talking. Oisela shared Fritz' s hostility tow ard
Michael because he had once offended her during her apprenticeship with
KoMet by accusing her of being an unproductive parasite within the collec-
tive. She accused Noppe of hav ing suggested that Michael shoul d use theKo-
Met machinery deliberately in order to provoke Fritz and herself. Instead,
she offered to fmd another workshop for Michael. Noppe countered that he
considered Michad s unpaid work for the Nicaragua proj ect v ery useful and
that he had been sure the others w oul d hav ew anted to support it. He propos ed
that Michael could use the machines in the early hours of the moming at a
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time when Fritz and Gisela were not working.
The discussion continuel to oscillate between the two pol es and no clear-
cut decision w as taken. Fritz and Michael, the actual opponents, didnot par-
ticipate in the discussion at all. Gisela claimed that she didnotwish to impose
her personal view of Michael on the others but wanted Noppe to show some
understanding of her point of view, otherwiseshew oul d not"grow ol d in this
collective. " Most of the other members had no particular sympathy nor dis-
like for Michael and w anted the conflict to be resolv edpeacefully. How ever,
none of them w as capabl e of proposing an acceptable compromise, and in the
end Michael simply came to work in the early morning, leaving before Fritz
and Gisela arrived
In this conflict, only a small minority of members was irrvolved: Noppe
made the proposai, and Fritz and Gisela objected to it But Fritz and Noppe
were the members of longest standing and had considerable influence as opi-
nion leaders, so their conflict could not be ignoredby the other members. It
developed into a pow er struggle betw een Fritz andNoppe, w hich wentmuch
further than the actual topic under discussion. A clear-cut decision by the
other members in favour of one or the otherwould hav e spl it the col 1 ective by
show ing very clearly the allegiances to Fritz or to Noppe. By stressing that
shedid not wish to push through a decisionbutwanted tosee signs of unders-
tanding on both sides, Giseia tried to disarm the tw o factions and show w illin-
gness to compromise. In fast; by the time Fritz left the collective a few
months later, Gisela had managed to change positions from that of an ally of
Fritz to a figure of reconciliation.
Dealing with one another in an egalitarian contez t is asocial skill that must
be learned, and members possess it in differing degrees when they join. The
members who have a greater say in the enterprise and are most listened to are
not necessarily those with the most developed manual skills and the greatest
work experience; sômetimes those with greater say have more social skills
and are accustomed, from their previous work and living situations, to dea-
ling with problems and conflicts in larger groups. Gisela, for instance, had
only six months' work experience as a toolmaker but had lived for years in
communal households (Wohrtgemeinschaften)andhadparticipated in group
experiments. She was already much more at ease in fighting her points
through at meetings thanw ere Friedel andNoppe, w ho hadworked foryears
as toolmakers in business industry.
Collectives abundantly use what Ffirschman calls "the voice option."
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Dissatisfied members are expected to discuss at length their problems in the
group and to search for a solution that enforces their loyalty to the group
(Ilirschman 1970:77). How ev er, those members, especially, who are not
able to make their opinions heard or w ho have started to disagree profoundly
with the very principles of collective organisation often quite suddenly
choose the "exit option" — they leave the collective. The sudden departure
of a fellow member often throws the group into greater confusion than
months of heated debates, as there is "no talking back to thosewho have ex it-
ed" (1-llrschman 1970:126). The group remains behind with its contradic-
tions and often only then is it able to make the decisions it has delayed for so
long. As w e saw in the preceeding chapter, it w as the "exit" of Hansi that
pushed Wuseltronick into allowing for the possibility of private accumula-
tion.
The outcome of a decision-making process often depends on the presence
or absence of reconciliatory figures; the ability of one member to formulate
generally acceptable compromises prov es as important as efficient produc-
tion planning . As the chairman of a large German firm pointed out to me, the
avoidance of majority decisions is also characteristic of decision-making
processes on the managerial boards of business enterprises. Disagreements
between managing directors are frequent, but actual voting on a controv er-
sial issue occurred on theboard of this particular firm as rarely as two or three
times a y ear. Decisions were rarely made on the board itself; agreements
were reached through a slow process of finding a generally acceptable solu-
tion. The role of the chainnanw as to pose the problem and to listen to the so-
lutions suggested at the meeting, discuss thesewith the opposing factions in-
div idually then, at a further meeting, formulate a generally acceptable com-
promise.
According to Bales, most successful groups first assemble information,
then from this make inferences to try and form corrunon opinions. Only after
such groundwork of accepted facts, common inferences, and sentiments do
they corne to more specific suggestions (Baies quoted in Sofer 1972:171). As
the example of the chairman giv en above shows, this can be done more effi-
ciently if somebody is allocated the task of summing up and formulating
compromises. Kuper (1971:18) makes a similar analytical point referring to
decision-making processes among the Kalagari. He w rites that, especially
when a chairman with an external power base is introduced, decision-ma-
king becomes more efficient.
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The "Boss"
All the collectives I analysed once had, or still have, one or two members
who stand out clearly from the rest. The collectivists themselves jokingly
call them " our bosses." At different periods in the history of their respective
collectives, Hans-Christian and Fritz of KoMet, Reiner, Hansi, and Eber-
hardof Riiseltronick, Helmut and Constantin of Oktoberdruclç and Klaus of
the FahrradBüro have occupied this position. These strongly motivated
members imposed themselves on the others by their determination to realize
their ideals and to take action where others were hesitating.
Characteristics of the "Boss"
Of the eight "bosses" listed above, Fritz of KoMet is a classic example. He
took part in the founding of the collective in 1979 and was an enthusiastic
propagator of theidea of workers' self-management. Hestrongly believedin
emancipated structures of production in w hich ev ery body w oul d vol untarily
contribute his best to the running of the enterprise. Relatively inexperienced
when he beg anw orkwithKoMet, heinvested a great deal of energy in acquir-
ing the skills of a professional toolmaker and in building up the enterprise.
When the old founders — who had initially shared his enthusiasm — left,
Fritz found himself the most experienced and enterprising member, sur-
rounded by inexperienced new corners. He dealtw ith the customers, w ho be-
came used to asking for him if they wanted to negotiate an order or required a
special service. To complete orders he had personally promised to custom-
ers, Fritz sometimes w orkecl I ate into the night At meetings, the other mem-
bers became accustomed to waiting for him before starting to discuss busi-
ness matters. Hais burden of responsibilities constantly increased. He not
only had to excuse the other members' shortcomings to the customers but
was also asked by the other members to check their products before they
were sent out. But his criticisms were not always well received and were
sometimes rejected as displaying a bosslike attitude.
Informally, Fritz acquired the roles that are attributed formally to a mana-
ger in business. To maintain the continuity of the collective' s production, he
became the mediator between collective and customers, feeling personally
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"Hey boss, couldyou corne here! There 's someoneherewhowantstoknow about our
collective."
responsible for any shortcomings that affected the orders. He felt that he had
beenpushed into this role, despite his own political convictions, by pressure
of circumstances and was now unable to escape from it. Although the prob-
lem was discussed in the collective, it appeared difficult to redistribute the
burden Fritz w as bearing. He had grown into this role and w as now kept in it
not only by his colleagues but also by the customers, w ho addressed thernsel-
ves to him because they knew him best. To escape this contradictory situa-
tion, Fritz fmally left the collective.
The comparison with Fritz' s colleague and co-founder, Noppe, shows
that stepping into the role of " boss" when the more experienced and qualified
members 1 eav e is not an entirely automatic development. Noppe never tried
to take on more responsibilities than were necessary to sustain the tasks he
undertook. Although he had a g reat deal of w ork ex perience, he did not fe,e1 at
ease in dealing w ith customers, nor didhe enjoy training newcomers. Cisela,
the trainedpedagogue, explained the reluctance of her colleague torepresent
KoMet to the outsideworld in terras of education. While Fritz had spent sev -
eral y ears at university and in political groups mainly composed of students,
Noppe had left school at fourteen and hadbeen employ ed as a qualifiedw ork-
er ever since. He had not had the opportunity to acquire the same self-confi-
dence in presentation as a university student.
Fritz' s position with KoMet w as characterised by aspects he shares with
other informai leaders. Of the eight "bosses" mentioned above, all had re-
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ceived some university education; six had been, like Fritz, founders of their
collectives; five were the most-qualified members; seven had the most in-
tense contact with customers; four had a strong influence within the collec-
tive; four were or still are the formai owners of the machinery; and all are
men. Six of the leaders were virtually living for their collective. During the
period of their leadership, their energies were concentrated on the enter-
prise. Their allegiance show ed symptoms similar to those described by Co-
ser as typical for members of "greedy orgainsations" such as utopian com-
munities. "The good communitarian had no private self. ne greedy com-
munity had succeeded in sucidng up his substance, leaving only a shell" (Co-
ser 1967:215). Typically, emotional energies were al so transferred from the
dy ad to the community (Coser 1967:212). For years, the informai leaders
had no strong love-relationships, and not uncommonly their departure from
the " boss" role coincidedwith them hav ing children and entering into a more
demanding domestic relationship.
To become a " boss," a member must be prepared to assume increased re-
sponsibility , besides the additional tasks that any organisational mistake may
require; he must also enjoy this exposed position. Not all members would do
this, and some are ev en glad w hen certain tasks are taken from them. Analy s-
ing decision-making in business enterprises, Barnard points out that the
making of decisions was generally felt to be burdensome by managers. He
concluded that people tend to avert decisions if possible, rather titan feel
pl easure by imposing them on others (Barnard quoted in Sofer 1972:164).
To alleviate the taslcs of decision-making and representation, some members
of collectives would gladly tolerate an informai leader for a time and then re-
ject him if he becomes too powerful.
Sex Bics
In none of the four collectives analysed was a woman in the position of
"boss," but women were often active in overthrowing the male " bosses" if
such a situation presented itself. In this way, women were the vanguard for
an alternative style of leadership. In my research among other Berlin collec-
tives, I came across only one woman who was clearly the informai leader.
Marlene, a founding member of the consulting office STA771verke, had the
same characteristics as those listed for the eight male "bosses." Shewas the
most qualified member, writing a doctoral thesis on the means of financing
collective enterprises. She play ed the role of ideological leader and had taken
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an important part in developing contacts with customers.
Comparing the five most influential women in the four collectives — Ma-
rita, Cisela, Ulrike, Brigitte, and Veronika —with the eight male "bosses, "
it is seen that most had a university education, like the males they kept close
contact with the customers, and they had some influence in ideological is-
sues. But most of the women lacked higher working skills, nonew ere among
the founders of their collective, and nonew ere in the position of being the for-
mal owner of the enterprise.
It is still the exception for womentobe among the founders of collectives.
The only woman who participated in the setting up of any of the four collec-
tives studied was Marlis, Constantin' s girlfriend. Although she helped
foundagitdruck and later Oktoberdruclç she nev er became one of the format
co-owners of either enterprise. With both collectives, it was Constantin,
alone or with a male friend, who was registered as the owner. In most metal
and printing collectives, women play a much more important part than they
do in the general labour market. How ev er, men are still in the majority and
tend to be better qualified In the bicycle collectives, the sex ratio is more ba-
lanced. For instance, in the Fahrradeiro Ulrike, the first woman member,
advanced after y ears of membership to become one of the most experienced
bicycle mechanics, but she did notbecome aleatler, although the w omen out-
numbered the men four to three. Insteacl of becoming a leader herself, she ac-
tiv ely participated in removing Klaus, who occupied the role of " boss. " She
ev en consulted alawyer in order to take legal action against Klaus. Together
with other women fiercely opposed to the emergence of leadership-roles,
she then tried to inhibit the emergence of replacement "bosses."
Hans, who is now the owner of theFahrradBüro, tried to assume the role
of leader butwithout success. When helefttheFahrradBüro in the autumn of
1983 to take a temporary post as a trainee teacher (which he later aban-
doned), he tried to install a succ,essor w ho some of the w omen rejected. Apart
from his personal desire for greater influence, Hans had the conviction that
an enterprise like the FahrradBuro had to expand if it was to survive in the
market and offer its members a reasonable income. To achieve this goal and
give the collective a more dynamic structure, he was convinced that strong
leaders like himself were necessary.
The other members did not allow him to assume this role. Veronika, a fe-
minist, was strongly opposed to his choice of successor because she did not
want another pretender to the "boss-rote. " When she vetoed the integration
of Rolf, Hans' s candidate, Hans in tum vetoed the continued employ ment of
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Mathias, a member dear to the women's faction, who was still in his proba-
tionary period.
Veronika, the leader of the female faction, explained the conflict in terms
of sex roles. According to her, Mathias was rejected by the male faction be-
cause hewas not fulfilling the expected male role of a " macho" comrade. He
was a quiet man, calmly going about his work without trying to appropriate
the most interesting tasks for himself. For the women, he w as a cornpetent
person who had the needs of the entire collective at heart and was fulfilling
his tasks wherever necessary. They considered him ideal as a colleague, in
contrant to Hans, who in their ey es was a progressive collective manager in-
terested in developing profitable structures without caring greatly for the
people involved. They insisted that good personal relationships and a
friendly atmospherew ere more important to them than aprofitabl e org anisa-
tion that would earn them a fortune. The collective achieved a compromise
by employing both Rolf and Mathias in February 1984, but a y ear later Hans
sent Rolf, who was not yet a full associate, a letter of dismissal in order to
show him who was boss. The resistance of the female members, however,
made it impossible for this to be implemented.
Hans w as unable to become the "boss" because the other members denied
him access to this role. The innovations he wanted to introdueewere consid-
ered unsuitable, ev en objectionable, and the other members refused to sur-
render their responsibilities into the hands of a leader.
Education and class background seem to be important elements in deter-
mining how women react to the male appropriation of power. The twelve
womenworkers of the Fakenhanicooperativ e discussedby Wajcman felt in a
much weaker position toward male managers seizing power than do the
women in the Berlin collectives. The Fakenham women had occupied their
small shoe factory when it was to be closed down in 1972 and attempted to
continue it as aworkers' cooperative. All the women exc,epttheworkers' di-
rector, Nancy, had no higher education and no experience in dealing with ad-
ministration and male authority (Wajcman 1983:85). The cooperativ ew as at
first sponsored through bans from Scott Bader, who introduced a manage-
rial system of work-control and a male director. The new director removed
the responsibility of bookkeeping from the w omen, w ho thereby lost the pos-
sibil ity of participating effectively in the management of thefactory, butwas
hirnself unable to accomplish the managerial tasks. After months of misman-
agement, the women passed a motion of no confidence and dismissed the di-
rector (Wajcman 1983:78). They did not feel sufficiently self-confident and
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skilled, how ev er, to continue without a manager and were seeking a male
replacement. "As far as the Fakenham women were concerned, their know-
ledge that lias (the manager) had been incompetent didnot disturb their be-
nef that, in general, men made the best managers" (Wajcman 1983:178).
The Fake.nham women were not motivated by broad political considera-
tions when they occupied their factory but by the imminent need to preserve
their jobs. They only slowly acquired more self-confidence and a certain
pride in running their own enterprise, although their general attitude tow ard
men and society remained profoundly conservative. The women in the Ber-
lin collectives, on the contrary, choose to work in collectives because they
are strongly influenced by ferninist idea.s and are determined tomake a stand
against male dominance.
Keeping the "Boss" Under Control
The source of the informai leader' s power arises out of the inherent contra-
diction that all the members are expected to take an equal share of the respon-
sibilities but are often incapable of doing so, and out of the fact that decisions
made in the meeting are often so ambiguous that they =mot be directly im-
plemented. Recognising a similar dilemma on a large v ariety of councils,
Kuper (1971b: 23)maintained that "ambiguous decisions suppose an effec-
tiv e decision-making institution outside the council. " He quoted the ex ample
of die Secretary General of the United Nations, whose status and authority
arose from the fact that decisions taken by the United Nations council were
ambiguous, leaving him free to interpret them. Collectives do not have a for-
mai head, so any member can assume the rote of de facto decision-maker, a
factwhich contributes to some extent to the chaos of collective organisation.
The question that arises here is: are informai leaders more easily controlled
titan those to whom power is formally assigned?
No structures are developed to account for differences in qualifications,
work experience, and length of membership, which therefore manifest
themselves unpredictably. Members with work experience have greater in-
fluence in matters of production, thosew ho hav e know n customers for y ears
continue to negotiatewith them. In periods of strong fluctuation, these mem-
bers represent continuity and stability for the customers and the creditors.
Enterprising leaders often acquire their position by opening up new markets
or promoting new products.
In the Wuseltronick collective, for instance, Hansi — the first "boss" —
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provided the initial impetus to found the collective by virtue of his connec-
tions w ith research funding. Reiner, the second " boss, " brought i n one of the
most important research projects; and Eberhard, the most recent "boss,"
travelled to the United States to assess the market for their new product, the
large windmill.
Hansi lost his position as the founding "boss" in 1981, when he was ac-
cused of monopolising both contacts and the most interesting tasks. Reiner
was accusedwith him, but nobody took him seriously because of his dreamy
and unpractical attitude. Hansi agreed to withdraw from part of his activ ities
and reconrunended that everybody shoul d take on more responsibil ity for the
collective. Reiner feared this solution, in case it resulted in his having to
carry the entire responsibility alone. He put moral pressure on Hansi to re-
sume his activities, but as he continued to refuse, the twoold friends soon be-
came declared enemies.
The collectivists explained this conflict in ternis of "the chiefs" versus
"the workers." The structure of the collective was centred around the plan-
ners, who organised the proj ects the others w ere ex ecuting. The s mpl ew ith-
drawal of Hansi did not solve this more profound structural problem, as no
alternative was in sight to replace him in his role. Two of the "workers,"
Matze and Brigitte, tried the individualistic sol uti on ofleav ing the collective
fora couple of menais to find out for themselves whatjob they really wanted.
Both have since returned, and Matze, especially, has buil t up a work domain
for himself in which the others interfere as little as possible.
Hansi' s central position in the collective bas since been taken over by a
fairly recent member, Eberhard. He became a close friend of Reiner, coop-
erated on the collective' s three most important projects, and intensified ex-
ternal contacts. According to him, a collective involved in such compl icated
work processes cannot manage w ithout a chief, and a person capable of un-
derstanding complex contexts can very easily slip into this role.
By 1988, the responsibility for ex ternal contacts was clearly divided
among the members, according to the products they produced Brigitte, for
instance, became responsible for the wind-measuring section. Eberhard,
however, well known to all the customers, continued to be addressed by
them.
The shyness and i nex perience of some members reinforces the pos i tion of
the "boss," as these members often turn to him for help and advice. As new
members are often not systematically introduced into the collective organi-
sation, most are only too gl ad te fi nd somebody whowill take charge of them.
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How ev er, more experienced members strongly resent a fellow member giv -
ing them advice without being asked to do so. One of the usual reproaches
made to an informai leader is that he walks through the workshop surveying
his colleagues' work just like a formait
"Bosses" in collectives are in aprecarious situation, as no special position
is assigned to them, and the mere recognition of their ex istencew ould contra-
dict the collective principles. A master artisan working in the crafts' collec-
tiveHandwerker Genossenschaft Mannheim, comparedhis present ambigu-
ous role in the collectiv ewith his previous work experiences in a business en-
terprise. In the latter, his functions as a master were clearly defined and his
relationships to his colleagues detemtined by them He w as the mouthpiece
for the boss. He made out the lists of tasks to be done, acted as mediator be-
tw een customers and j ourney men, and organised the training of apprentices.
In the collectiv e, he w as formally on an equal footing w ithhis colleagues, but
it was still he who gave the technical advice. When customers complained
about the completion of an order, he felt entirely responsible for the profes-
sional performance of his colleagues, an attitude that w as incompatible w ith
the principles of self-management (Flieger 1984:219).
Faced with a similar problem of unauthoritative leadership, the contem-
porary commune TwinOaks. , in the United States, attempted to solve itby ap-
pointing three planners who would serve eighteen month ternis. These rota-
ting planners did not dev elop any long-term plans, however, but tried to
serve the immediatew ants of the commune. As they were nev ertheless con-
stantly subjected to heavy criticism from the other members, their role soon
became so dreaded that nobody was willing to take it on (Kanter
1972:18-21).
An informai leader must keep a low profile in order to survive. Only if he
manages to convince the other members by his arguments and commitment
to the collective may he keep his position for some time. Leaders in collec-
tives tend to be "expressive" rather than "instrumental," to use the distinc-
tion made by Parsons and Baies (1956:318). They are mediators; they defuse
disputes, and they can only be permissive as they lack the possibility of punis -
hing their fellow members. If they attempt to take on the role of "instrumen-
tal leader" — that is to say, if they try to impose discipline and give instruc-
tions — they are generally discarded rapidly . Leaders w ho try to impose their
point of view by manipulation or conspiracy, and thosewho no longer make
special contribution to the collective, are generally excluded from the group
with great rapidity. . Having occupied the position of leader, they can rarely
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be reintegrated as ordinary members.
Since 1981, of the eight "bosses" I have mentioned, three (Hans-Chris-
tian, Klaus and Helmut) have been more or less forcefully evicted, two
(Hansi and Fritz) have leftvoluntarily, and one (Constantin) was sent on hol-
iday for a year and then became an ordinary member. Only Eberhard and
Reiner are still recognized as the informai leaders of Wuseltronick.
Helmut of Oktoberdruck is a typical example of an unloved "boss" w ho
his fellow members finally evicted. He had managed to make the collective
dependent upon him in a situation of flux and friction As he had been respon-
sibl e for the office for some y ears, hewas able to use his knowl edge of the fi-
nancial situation to influence others at meetings. For instance, he decided al-
most entirely on his own initiativ e to allow the typesetter to set up his business
in one of Oktoberdruck' s rooms As he w as worlcing not only in the office but
also in the repro-mounting department, his influence was felt everywhere.
His excellent contacts with customers and suppliers were considered very
valuable for the enterprise. It w as alsogenerally admitted that a proportion of
the orders depended directly on him. Helmut did nothing to dissipate this im-
pression, nor did he try to make the others participate more; on the contrary,
he enjoyed being the "boss." At lunches and meetings, he sat at the head of
the table and, on one occasion, even chased away a visitor w ho had inadver-
tently taken his seat.
But while he occupied a position of power, he also became an outsider to
the group. Most members disliked him personally, and he could only count
two members among his friends. These two, Udo and Amrai, w ere so closely
attached to him that they supported all his opinions and were nicknamed
"Helmut' s disciples." Although Helmut was disliked, he was also respect-
ed. This respect only ceased when it became obvions hewas no longer iden-
tifying with the collective and that he intended to convince the others to
the enterprise. Although most members disagreed entirely with his inten-
tions, they still hesitated to force him to leav e because they feared disastrous
consequences. Out off from direct relations with customers and administra-
tion, the other members had developed a certain awe of marketing. In this
respect, they had became as " alienated" as their col leagues in business enter-
prises.
Helmut was well aware of this insecurity and stated publicly that his fel-
low members were dependent on him. He promised to create such a bad at-
mosphere that the others w ould leav ebefore he did. How ev er, afterweelcs of
psychological warfare with silent communal lunches, he and his two sup-
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porters left of their own accord. Since then, the seat at the head of the table
had usually remained unoccupied, and w hen one member sat there itw as jok-
ingly said that he would become the next "boss."
In the process of excluding an informai leader, the values of non-hierar-
chical organisation are again upheld and the leader becomes the scapegoat
who is made responsible for failures. The collectiv e can liberate itself from a
negativ e self-image by sending a " boss" away, , w hile it would have to strug-
gle with all its contradictions by reintegrating him as an ordinary member.
Berlin collectives seem to practice the periodic overthrow and exclusion of
leaders to reestablish egalitarian structures similar to Barth' s (1959) obser-
vations among the Swat Pathan. Meanwhile, members become increasingly
conscious that the fact alone of sending a leader aw ay does not solv e the struc-
tural problems that made it possible for him to obtain his position in the first
place.
Conclusion
The initial ideal of collective organisation was that every member should
participate equally in internat decision making and external representation.
In practice, how ev er, differences in age and competence, self-confidence,
and w illingness to listen to others forma complex blend of human relations
and informai power structures. Members have to acquire social skills to en-
able them to relate to one another, to limit the power of the few, and to ov er-
come their fear of important decisions. Collectiv e planning and decisionma-
king are time consuming because of the high degree of participation and the
reluctance to assume responsibilities. Skill in administrative tasks is con-
stantly compromised by fluctuating membership.
In place of hierarchy in the organisation of production, the collectivists
reintroduce the personal element. Group consensus and good personal rela-
tions between members are the fragile basis of collective self-management.
Relations between members are not defined through format social status but
through the skills of convincing others and of reconciling differences. The
power of the informai leaders w ho emerge is often more difficult to control
than if they had a formai status.
The abolition of relations of power and dominion, which are at thebasis of
the idea of self-management, can only be realised if the collectivists admit
that power relations play an important part in cooperation (Crozier and
Friedberg 1984:336). Only if they are brought into the open can these rela-
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tionships be effectively regulated. 1f they are covered up, new structures of
dependencies will arise at the nodal points of the collective system, espe-
cially where informai "bosses" take over the roles of managers and media-
tors between the collective and the " system."
Notes
1. The Montan law of codetermination (Monummitbestitnmungsgesetz:
1951) determined that the supeivisory boards of the mining and steel indus-
tries were to be 50 percent composed of representatives of workers and em-
ployees. In 1952, the constitutional law of enterprise (Betriebsverfassungs-
gesetz) decreed one-thirdparity codetennination for all other joint stock com-
panies.
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The Division of Labour in Collectives
Collectivists do not often refer explicitly to Marx, but implicitly many of
their ideas about how a collective shoul d function are strongly influenced by
Marxist critical analysis of capitalist society. . One of the key issues is the
Marxist concept of alienation, in the sense of the estrangement of the worker
in a capitalist enterprise from both the work process and the item he is pro-
ducing. Marx writes about the division of labour in capitalist manufacture:
It transforms the worker into a cripple, a munster, by forcing him to develop
some highly specialised dexterity at thecost of aworl d of productive impulses
and faculties. Not only are the various partial operations allotted to different
individuals but the individual himself is split up, is transformed into the auto-
matic motor of some partial operation. (Marx 1930 (1890), 1:381)
The alienated worker is incorporated as a continuously replaceable part in a
defined division of the production process, sometimes without knowing the
finished form of what he is producing, or w hat purpose itwill ultimately ser-
ve.
Marx did not attribute alienation to the division of labour as such but rath-
er believed that in a higher phase of communism the enslaving character of
alienation would disappear, and ev en the distinction between mental and
physical work would v anish. The key to the exploitative nature of the divi-
sion of labour lay in the property relations under capitalism as the division of
tasks was decided upon by the capitalist ow ners of the means of production,
who made use of the labour power purchased toits full adv antage. Once the
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capitalists w ere ov erthrown, the division oflabour would take on a different
meaning and would be based on the workers' natural inclination to cooper-
ate, each making full use of his or her abilities and carrying out the task to
which he or she w as best suited until "labour" entirely disappeared.
The collectivists, aw are of the workers' position in the state industries in
East Germany, no longer trust this vision of the remote future. Closer to
Marcuse, they regard this type of work as being as alien to workers in the
"real existing socialism" (the ironie phrase used by members of collectives
to describe the East German economy) as it used to exist on the other side of
the Berlin Wall, as it is to those in capitalist society. As Marcuse does, they
maintain that it is the logic of industrial society, obeying the principle of in-
creasing mechanisation, rationalisation, and efficiency, that imposes its
laws on the worker and transforms him or her into an element of the work
process. As a result of this, he or she has no individual influence but must
continue to fill theworldwith useless obj ects, which the manipulated consu-
mer is then called upon to acquire (Marcuse 1968).
In 1968, in a sertes of lectures at the Free University of Berlin, Marcuse
(1970: 62 ff) emphasized that in a free society " freedom must appear in la-
bour itself and not beyond labour." It should allow for a "creative experi-
mentalionwith the productive forces. " Calling upon students to take action,
he said:
In established societies there are stil] gaps and interstices in which heretical
methods can be practised without meaningless sacrifice, and stil] help the
cause... . The interstices within the established society are still open, and one
of the most important tasks is to make use of them to the full. (Marcuse
1970:76-77)
Members of collectives define their work as breaking w ith the logic of in-
dustrial production and as practising complete control over the process of
production in the small enclaves of the system they occupy. . They emphasize
that they are attempting to ov ercome the isolation of a highly div ided and clo-
sely delimitedworkplace and that they w ant to restructure the org anis ation of
production in such a way that any one worker may participate in an almost
complete cycle of production in the workshop and perform a large variety of
tasks. They try to acquire a broad range of skills, to rotate tasks among each
other, and to follow up the making of the product from beginning to end, at-
tempting to learn all the necessary worksteps.
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Collectivists try to practisewhatWallmann (1979: 17) call edworkw ith a low
degree of alienation:
Degrees of alienation are greatest where the worker has negligible control
over the value and the disposition of his product, least where he initiates the
work-effort, organises time, place, person — all the elements of theworkpro-
cess — and can identify with the product and the values of the product
A Working Day with Oktoberdruck — 18 February 1984
When I entered the kitchen of the Oktoberdruck collective at eleven in the
morning, Ingrid was drinking coffee and skimming through a wholesale
marketing catalogue. She had been at work since eight o' clock and had cl ea-
ned the montage room, together with her colleague Constantin, who was
generally the first to arrive. Ingrid was one of the more recent members of
Olctoberdruck, having joined after Helmut and his friends left in September
1983. She is a feminist who worked for many y cars free of charge as a pas-
te-up artist with the feminist journal Courage before it went bankrupt, ear-
ning her living at die same lime in an ordinary printing shop. She had now
settled in w ith Oktoberdruck and felt at easewith her colleagues. Shew as re-
spected professionally, although she had not y et acquired much experience
in repro-photography.
As soon as I arrived, she returned with a cigarette and her cup of coffee to
die light-table, where she was mounting a printing foil for a comic book.
"People don't know how to read any more, so we have to do comics now,"
shecommented jolcingly on her order. When I explained to her that I intended
to write down everything she did during the day and analyse it as an example
of how she organised herworlc, shebegan tocriticise theway many newcom-
ers start work. "Sonie start by working fourteen hours in one go, and then
sleep lace for days". She was convinced that the irregular work patterns of
one person could spoil all the other members' work rhythms and make for a
very stressful situation. In her previous employment in an ordinary printing
shop, she had felt much less tired, even though she had simultaneously been
working ten hours per w eek w ith Courage. Sheconsidered die emotional, in-
terpersonal discussions the most tiring aspect of her current work.
Ingrid then asked Constantin as a favour to redo one of the films she had
made for her order, so that she could continue mounting the foils. She
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brought a new foui, mounted the marks for the print and the fol d, checked the
page numbers with the help of an imposition sheet (Ausschiefimuster), and
marked them with a blue pen on the eight fields of her plan of the layout
(Standbogen). Then she fetched one film after another, checked them against
the paper model where the proportions were marked, and glued them imme-
diately to the foil, to avoid having to look them up again.
Klaus asked her where his ruler w as, and she gave him hers. She put the
finished foil on top of the others with a thin piece of paper in betw een. A tem-
porary helper came from the office looking for an order sheet. These sheets
were filled out in the mounting and print sections to allow the office to cal-
culate prices corresponding to hours worked. The order sheets had only re-
cently been introduced because the previous prices calculated by the office
differed too considerably from the actual hours worked. Ingrid' s search for
the order sheetw as interrupted by the telephone. She spoke for a w hile on the
phone then went back to work until Helmut, the typesetter w ho ran his own
small business next door to the mounting room, arriv ed fora chat. " If the cus-
tomers aren' tsloppy, for once, thenw e are, " he said, thenaddedjokingly, "I
am in favour of the replacement of man by the machine!" Ingrid responded
that this was not creative enough for her and drew Klaus into a discussion
about the pressures under which they were working.
When she had finished her fourth sheet, Ingrid took new foils from the
drawer punched themwith a punching machine, which also serv ed to punch
the printing plates. These holes are used to fix the plates in the press, and also
serve as an orientation for the mounting tokeep the distance to the edges cor-
rect. Donald (the printer) came up searching for the printing plate for the" so-
cial help leaflet" env clope, and Ingrid show ed him where it was.
She explained to me that she was checking black and white lay-sheets
(Montagen) by placing two foils mirror inverted on top of each other. She
then made carbon copies, which the customers had to check before the print
run w as started. For each alteration that w as not due to an error on her part,
she charged the customer a set amount: for instance, if she had to replace a
drawing and this had not been indicated beforehand. If she made a mistake
herself, for example mounting mirror inverted, she would make no charge.
Carbon copies had only recently been introduced to avoid the customer not
identify Mg a mistake until after the order had been printed and then claiming
a reduction or refund.
At one o'clock, lunch was ready, cooked by a woman from the canteen
collective. One after another, the members arrived, the last being the prin-
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ters w ho worked the ev ening shift from 2 to 9 p. ni Theconv ersation at the di-
ning table revolved around a dispute between a member of the commune
UFA and a member of die tageszeitung about whether the informai meeting
of collectives, Lundkreis, had the right to organise the "congress" of West
German and Berlin collectives in Berlin.
At tw oo' dock, Ingrid returned to herwork. Jürgen, w ho had taken the or-
der, came to explain to her that the paper for the order w as to be 63 cm, not 61
cm as she had initially thought, so she could work more easily. A customer
came tobring Constantin some moclels and fix a date for checking the carbon
copies. Constantin went to look up on the printing plan when the order w as
scheduled for printing, and the customer commented, "My god, you' re get-
ting pretty precisearound here!" Infact, the printing pl anw as also part of the
recent innovations.
At half past four, Ingrid started the last foil of the order. 'The order had
been a radier urgent one, which had put her under pressure. She had already
worked on Saturday in order to be able to work at a more relaxed pace the-
reafter. She intended to take another day off during thew eek instead. She ho-
ped to finish the rest of thecarboncopies before leaving that night and to hav e
enough time to make the corrections the next day and develop the last print-
ing plates in the afternoon. The printing would then be finished on the follow-
ing day. "Detennining the working time myself is a pleasure, but not ev ery -
body has learnt to estimate how long the individual work-steps are going to
take. With inexperienced newcomers this can be quite a strain."
Some films were missing for the last foil. Ingrid was running back and
forth between the montage room and repro-camera. At the same time, she
was chatting with Klaus and me about whether one should emigrate from
Germany if F. J. Strauss came topow er or the fundamentalist of the party Die
Grünen, Rudolf Bahro. Ingrid seemed radier suspicions of l3ahro' s funda-
mentalismbut hadbeen detemined since 1963 to emigrate if Strauss became
the new chancellor.
Klaus, w ho had finished his own work, suggested that he might help In-
grid with the final repro-photography. She had to search for the copies (Vor-
lagen) on films from previous orders. She put the films under the repro-ca-
mera on one side, and Klaus took the picture on the other. She realized too
late that the films were too large to fit her montage foil and would have to be
reduced. Itw as five past fiv e and Ingrid fel t too tired to concentrate properly.
Klaus too advised her to stop. But as she had set herself the goal of finishing,
she made a final effort, stuck the films together, and made a reductionwith
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Crans-illumination. But this process was unable to reproduce the small-size
lettering.
Just as she was deciding to give up and try again the next day, Constantin
joined them and adv ised Ingrid to put the film onw hitepaper and make a pho-
tographwith seven units. This was successful. Constantinwas more experi-
enced than any other member in the repro-montage department as he had
worked for ten years an as autodidact in all parts of the enterprise.
The printer on the evening shift came with the first printed sheet of the
comicbook, complaining that the drawing mark was in the wrong place. He
showed Ingrid the correct place. Constantin intervened and remarked that it
would havebeenbetter tomount lion a larg er foil altogether, because the tee
was v ery close to the edge and difficult to copy onto the printing plate. Ingrid
reacted cahnly, , explaining that she only received the correct paper size after
lunch and was going to replace the drawing marks the next day. 'The last pa-
ges with the photographs of the authors were still missing and the pictures
had to be screened But Ingrid preferred to leave this until the next day as she
was no longer working efficiently. She tidied up, threw the remains of the
fouis into the foil bin — Oktoberdruckcollects leftover printing materials se-
parately for recycling — covered the foils with tissue paper, and entered the
hours worked on the order sheet. It was 6 o' clock.
During her work day, Ingrid hadperformedmany tasks that in an ordinary
printing shop would have been taken over by several different people. She
carried out the repro-photography, mounted the foils, copied the printing
plates, and made the carboncopies, and she also dealtdirectly w ith the cus to-
mer. Although she w as solely responsible for her product until it reached the
printing stage, she constantly interacted with her colleagues. Unlike in abu-
siness enterprise, her colleagues participated in a sporadic and spontaneous
way. When Constantin made a few repro-photography for Ingrid' s order, it
was not because his assigned work was repro-photography but because he
wanted to do her a favour, and anyway was doing a few for the order hewas
working on. When Klaus stepped in to help Ingrid, he did sow ithout any obli-
gation, simply to allow her the possibility of going home earlier; he might ex -
pect her to do the same for him another day.
The closest interaction going on during this working day concerned mu-
tual problem solving. Members passed each other tools, discussedproblems
of production methods, and gave each other a hand with difficult tasks. To
make the reductionw ith the repro-camera, Ingrid and Klaus used trial and er-
ror until Constantin contributed from his own experience. In an ordinary
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printing shop, this technical problemwould hav ebeen solv ed by the foreman
or master; theworkers woul d not hav ebeen allow edto spend so much time in
experimentation. In the montage section of Oktoberdruck, problems have to
be solved in discussion with colleages, and mistakes are also discovered in
thatw ay . Unlike in an ordinary enterprise, theprinter complained clirectly to
the repro-monteur about an incorrect draw ing mark and explained how he
wanted the printing plate to look. No foreman existed who could have inter-
vened.
The Non-Division of Labour...
Most collectiv es set themselv es the aim of seeing that each member becomes
familiar with the entire production process, participates in its coordination
on an equal basis, and organises his or her own tasks at his or her own pave.
Fritz, a skillecl metalworker, emphasized the members' high lev el of indivi-
dual autonomy:
The great advantage ofwork in a coll ective is thecompletely free organisation
of one's own worlcplace and together with the members of one's own enter-
prise, the possibility of acquiring experiencewhichyou can get nowhere else
because elsewhere it is linked to format qualifications. (Fritz, Ko-
Met,13.4.1984)
Collectivists believe that only if each of themhas reached a high degree of in-
dividual autonomy will they then be able to replace a hierarchical organisa-
tion of production with a collective one. The ultimate practical aim is, there-
fore, to make each member replaceable by any of his colleagues, requiring
an equal level of skill and knowledge for all members.
...Versus Scientific Management
When I discussed the organisation of work in collectives with Constantin of
Oktoberdruck, one of the ideologists of the "raovement," he advised me to
read Bravennan' s Labour and Monopoly* Capital, so that I would be able to
appreciate the concept of work in collectiv es as a radical raponse to the Tay -
lorist theories of "scientific management "
Braverman (1974) analysed the theories of management developed by
Taylor at the end of the nineteenth century. Based on his own experiences as a
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Alternative Technology
Foreman: "Hup! Hup!"
Worker: "No way!"
foreman and master in the metal industry, Taylorwantedto dev elop a system
of work that made deliberate " go-slow" impossible and that forcedworkers
employed on a piece rate basis to accelerate iheir pace. His central ides w as
that managers should also acquire all the practical knowledge possessed by
the skilledworkers and should start to plan and div ide the production process
into very minute detail. Bray erman (1974:86,90) defined " scientific mana-
gement" as
an attempt to apply the methods of science to the increasingly compl ex prob-
lems of control of labour... . It starts, despite occasional protestations to the
contrary, not from the human point of view but from the point of view of the
management of a refractory work-force in a setting of antagonistic social rela-
tions... . Taylor w as seeking ... but an answer to the specific problem of how
best to control alienated labour — that is to say, labour power that is bought
and sold.
The skilled worker of Taylor' s day performed a large variety of tasks and
possessed the actual intellectual and practical knowledge necessary for pro-
duction, which the manager did not
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The machinist started with the shopdrawing, and turned, milled, bored,
drilled, pl aned, shaped, ground, filed, andotherwise machine- and hand-pro-
cessed die proper stock to the desired shape, as specified in the drawing. The
range of decisions to be made in the course of the process is by its very na-
ture enormous. (Braverman 1974:110)
The radical alterations proposed by Taylor to gain control over the labour
power w ere directed toward deskilling the worker. Ms first principlew as to
render the labour process independent of craft, tradition, and the workers'
knowledge. The second was to remove all possible mental laboùr from the
shop and centre it in the planning or layout department. The third was to use
this monopoly over knowledge to control each step of thelabour process and
its mode of execution (Braverman 1974:113-119).
The workers in the industries in which Taylor' s methods were first ap-
plied strongly objected to this deskilling, combined with strict control, and
mostly left to work in other traditional enterprises. Braverman (1974:149)
quotes the example of the Ford workers:
So great was labour' s distaste for the new machine system that towards die
close of 1913 every time the company wanted to add 100 ment° its factory per-
sonnel, it was necessary to hire 963.
However, soon the new style of organisation became so generalised that
workers had no other alternative. Braverman (1974:151) concluded: "The
apparent acclimatization of the w orker to the new mode of production grows
out of the destruction of all other ways of living."
13ravennan's analysis of the labour process under modem capitalism is
certainly very much to the point. It does not account, how ever, for the de-
fense mechanisms, such as sabotage, practised especially by workers in
Taylorised industries. Nor does he consider the much finer psychological
measures with which enterprises experiment today to coerce employees to
work liard and identify with the enterprise. As Gol dthorpe (quoted in Bey non
and Nichols 1977:xiii) wrote about new management techniques:
The second industrial revolution was sweeping aside the satanic mins of the
first and creating new types of factory. Managements werebecoming increas-
ingly concernedwith human relations,' while automated or process produc-
don systems gave rise to conditions of workwhich, from both aphysical and a
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social point of view, differed markedly from those characteristic of an earlier
age of industry.
Analysing theworking conditions in a modern chemical factory with the rep-
utation of being a vanguard for humane, automated production, Bey non and
Nichols concluded that the setup in the factory did not return to thew orkers
any of their original skills. Instead of re-establishing a direct link betw een the
worker and his product, the "system" only became more contradictory:
Itwants tp engage people as acorrnnodity, as labour power, tobe managed, di-
rected, controlled; it also wants them to become engaged, to be involved —
but not to control, not to manage for themselves. (Beynon and Nichols
1977:203)
While Bray ennan underlines the mechanisms of total control over the la-
bour force and Beynon and Nichols analy se the manipulativ e mechanisms of
modern management, Burawoy tries to resolve the paradox that workers
do actually identify with a labour process in w hich they have lost all control
ov er the product. He attempts toexplainw hy employ ees work as hardas they
do. Analysing the piece rate system in a machine shop in the " Allied" corpo-
ration in South Chicago, he emphasizes the importance of competition bet-
w eenworkers and of acertain amount of self-detennination to motiv ate them
(Burawoy 1979:94). Eng aging in what Buraw oy caps " the game of making
out," try ing to exceed the assigned production quota, the employees notonly
strive to make more money but also compete against each other to affirm
their status in their own infonnal hierarchies (Burawoy 1979:64). The game
is entered into for its relative satisfaction and ability to alleviate the mono-
tony of repeated tasks and because it presents an individual challenge to
achieve the best result inside the narrow limas of the piece rate system. It is
the desire to see outstanding individual performance rewarded and singled
out from that of fellow workers that motivates wage-labourers.
A "Network" Model of Production
Collectives wish to develop an alternative to the large scale industrial pro-
duction with which some members are familiar from personal experience
during their traineeship or previous employ ment. Instead of hierarchically
organised units, where each worker has an insight into only a tiny aspect of
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the ov erall process, they try toconceiv e of theproduction of ecologically and
socially useful goods through the cooperation of small independent units.
They want to substitute for the hierarchical "military" model a "network"
model of production. Uwe, a former member of KoMet, developed the initial
ideas his collective held about the substitution of industrial production:
Itwas not only our aim toproduceunder non-hierarchical relations ourselves
butwe alsowanted to demons trate a social principle. Wewanted to show that a
sixiety whichis organised on a small scalecan nevertheless produce products
likeballpens, spoons and tape-recordera.... Ifyoucouldprovethatcomplica-
ted final products, also mass products, can beproduced on a small scale and in
collective relations of production, then you could say to people: You don't
need military hierarchical production to get a refrigerator or a washing ma-
chine.' Because this is their fear, that a revolution or other fundamental
change would alter their standard of living and endanger the production of
consumer goods. (Uwe, KoMet, 25.4.1984)
Uwe' s view is not altogether representative of the majority of collecti-
vists, but all of themwould agreewith his preference for small scale produc-
lion. Most collectives maintain that their ideal for work organisation can
only be realistically approached in small, easily managed structures, where
communication between members is direct and the level of qualifications
high. Size seems to be one of the decisive factors in determining whether a
collective can manage without a formai division of labour. In fact, none of
the forty -six production collectives in West Berlin has more than seventeen
members (with the exception of the newspaper die tageszeitung with more
than 200 members). They tend tow ard crafts, w hich can be practised in small
units. None of the collectives have engaged in industrial production of mass
items. They manufacture single parts and small series for which a fairly high
lev el of skill and creativity is required. As Wallmann (1979:17) points out,
the balance between identity and alienation is casier to maintain in a small-
scale setting with "multiplex" relationships, where the workers "know all
about each other and where they have more than a single work-role."
In an analysis of ninteenth century Genossenschaften, Franz Oppen-
heimer (1922:70) maintains than this appeared mainly in crafts that had not
yetbeen" revolutionizedby the machine," where the machinewas el a tool
of the worker, not the worker an auxiliary of the machine. It is striking that a
large number of the crafts he lists as being practised by these Genossenschaf-
halshs 00373687 (2009-04-07)
138 	 Division of Labour
ten are the same as those undertaken by contemporary collectives, parti-
cularly woodworking, printing, baking, shoemaking, and pottery. They
have remained occupations that can be performed on a small scale by one or
two workers alone producing thewhole item. Watchmaking, combmaking,
and gilding, other nineteenth-century crafts, have since been replaced by
large scale industrial production, which collectives have not taken up. In
some crafts unknown in the last century — such as car, cy cl e and el ectrical re-
pairs, electronics, alternative energy, and computing — contemporary col-
lectives have found new fields of activity.
In recent y ears, there have been numerous attempts to undertake larger
proj ects involving the cooperation of several collectives. Because itw as fea-
tured several times in the media and is technologically very demanding, the
most well known is the cooperative founded by Wuseltronick producing
windmills and wind-measuring instruments. The cooperative of construc-
tion engineers, Baubüro Schlineberg, encouraged the cooperation of collec-
tives in the building trades — plumbing, carpenting, building, and painting
— to undertake the renov ation of entire houses. TheBaubüro al so founded an
association grouping architects, construction engineers, carpenters, and
specialist woodworkers, which specialised in the hot-air treatment of wood-
work infectedby fungus. This joint activity has become a supplement totheir
regular incomes.
In both cases, the intention w as that these associations should function on
an egalitarian basis; how ev er, they were initiated and coordinated by engi-
neers who play ed the same leading role as individual engineers in business
industry. Both engineers' collectives, Baubüro and Wuseltronick, had more
direct access to larger orders and state funding than the craft collectives that
participated. Their members were trained for coordinating and planning the
tasks that others were going to execute, and titis rolew as to some extent per-
petuated in the relations between the autonomous collectives.
The counterpart to autonomous collectives undertaking joint activities is
the subdivision into quasi-autonomous units of the larger collective. The
newspaper die tageszeitung, for instance, is subdivided into units of from
three to six members. In the initial conception of the newspaper, it was in-
tended that the people working in the different sections would from time to
time exchange work-places — a paste-up artist working in the office, for
example, and an editor doing the typesetting. This idea has since been aban-
doned, and the div ision of labour betw een the sections has become fixed. Al-
though members doing technical and administrative jobs may occasionally
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have the opportunity topublish an article, the editors no longer replace them
in their work. Within the new spaper, editorial work has higher prestige than
have technical or administrative jobs. Although the lev el of pay and the vote
in meetings is the same for all, a certain hierarchy of prestige has slipped in
throug h the backdoor, and the de facto equality is only maintained within the
individual sections. Comparedtoother newspapers, how ev er, wherepeople
doing technical jobs have no influence at all on the content of the paper or its
political tendencies, in die tageszeitung they have both the right and the op-
portunity to make their opinions heard.
Collectives with more than five or six members tend to be subdivided into
smaller units with clearly delimited functions. Among the six printing col-
lectives in West Berlin, the fiv e sri -taller ones with no more thanfiv emembers
each lack any formai division, but Oktoberdruclç with twelve members in
1984, introduced a format division of the enterprise into three sections: of-
fice (two members); repro-montage (five members); and printing (five
members).
Following the Endre Production Process
The division of Oktoberdruckw as not intended tobe rigid but to allow for the
moving of members from one section to another. The ides was to equip ev e-
rybody in the long run with all the skills necessary for printing. In fact, in
1983, three of the twelve members changed from one section to another:
Jürgen, an unskilledprinter, tookover one of the office jobs; Marita, who for
three y ears had been the bookkeeper, started training in the repro-montage
section; and Constantin, a printer w ith experience in the repro-mounting de-
partment, took over a job there. Neither the rotation of Jürgen nor that of
Constantin affected the smooth running of the enterprise. But the whole col-
lective felt it a great disadv antage that Maritaw anted to change. It meant that
a new bookkeeper had to familiarise him or herself with the task and that Ma-
rita, w ho was not a trained repro-monteur, had to be trained from scratch. In
discussions on the issue, the argument was raised repeatedly that it would
mean a loss of income for the w hol e collective sirnply to satisfy Marita' s indi-
vidual wishes. It was only after she had raised the issue for a y ear and had
threatened to leave that she finally had the opportunity to change. In fact, the
rotation of tasks is practised only to a small ex tent and exclusively by long-
term members. In 1983, only the founder, Constantin, w as able to perform
all the tasks, though not all of them equally well. The highly skilledmembers
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of one section tended not to mov e elsewhere because their skills were badly
needed to make their own sections run smoothly.
The Oktoberdruckcollectivists claimed that the real difference in die divi-
sion of labour between their collective and a business enterprise show ed it-
self within the sections. Herbie, a trained repro-photographer, maintained
that, in the enterprisewhere heworked previously, all the tasks in the repro-
mounting department were clearly divided. A repro-photographer would
spend all dày in the darkroom and would not take over any montage task. In
the montage section, the tasks w ere dividedbetw een those done by unskilled
workers, such as scratching and cutting films and developing the printing
plate, and those done by a trained photomonteur, for instance mounting films
on the foil. In the collective, this division did not exista all tasks from repro-
photog raphy to the developmentof the plates w ere done one after the other by
a single person. Only when larger books had to be prepared did several peo-
ple cooperate.
In the printing section, the collectivists tried to train themselv es to be able
to carry out all thejobs, operate bothprinting machines and become entirely
interchangeable. Donald, a skilledprinter, tnaintained that he w as perform-
ing thejobs that five differentpeoplewouldhave carried out in the enterprise
whereheworkedpreviously: ordering paper and colours; cutting paper; put-
ting paper onto the printing press (Vorstapeln); printing; and machine main-
tenance. 'This firm — Druckhaus Tempelhof — w as one of the larg est printing
shops in Berlin with no fewer than 150 employees and printing presses up to
15 min length. But although Oktoberdruckwas much smaller, the abolition
of any division of labour was still not perfect. In the summer of 1984, only
four of the fiveworkers in the printing sectionwerereally skilled and the fifth
member, the only woman, did mainly unskilled work such as transporting
and cutting paper, although she was meant to be training as a printer. The
running of the largeMiller two-colour printing press coul d notbe undertaken
by all the printers — of the five, only three could do this.
The aim of many members w as to perform all the steps in a job, from the
acceptance of the order to the delivery to the cus tomer, themselves. In the
KoMet collective, the members tried to carry out all four steps involved in
producing a machine-tool: design, production planning, ex ecution of pro-
duction, and quality control. The qualifications neededwere therefore more
diversified than alose most skilled metalworkers acquire during their ap-
prenticeship.
Designing a machine-tool is usually not part of the training of a qualified
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metalworker. Although a skilled tooltnaker in a business enterprise
constantly has to interpret designs, he normally could not have produced
thesehimself. Only when qualify ing for the higher stageof master of his craft
are skills in design required. The design a w orker in industry uses is drawn,
in minutest detail, by an engineer or technician w ho usually has never ac-
tually workedwith such a machine himself. Wolfgang, one of KoMet' s most
experienced toolmakers, regarded the most serious disadvantage of his for-
mer job the fact that the masters and foremen did not take seriously his own
suggestions for improving production and that he had to work with designs
that did not provide what he considered to be the best possible solution.
In the collective KoMet, the designs the workers drew for themselves
were less precise and elaborate than those produced by industrial designers.
Very skilled members, like Fritz and Wolfgang, had in mind the functions
their product had to fulfill and the problems involved in actually making it.
Their designs were more adapted to the actual production than those of an in-
dustrial designer. They were often able to recognise small mistakes rapidly
and to change their design accordingly, as the preliminary design w as not in-
tended as an exact specification but as an interpretation of the customer' s re-
quirements.
Fritz maintained that he w ould be able toproducea cotnplicatedtool more
rapidly and efficiently than an enterprise with a high lev el of division of la-
bour. But not all KoMet members were equally capable of both design and
execution. For instance, despite having worked for y cars in business enter-
prises, Friedel still left the more difficult designs to Fritz, Noppe, or Wolf-
gang. The newcomers, Cisela, Thomas, Otto, and Peter — almost half the
collectiv e at the time of my fieldwork — did not know how to design at all, al-
though they were gradually learning.
If all KoMet members had been as skilled as Fritz and Wolfgang, their
method of producing highly specialised tools might havebeen more efficient
than that of an enterprise with a high division of labour, as the problem of
communication between technician and executing worker did not exist.
However, only three of the ten members had achieved this 1 evel of skill. For
the others, the collective way of producing meant slowly learning to take on
more aspects of the production process. In the business enterprises where
they hadworked previously, the responsibilities of theworkers and the tech-
nicians were clearly delimited, and the workers only had to execute a design
to the specifications and tolerances supplied by the designer. Mistakes in the
design w ere not their responsibility Often they didnot lcnow for w hat type of
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production machine the parts w ere designexl, nor the customer to whom they
would be delivered. The members who had worked in small toolmaking
shops had a better overview of the entire production process, but ev en so they
had still been excluded from the administration and design aspects, which
were reserved for the owner or master.
As we have seen, one ideal many founders of collectives believed in w as
that, if they ow necl and ran the enterprise, they w ould alsobe able to stipulate
that only ecologically sound and socially useful products were to be manu-
factured. This, how ever, was in practice not always economically feasible.
In order to compete on the openmarket, collectiv es had to transactw ith firms
they might politically despise. The founders of KoMet had to rev ise their ho-
pes silice 1979. The tools and devices they were making in 1984 were the
same as those made in any other toolmaking enterprise in West Berlin. Their
customers were big business enterprises that ordered tools and devices for
their large manufacturing plants. The social and ecological usefulness of the
products manufactured in these plants was beyond their range of influence.
As mentioned earlier, only once didKoMet refuse to make a tool, when they
learned that it was destined for stamping the housing of a police walkie-tal-
kie. This decisionled to the loss of their most important customer and created
considerable tension with those members who would have preferred to ac-
cept the order and thereby save the economic situation.
Their actual customers order tools for manufacturing plants that produce
cars, dialysis machines, equipment for packaging, crown-corks, etc. — of-
ten products that determined ecologists would regard with horror. KoMet
members regret their dependence upon their large customers as one of the
most serions handicaps to the collective experiment Wolfgang' s view illu-
strates the dilemmes
We are still the extendedworkbench for other firms. What we are doing here
is still the lowest level of a self-reliant enterprise. We often receive orders
with such detailed constructions that it almost feels as if one was still working
in an ordinal), enterprise. We have to startproducingwhole machines, de-
velop our own product (Wolfgang, KoMet, 15.8. 1984)
The realisation of the dream of their " ow nproduct" seerns far aw ay . Produc-
tion machines are expensive and their purchase is only profitable if there is a
ready market for the products. The purchase of a small lathe and chainsaw
for series production had already split the collective. Some members only
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agreed reluctantly to the "waste of money" involved in this attempt to build
up machines for series production.
In order to show the world that a radical division between workers pro-
ducing " monotonous" series and those creativ ely manufacturing special ma-
chine-tools can be overcome, Uwe, one of the founders, wanted the collec-
tiveto integrate repetitiv e series into theirw ork. He reg arded it as a socio-po-
litical aim of work in a collective that members shoul d share equally certain
undesirable tasks in series production and dedicate the rest of their time to the
more creative making of complicated tools. However, he admitted that this
method of overcoming the division between repetitive and creative work
could only function if the skilled toolmakers also performed the recurrent
tasks, as it would be beyond the capacities of the collective to employ work-
ers familiar with serial work and train them as skilled toolmakers. Most
members were not enthusiastic about the idea of series production and w ere
in favour of farming out uninteresting and disagreeable parts of orders to
other &ms, keeping the more stimulating ones for themselv es. The "own
product" they would like to producewould have to be complicated and spe-
cialised.
The w ish topromote andproduce a socially valuableproduct also inspired
the service collectives Wuseltronick and FahrradBüro. Their aim was to
overcome the limitations of providing services to an anonymous clientele
and to engage in much broader relationships with customers and products
titan ordinary firms in the same field.
To enlarge the functions of a simple bicycle shop and tomake itinto a poli-
tical forum were the aims of the intellectuals who started the FahrradBüro.
The activities of the collective involved not only repairing and selling cycles
but also writing and publishing books on traffic politics and about cycling
holidays and producing a map of Berlin for cyclists. During the first few
years, each member performed the job he or she liked best, but as the male
members started to monopolise the w ork in the repair shop and leave the un-
popular salesperson' s job in the shop to the fernale members, a system of j ob
rotation was introduced. At the meeting on Tuesday mornings, the tasks for
the coming week were distributed. Every member had to work for two days
perweek in the shop, one in theoffice, andonein the repair shop. Work inthe
repair shop was regarded as the most attractive, especially by the female
members. They stressed how important itwas for them to learn a technologi-
cally useful skill and to work with metal, which had always been a male pre-
serve. Most members enjoyed the alternation between manual and intellec-
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tuai tasks. They found it stimulating to repair abicycl e one day and to rtm the
publishing side and write an article on traffic politics the next. They appre-
ciated the constant shifting betw een a hectic work-style serving people in the
shop and working alone in the office or repair shop.
The usual task of an engineer in industry or univ ersity is to solveproblems
posed by others, to conceiv e products that are then produced by others, and,
in the end, to lose ail relationship with the product and the consumer itwill
serve. The engineers of Wuseltronickwanted to rev erse this relationship and
enlarge their control ov er the product they conceived. Their main idea was
that the technology they developed was not neutral, that the decentralised,
locally controllable, wind-power station they developedbore a different v al-
ue than an atomic powerstation. They therefore intended to conceive and
also to produce only products they considered useful. They received re-
search grants from the Ministry of Research and Technology for some of
their products, and as they paidthemselves muchless than the salary of an or-
dinary quai ified engineer, they were able to finance the dev elopment of some
prototypes that were not subsidized. One of these products was a small in-
strument for measuring wind strength, which they developed for determi-
ning the most suitable site for their wind-power plant. But hav ing produced a
small series of this instrument and displayed it at the industrial fair in Hanno-
ver, they were unable to meet the resulting order, as all the members were
heavily involved in research and w ere reluctant to make Lime for series pro-
duction.
The idea of developing their own product again became more concrete
when Reiner and Eberhard, cooperating on the same project, had the idea of
setting up a producers' Genossenschaft together w ith other coll ectiv es. They
wanted to start producing windmills, and perhaps other products, en mass.
The other half of the collectiv ew as not involv ed in this planning and remain-
ed rather skeptical. Reiner and Eberhard maintained thatwork in the colle,c-
tiv e would only remain stimulating if it w as constantly progressing and ex-
panding. To enter into production and create larger collective structures
woul d mean a new challenge and a step forw ard for thewhole mov ement Af-
ter months of discussion, the Genossenschaft was officially founded and two
other collectives, Südwind (producing vanes for the windmills) and Coso-
nanz (another electronics collective), joined in.
How ever, enthusiasm for the Genossenschaft started to fade w hen it be-
came clear that the prototype of the largewindmill, which was the only one
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to stand a chance in the market, needed another two y ears' work before it
would be ready to go into production. Other products, such as a measuring
instrument, were already being produced by Wuseltronickitself, albeit with
difficulty. To keep the Genossenschaft alive, it w as decided to apply for re-
searchgrants. Infact, only a few members of Wuseltronickwere interested in
spending their lime in actual production, and ev en Reiner and Eberhard, the
initiators of the idea, preferred research. The utopian idea of freely associat-
ing collectives joining together to produce a complicated order was far from
realisation. Wuseltronickcollectivistswere not only afraid that the entry into
production and the direct confrontation with the market might radically alter
their structure of organisation but also that they woul d become the managers
for the whole Genossenschaft, as it was they who had initiated the idea and
developed most of the products.
M a meeting of the Genossenschaft in the summer of 1984, the other col-
lectives complained that Wuseltronickwas losing interest, that members no
longer attended meetings, and that they were withholding information. For
members of other collectives, the success of the cooperative was almost a
question of surviv al, as they lackedorders and other financial means, where-
as Wuseltronickwoul d be able to survive on its ow n resources and in cooper-
ation with business enterprises.
In the last y ears, the situation lias completely reversed Wuseltronick is
now producing and marketing a wide range of products through the Genos-
senschaft. Over 60 percent of their turnover now cornes from the production
and/or marketing of wind-measuring instruments, tel emetry systems, con-
trol systems, and so on. Wind energy systems are produced and marketed by
Siidwind, but outside the Genossenschaft. All members of Wuseltronick and
Cosonanz have also become associates of the Genossenschaft, while only
two of the thirteen members of Südwind have joined in. As they had predict-
ed, Wuseltronickcollectivists became the managers of the w hol e Genossens-
chaft. All four members of the board of directors belong to Wuseltronick.
The Problem of Working Together
A relatively low degree of cooperation and flexibility is required from the
workers in collectives in the sense that they do not have to adapt their work
pave to colleagues sharing their tanks. They normally work alone on an order
they themselves took on and interact only loosely with their fellow members.
Therefore, all the more stressful are the Limes when members are suddenly
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obliged to adapt to one another and when a high degree of personal cooper-
ation is suddenly necessary. Members going on holiday and handing over
"their" order to a colleague, the acceptance of larger orders that require the
close cooperation of sev eral members — such situations rev erse the ordinaiy
structure of the organisation and suddenly demand a relativ ely high degree of
adaptability.
During my fieldwork with Oktoberdruck, tremendous tensions arose in
the repro-mounting department because Udo had gone on holidays leaving
his colleague Herbie a complicated order to complete without sufficient ex-
pl anation. 'The order comprised a large collection of articles offering practi-
cal advice for an "alternative"l ti e  lifestyle, illustrated with munerous drawings
and photographs, which had to be enlarged, screened, and mounted on the
correct pages. The drawings and photographs were numbered, but no page
numberwas giv en; sometimes the corresponding numberwas missed off the
page, and not infrequently it had been cut off by accident. On top of this, the
sequence of the numbers did not correspond to that of the almost three
dred pages. Herbie became frantic trying to sort all this out. He cursed the
" alternativ e" customers, accusing them of being too lazy or inexperienced to
mark the photographs with the proper page numbers, and even composed a
hymn of praise to bourgeois customers. The publishers of STAT7buch
claimed they were innocent — they had explained everything fully to Udo —
and in turncriticised the sloppiness of the printing collective. Finally, how e-
ver, they agreed to stay till ten one night to reorganise the drawings and pho-
tographs w hile Herbie went home at five.
Nevertheless, the book, energisch leben (five Energetically), still re-
quired more lime than originally estimated, and Herbie did not hesitate in
charging part of the time spent sorting out the muddle tmSTAT7buch. The
rest w as time lost for the repro section, where first Herbie and later also his
colleagues had to work unpaid overtime.
Herbie had the unpleasant task of dealing with the impatient customer,
whoblamed him for his colleague' s mistakes. This roleis.assumed in an ordi-
nary enterprise by the boss, w ho w oul d hav e dealtw ith the customer and dis-
ciplined the worker responsible. In the collective, everybody must assume
the role of boss and put right any damage done. While in an ordinary enter-
prise the workers would be paid for overtime worked, even if it w as to com-
pensate for die negligence of one of their colleagues, in Oktoberdruck the
whole section had to work unpaid overtime in order to maintain the same lev -
el of income, as each section kept its own accounts and incomes depended on
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the monthly balance. If the order had been delivered too late, they would
have had to pay the penalty. Udo himself was unaffected as bis holiday was
unpaid and did not therefore depend on the results of the collective' s endea-
vours in his absence.
In those larger collectives, which have established a certain formai divi-
sion of labour, the critical point in the organisation is when one section takes
over the tasks from another. The printing section of Oktoberdruck, for in-
stance, can only use its machinery efficiently if the repro-montage section
has the printing plates ready on time. In 1983, when the two sections still cal-
culated their incomes independently, tensions w ere high if a printer was
slack and consequently earned less because of the inefficiency of his col-
leagues in the repro-montage section. Both sections had to rely, in turn, on
the information given by the office in order to carry out the order correctly.
The introduction of a single basis for the calculation of income alleviated
some of the tensions but also created new ones — for instance, when large
and expensiv e mistakes made by the printing section had tobe taken on board
by the whole collective.
Within the sections, as well as in collectives without a formai division of
labour, the members' mutual interdependence becomes most obvions in the
common use of machinery and tools. A smoothbeginning to the w orking day
for an Oktoberdruckprinter, for instance, depends on the carewithw hich his
or her colleague on the prev ious shift has cleaned the print drums. As nobody
is employed solely to maintain the machinery, the printers depend on their
colleagues. Donald, one of the older printers, complained that the young
newcomers with whom he was working tried to dodge this unpleasant task.
In KoMet, members complained repeatedly that they had to remove kilos of
scobs before they were able to use a machine. Although maintenance sche-
dul es w ereworked out, they w ere rarely effective for longer than a few days.
Similarly, in the FahrradBüro, the amount of stress suffered by collective
members during a busy day in the shop depended to a large extent on how
carefully their colleagues had priced up the goods and ordered the merchan-
dise. After a sertes of conflicts about repairs that had been accepted by mem-
bers w ho then di d nothave time to do them, members only did the repairs they
themselves had accepted.
Collectivists tend to regard responsibility and discipline as ambiguous
values, and, not infrequently, they seem to congratulate themselves for not
respecting them. Almost every collectivist I interviewed about his work si-
tuation mentioned the chaos and disorder as one of the most serions difficul-
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fies in collective production. But at the same lime, they talked about "the
creative chaos" that makes collective work so much more interesting.
Most members of KoMet defended their casual attitude. Fritz, for in-
stance, was convinced they would only be able to achieve a higher level of
discipline by introducing a system of supervision and control, which he re-
j ected. According to him, collectiv ists must be free to decide to create chaos,
if they wish, and earn less. Cisela hated the lack of order and cleanliness, but
she did not regard the lack of discipline as a complete disadvantage:
Discipline has alwaysbeen maintained throughfear, so I clearly cannot advo-
cate We don't want to be as quick as a worker in an ordinary enterprise
(Normalbetrieb) because then the work would not be fun any more. (Œsel a,
KoMet, 9.8.1984)
Ev en Nappe, who would have liked to introduce el aborate work schedul es,
admitted that the chaos had its positive side, since it stimulated the imagina-
tion as well as individual problem-solving. However, he was convinced that
collective responsibility can only be achieved if people learn to respect the
common planning. He was certain that formai plans were necessary when
members did not voluntarily assume the common responsibilities.
As the sloppiness and inaccuracy of colleagues become more obvious in
work situations with an intensive division of labour, those members tend to
cooperate who have a good personal relationship. Both Oktoberdruck and
KoMet sometimes accepted large orders that would occupy one worker for
weeks or months and could only be completed rapidly and efficiently if sev-
eral members cooperated. For ex ample, KoMet accepted the production of a
small sertes of 110-lathed parts for its most important customer, Mirotec.
lbree members cooperated on this order: Günther milled the side flat, w hile
Fritz milled the openings, and Cisela drilled the holes using a drill-jig. As
soon as Günther had finished the first step, he made the dips into the holes Gi-
sela had drille& As the drilling of the holes took longest, Günther had to ad-
just his work pace to that of Cisela. While she was boring the holes, the drill
headbroketwice; andw hen Günther, and 1 ater Fritz, tri ed to show her how to
do the job properly, they only succeeded in breaking two more drill heads,
leaving only one more. In the end, they decided to try immobilizing the drill-
jig to reduce the vibration, and this w as successful. The drilling proceeding
without further problems. In an ordinary enterprise, such a problem would
havebeensolv edby the foreman or master; the other workers would nothav e
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been al low ed to interrupt their ow n work, and as a resultwastematerials, and
they would not hav ebeenpermitted to fi nd their own solution to the problem.
The organisation of work depends on personal factors in a w ay different to
that in an ordinary business enterprise, where how and when workers coop-
erate is dictatedby a superior. In a business enterprise, each worker in theory
has his or her clearly delimited field of activity and is supposed to work hand
in glove with his or her colleagues. In a piece rate system, such as Haraszti
(1976) describes in Hungary and Burawoy (1970) in the United States, the
worker who is eager to "make out," to exceed the quota, is to a large extent
dependent on good relations with the auxiliary workers paid on a time basis,
such as the scheduling staff giving out the piecework, crib attendants hand-
ing out tools, setup men preparing the machines, and so on (Burawoy
1979:53-55). Bad personal relations lead inevitably to delays in the execu-
don of a job and to a reduction in income. In a collective this formai division
of tasks does not ex i st: the KoMet toolmakers have no pi ece rates, they fetch
their tools themselves and set up their own machine for production. In-
formally, however, they are to a large extent dependent on the direct support
of their colleagues. They need their advice when filling a difficult order,
their help when searching for a tool, and their cooperation in lifting heavy
pieces of metal. 'Mis support, however, is neither automatic nor sel f-ev ident
but depends on personal Sympathies. While collectivists do not di rectly lose
part of their income, they might lose their temper if their colleagues do not
cooperate. As in principle all members are expected to be able to do every
task, their work domains overlap, responsibility is not cl early del imi ted, and
good informai communication is necessary if the enterprise is to run
smoothly.
The cooperationincollectives is based on w hat Fox (1974: 71) cal Is high-
trust relations. It involv es the principle that one perron does another a favour
in the general expectation of some future return, the exact nature of which is
not stipulated in advance. 'This long-term reciprocity engenders feelings of
personal obligation and gratitude. However, contrat) ,
 to business firms,
which can switch from a regime of high trust to one of close supervision en-
forced through an organisational hierarchy, in a collective the organisation
of work is dependent on spontaneous consensus.
Cisela was in her sixth month of pregnancy when she needed the help of
her old workmate and opponent, Noppe, to complete an order on which she
had already worked for 75 hours in the course of that particular week. She
hesitated for a long time before asking him, because their relationship had
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been strained before her boyfriend, Fritz, left the group. When asked,
Noppe immediately postponed completing his ownwork and put in two days
exclusively on Cisela' s. Their friendly cooperation was a sign of their im-
proving personal relationship.
Transmitting Knowledge
The training of newcomers, and their introduction into the specific require-
ments of collective production, is a constantly repeated task, since the turn-
over of members is high. Even experienced new corners well trained in the
production process in a business enterprise must get used to the extensive
autonomy, the self-management, and the direct contact with customers.
It might be supposed that only the efficient and smooth introduction of
new members can guarantee the continuity of the enterprise and establish a
relative equality of status between members. The reality is quite the oppo-
site, with the new member being " thrown in at the deep end," having to find
his or her own way through the chaos of collective organisation.
"Newcomers have to find out by themselves" seems to be the pedagogic
strategy of theKoMet collective; "if they don' t know, they can always ask. "
A high degree of initiative is expected from beginners. Most collectives let
the newcomer try working in the group for one or two months, and only if he
or she has proved themselves sufficiently autonomous will he or she then
start the probationary period. This lasts from six months to a year, after
which he or she becomes a full associate. Members of longer standing de-
scribe their first months in the collective as very demanding. They felt left
alone with a burden of responsibilities weighing on their shoulders.
Newcomers have to make their way through all the same problems as every-
one else. Every newcomer should experience a saw blade bursting because
nobody has explained how to avoid this. (Noppe, KoMet, 8.8.1984)
Noppe was in favour of more systematic training for beginners, but his
opinion came up against the resistance of most of his colleagues, especially
his adversary Fritz. The latter preferred to assign inexperienced members
difficult tasks so that they w oul d acquire skills more rapidly as well as learn to
find their own solutions to the problems that arose. Ibis method of "alterna
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KoMet member Friedel explaining the grinder to the newcomer Otto (photo
by author).
live learning" coul d take an ex treme form as in the case of Otto, w ho, hav ing
been away from this type of work for duce y cars, wantcd to start his new job
by drilling holes in a steel plate with précision tolerancc of one-hundredth of
a mi 1 I i metcr. He tried to do this tank for days and had to start all over again
several times.
General ly, an experienced member tends to work with an inexperienced
one, but he does not actually instruct hi m. The new corner must di scover and
formulate the di fficul tics that he fi nds, then ask his ex peri cnced col I cagues
specific questions. For example , Cisela manufactured her first complicated
machine tool in cooperation with Wol fgang. He had accepte/d the order,
knew the customer, and had draw n the design. For every production step,
Gisel a had toget the exact détails from Wol fgang. The information he woul d
givc hcr was not of a descriptive kind — such as, "You have to drill a hole of
0.51 mm diameter at 6.5 mm distance from the edge of the tool" — but in-
volv ed posing a technical probl cm: "This holc bas to be adapted to this kind
of scrcw, w hi ch joins the upper part of the tool to the base. " Gi sel a then had to
calcul ate for hcrself the specifications of the hol c by maki ng smal I sketches.
The Oldoberdruck collective also wants its newcomers to fi nd their own
methods and rhythm of work. However, leav ing thom entirely atone with
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unknowntasks and unfarniliar machinery is not only motivated by thew ish to
create highly autonomous workers but also to a certain extent by the listless-
ness of die experienced members. When Ingrid and Klaus started to work in
the repro-montage section, they had to find out for themselv es how the large
repro-cameraworked. TheircolleagueHerbie, tired of introducing y et more
newcomers to its functioning, only show ed them the bare minimum but,
nevertheless, still criticised their poor performance. Klaus soon felt so un-
comfortable that he announced after a couple of weeks that he intended to
leave die collective. The others then persuaded him to stay and promised to
help him.
The methods members of Oktoberdruck use to introduce new members
are reminiscent to some extent of die teaching methods of anti-authoritarian
schools. The new members are confrontedwithproblems arising out of their
work, which they must solve to continue production. They are not giv en
ready-made solutions from die outset. On die other hand, pressure of work
and flux in membership is such that there is also not enough time and energy
left to engage in extensive formai training.
The difficulty is that beginners in collectives are certainly less productive
than beginners in an ordinary enterprise. They often have no work expe-
rience at all when they start, and the capabilities they acquired during their
traineeship are insufficient for independent and profitable production. Be-
ginners in ordinary enterprises are not more skilled, but die skills they pos-
sess are used in a way that is more profitable for the enterprise. In a machine
shop operated on a piece rate basic, such as Burawoy describes it, new-
comers are trained by experienced workers w ho, how ever, often show mar-
ked reluctance to introduce the youngsters to the complicated setup and to
tricks to "make out," to make more money. Hostility between traîner and
trainee may be particularly pronounced when the newcomer poses some
threat to the incombent (Burawoy 1979:102).
Examining the job satisfaction and expectations of young toolmakers in
ordinary industry, Lappe found that the first job of a trained toolmaker tends
to demand fewer skills than he or she learned during apprenticeship (Lappe
1984:30). Although the job of toolmaker is one of the most skilled in the me-
tal industry, after their traineeship beginners acquire further skills only very
slowly. . They are put on simple jobs that they can perfonn efficiently with the
skills they already have, usually only rising up the hierarchy of qualifications
by attending special training courses. Beginners without further work expé-
rience are often at risk of dequalification, as they have to accept transitory
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jobs beneath their level of qualification, paid at piece rate. They usually keep
such temporary jobs until they eventually find a job in the profession they
have learned (Lappe 1984:65-66). For some of them, these difficulties in
getting started in their professional career may enhance the attraction of
poorly paid but skilled work in collectives like KoMet. In fact, two of Ko-
Met' s new members had corne from as far a field as West Germany because
they had read an article about the collective. Although toolmaking is still one
of the most skilled jobs in the metal industry, it is threatened by rationalisa-
tion. The actual making of tools has to some extent been replaced by the as-
sembling of devices (Lappe 1984:29), and recently, CNC and CNB machi-
nes have been introduced, which delegate the intelligent part of toolmaking
to the technician who prograrns the production computer. Skilled toolma-
kers, though, have great interest, according to Lappe (1984:31-32), in inte-
gral activities and generally inv est considerable effort in acquiring further
qualifications.
In collectives, the training of members is essential and depends on the as-
sumption that everyone is willing to increase his or her qualifications, ac-
quire new skills, and retain the value of those already possessed. Collecti-
vists, how ev er, w ho ov erestimate their ow ncapabilities can pose ev en great-
er problems to the smooth running of the enterprise than those incapable of
working independently. KoMet, for instance, was confrontedwith the prob-
lem of the overwhelming self-confidence of their new member Otto. He ac-
cepted, and ev en asked permission to carry out orders that he could not com-
plete. The tasks he attempted had either tobe redone entirely or tobe fixed up
by other members, who became increasingly reluctant to entrust him with
orders. At the same time, they had to accept the internai contradiction of
wanting to encourage his independence and of limiting the damage he did.
After six months, another newcomer, Thomas, who had arrived with Otto,
was integrated as an associate. But Otto decided to continue on probalionary
terrils, thereby avoiding a group decision against his integration, and ulti-
mately left the collective.
Although in theory all members shoul d work independently, the differen-
ces in skill mean that the experienced members become the centre of produc-
tion activities. Their advice is asked constantly; they must explain how the
machines work and are ev en asked topass j udgement on the w ork of their less
experienced colleagues before it is sent out. The lev el of efficiency of the col-
lective as a whole, and ev en the range of products it can make, depends on its
most skilled members. For instance, since Wolfgang leftKoMet in Decem-
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ber 1984, the collective can no longer offer to produce the complicated
hydraulic tools that were his speciality.
As the division of labour in collective enterprises is far less pronounced,
the qualifications each member has to acquire are much broader, but gaining
skill in the depth necessary to carry out specialised tanks becomes more diffi-
cult. Members wishing to acquire further skills not infrequently must work
longer hours and learn by experimenting with new fields of production, in
the course of which they become trailblazers attracting interested custom-
ers.
To achieve the ideal of abolishing the division of labour, newcomers are
thrown in at the deep end without preparation and are expected to adapt
quickly, learning to be completely interchangeable with any other member.
How ever, there are some difficulties w ith the realisation of this ide,al. Firstly
newcomers starting work without instructions on a complicated job are not
productive. Moreover, as long as they have not acquired an equally high le-
vel of skill as the experienced members, an informai division of labour ne-
cessarily exists between skilled and unskilled, or semiskilled members. Ho-
wever, this informa! division of labour is difficult to overcome as the skills
each member obtains are largely dependent on his or her personal commit-
ment. The systematic training of new members, and of those less qualified,
has not been able to be undertaken to date, due to the high pressure of work
and lack of organisation. Some members have ev en lost some of their specia-
lised skills in the course of obtaining broader ones. Noppe, for instance, cl ai-
med that he had been a far better die-maker (Schnittbauer) before he joined
KoMet, but, on the other hand, he has obtained a considerable number of ad-
ditional skills ranging from design to administration. In fact, as soon as a
member acquires the entire range of skills needed in the enterprise and beco-
mes able to replace any of his or her colleagues, he or shebecomes of singular
importance for the collective and is not interchangeable with any newcomer
from outside.
The Limits of Collectivity: Sexual Division of Labour
The constant feuds around tidying up at lengthbecome unbearable, and in the
end it is always a woman who puts things back in order. In the office, for in-
stance, one day I clear away the stuff on the table and the next day somebody
covers it with rubbish again. Then I have the choice between tidying up or
working in the Tnidstof rubbish. Ultimately I always do tidy up, but I am angry
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with myself. I don' twant to resort to brutal methods likeflinging the stuff in a
corner. I really don' t want to. (Ulrike, FahrradBüro, Nov. 1983)
The taslcs of tidying up, cleaning, cooking, and washing up are considerul in
the dominant western culture, though not in the alternative counterculture,
as part of the female domain. In the early days, collectivists regarded it as
self-évident that such a division of labour would never occur in their enter-
prise and that men and women would share out their tasks equally. Since
then, the sexual divisionof labour has become one of the most heatedly deba-
ted issues at alternative meetings and congresses. As in so many progressive
communes and communal households, these daily services to the commu-
nity remain a problematic chapter in collective life. As they still bear the
stigma of inferior and unproductive work, they are considered undesirable
tasks. With the formal abolition of the sexual division of labour, the different
values accorded to certain tasks were not removed (Flieger 1984:221). It is
not self-évident but rather a sign of particularly harmonious relationships
between members if these tasks are accomplished without problem.
A lack of motivation characterised the increasingly chaotic organisation
of work in theFahrradBüro when a serious conflict opposed rnal e and female
members. At the meeting, the women, in particular Veronika, a radical fe-
minist and a lesbian, called attention for the first time to the sexual divisionof
labour in the collective and to the fact that the women were bearing the brunt
of the most unpleasant tasks, such as cleaning up, putting things back in or-
der, and pricing wares. They were fed up with battling against the chaos that
their colleagues Hans and Bernhard tended to ignore. Hans claimed that he
himself suffered because of the chaos, but his solution did not lie in a daily ef-
fort to keep things in order. He wanted to restructure the entire organisation
according to the principles of modern management, involving the introduc-
tion of an electronic till to record all the types of merchandise sold and to ev a-
luate the sales performance of each member. Significantly, he did not parti-
cipate in the general cleaning up which took place after the meeting.
The sexual division of labour exists to some degree in all the collectives I
analysed. In conformity with their " traditional" social mie, men tend to
ignore dirt and disorder and attribute only minor importance to tasks like
cooking. When Iinterviewed the members of KoMet for the first time in Oc-
tober 1982, when it was an all-male collective, they complained about the
Jack of care with which food was prepared at lunchtime. Everybody seemed
to consider the production of tools the task tube given absolute priority but
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suffered from eating canned food. Two years later, I interview ed one of the
firstwomentowork inKoMet, w ho explained that an equal divisionof labour
for cooking, sweeping up,- and cleaning the toilels did not exist. The " quali-
fiecl men" dodged these tasks, pretending they had something more impor-
tant to do, while the women did the cleaning becausethey coul d not stand the
dirt. During theperiod of my fieldwork, thecollectiveemployedawomanon
a temporary basis to do the cooldn and w ash the members' work clothes. The
discussions about undesirable tasks ceased because the female rolew as taken
on by a female outsider.
Women who work in the collectives I analysed generally want to break
from the traditional female role and become familiarw ith the male domain of
technical work. They thereforebecomeprinters, metalworkers, andmecha-
nies, professions that are still largely reserved for men in the labour market.
As one of the female members of the Handwerker Genossenschaft Mann-
heim explained:
Iwant to acquire thecapability to do the tasks thatpreviously men did forme. I
want to learn a technical skill, represent myself to official bodies, finance my
own living, and I want to cook and tidy up together with men. (Flieger
1984:221)
Very conscious of the discrimination women suffer if they ny to take on typi-
cally male jobs, most of the timewomen in collectiv es are not prepared to ac-
cept the reintroduction of the old sexual divisionof labour into the alternative
enterprises. Because of their experiences as female apprentices in business
enterprises, where they often did not receive an appropriate training, they
were frequently less qualified than their male colleagues when they entered
the collective, but nevertheless were determined to become equally skilled.
Andrea, the only woman printer with Oktoberdruclç was a typical exam-
ple of a woman who had tied to cope with a male job:
After my apprenticeship in Dortmund, I could not get a job in the firm where I
trained. I would not havewanted it anyway, because the master had pestered
me unbelievably during my apprenticeship, and did not give me a proper
training. He wanted to proue to me that printing was not the right profession
for me as awoman. I then found a job in Hamburg. I was dismissed after three
months because I was unable to print, and because we had a quarrel. Then I
was without work for Pive months, and I started to doubt my own abilities. I
had been rejectedby numerous printing shops either just because I was a wo-
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man or because I was not good enough I finally responded fo an advertise-
ment by Oktoberdruck in die tageszeitung. They were willing to accept me,
even though I told them I was a poor printer. (Andrea, Oktoberdruck,
27.9.83)
During the months that I spent with Oktoberdruck in the summer of 1983,
Andrea w orked very liard to improve her skills and performance, at the same
lime criticising her male colleagues for their sloppy work. They in Min ac-
cused her of being arrogant and aggressive and saw her as responsible for the
rising tensions in the printing section. She attributed this joint attack from her
male colleagues to the conflict between male and female roles, because it
arose after she had shifted from being an inexperienced and helpless female
to a skilled printer. "I think men have difficulties getting along with a self-
confident w oman. Formerly, I often used to stand ming at the machine, and
then they could take me in their arms to comfort me." The fear of being
pushed into the rol e of scapegoat for the w hol e printing section, togetherwith
a serions allergy to the chemicals used for washing the print cylinders, led
her to look for another job outside.
Andrea' s colleague Marita, working in the office in a typically female
job, told a similar stoiy. She resented the fact that she w as excluded from the
technical knowledge by her male colleagues. She claimed that they ex-
plained details to her in such a way that she could not understand, although
she would understand perfectly when Andrea explained. Shew as convinced
that the men were taking personal problems onto a technical level where she
could no longer argue with them.
If diere is a complaint about a printing order and Iwant to arguewith the print-
er because he did a sloppy job, he tells me the machine lias broken clown. Then
I can only reply, ` That' s becauseyou did not look after itproperly, ' but I can' t
refute him. I would only be capable of doing soif I had sufficient insight into
production itself. (Marita, Oktoberdruck, 13.7. 1983)
As a consequence Marita insisted on the opportunity of changing to a job in
one of the production sections.
The systematic refusal of the female members to be content with the I ess
skilledwork and to takeover the typically female tasks may havecontributed
to the fact that for some of these tasks the collectives have started to employ
temporary helpers from outside. In spite of Marita' s protests (see Chapter
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6), Oktoberdruck repeatedly employed female labour to do the cooking and
cleaning; the construction engineers' office, Baubiiro, employed a cleaning
woman twice a week. The principle that the monotonous and disagreeable
tasks should al so be shared out equally among members is gradually weake-
ning, especially in the larger collectives. The justification for this is always
giv en as being the enormous pressure of work, making it impossible to spend
sufficient time on cooking and cleaning. How ev er, a proper fulfillment of
these services makes work in the collective much more agreeabl e and impro-
ves personal relationships. Some collectivists, therefore, regard it as a spe-
cial service they can do for the "collectivity" if they employ somebody to do
the cooking. Others, mainly women like Marita, criticise this as the old ex-
ploitation of women reintroduced silently through the back door.
Conclusion
The ideal that underlay the effort not to divide the production process was
that each member shouldbecome able to keep control over the manufactur-
ing of his product from beginning to end. Collectivists were to plan, pro-
duce, sell, discuss, and administer equally, making foremen and technicians
superfluous and cooperating without constraints and overriding authority.
In practice, however, the individualistic work-style, which resulted from
members working v ery much on their ow n, provedproblematic. The organi-
sation of production, particularly, show ed w eak points w here members had
to work together and share tasks. Gaoperationw as cheerful and satisfying as
long as personal relations were harmonious but became tiresome and stress-
ful when enmity developedbetween members w ho had to work together. In-
div idual likes and dislikes, convictions and doubts, had a strong impact on an
organisation of work that w as not coordinatedby a superior and made it more
vulnerable than that of a business enterprise.
It was assumed that each member would be equally committed to the en-
terprise and that differences in sklll and experience could be compensated
for. In practice, however, a division between skilled and inexperienced
members continued to existas the fluctuation in membership remained high
and newcomers were left to train themselves. The unpleasant tasks were not
voluntarily shared by an, and female members had to fight hard to make their
male colleagues participate in the cooking and cleaning.
Wilde collective work is more stimulating and challenging than jobs in
hierarchically organised business enterprises, because one collectiv ist is re-
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sponsible for all the different stages in the producion process, this organisa-
tion of complex work is inherently less efficient than the divided work exe-
cuted by several different wage-labourers in a business enterprise.
Marx, and before Win Adam Smith (1981:112), observed in the nine-
teenth century the advantage in efficiency for manufacturers with clearly di-
vided work-tasks as compared to craftshops practising simple cooperation.
Marx wrote about the worker carrying out all the steps in making a product
It is obvious that this direct dependence of the operations, and therefore of the
workers, one upon the other, makes it incumbent upon each individual to ex-
pend no more than the amount of time necessary for his particular fonction.
Thus the continuity, uniformity, regularity, orderliness and above all inten-
sity of the work became very different in such a manufacturing process from
what they are in independent craftmanshipor evensimplecooperation. (Marx
1930 1:363)
The collectiv es, practising simple cooperation, areat an econornic disadv an-
tage in relation to any business enterprise with a more specialised allocation
of tasks. Most alternative enterprises I analysed have only been able to sur-
vive in the market because they produce complicated or crafted products,
which camiot yet be manufactured more efficiently in industrial production
or which are not produced en mass. Marty of their business competitors are
also small enterprises in which the division of labour is not as pronounced as
in industry.
Also, in future competition the development of new technologies allow-
ing for decentral ised production may be more decisive than a high lev el of di-
vision of labour. The micro-electronic " revolution" has brought about anew
vision for the future of work in industrial society, where fewer workers will
produce in less time highly "intelligent" products in a self-detenninedway.
(Gorz 1990:23)
halshs 00373687 (2009-04-07)
8
Work-Time and Social Boundaries
When, in the spring of 1984, the West German steel and printing workers
went on strike to fight for a 35-hour weelc, such jokes circulated among mem-
bers of collectives as: "We have had a 35-hour week fora long time — only
our hour has ninety minutes!" or" We call for a reduction of theworkweek —
to 48 hours!" The joker expressed what everybody felt acutely every day:
that workers in collectives worked far longer hours for far lower pay than
their counterparts in business industry.
When the industrial workers began their action fora shorter work week,
the collectivists in the printing enterprises discussed the possibility of com-
ing out on a solidarity strike but rapidly abandoned the idea since they reali-
sed they wouldbe striking against themselves. Itbecameobvious tothem that
collectivists and wage-labourers had differentpriorities of interest, not only
because collectivists were at the same lime the owners of their enterprises
and a strikewould damage them in their interests as owners but also because
they wanted to conceive of their work-time in a differentway to thatof the in-
dustrial worker.
"In a society where labour power is purchased and sol d, working time be-
cornes sharply and antagonistically divided from non-working time, and the
worker places an extraordinary value upon his `free' time, while on-the-job
time is regarded as lost or wasted," wrote Braverman in the 1970s
(1974:278). This, how ev er, w as not the only reasonwhy theworkers strove
for a reduction in the work week. For the wage-labourer, a 35-hour week
with full wage-adjustment meant a reduction of the capitalist owner' s profit
margin and the hope that, for the moment, fewer workers would be made re-
dondant following automatisation. In a collective, the hours worked per
week could only be reduced if the members were willing to forego some of
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their immediate spendings and investin labour-saving dev ices or if they were
willing and abl e to speed up theirwork pace in order to maintainthesame lev-
el of profitability. Greater efficiency and a higher work performance,
though, coul d becomecontradictory tonne of the key principl es of collective
work: to maintain a rhythm of w ork that is notsubstantially different from the
rhythm of life outside work.
As E P. Thompson (1967: 94) poi nted out, a different pattern of v alues se-
parates lime at work from lime outsidework in industrial societies. Whereas
linked to work are values such as impersonality, rationality, punctuality, de-
ference to authority, and respect for property rights, outsidework values in-
clude love for the family, expression of aesthetic capacities, and similar
ideas. How ever, in capitalist society " leisure" increasingly becomes a pro-
blern, as men become incapable of " losing the restless urgency" to
"consume Lime purposely" and of filling "the interstices of their days with
enriched, more leisurely, personal and social relations" (Thompson
1967:95).
For the col lectivists, however, the problem posed itself in the opposite
way. Members can experimentw i th this di fferent approach towork-time in-
side their collectives white renouncing larger incomes. Having enriched
their work-time with persona] relations and by leaving room for creativity,
the pressures of the " social system" then bcar upon them in the time outside
work, when they must see that their chi ldren go to school on lime, must re-
spect appointments with doctors, administrators, and acquaintances who
fol low the dominant pattern of time. As we saw in the discussion on inv est-
ments in collectives, outside material pressures and values influence the
choices of collectivisas and have consequences for their work-effort and use
of time.
A Different Rhythm at Work
Timed labour is closely related to the introduction of wage-labour, as
Thompson (1967: 61-69) pointed out. At first, farmhands were paid roughly
according to the number of " bushels per day" they harvested, but w ith the ad-
v ent of the Industrial Revolution, labour had tobe more precisely synchroni-
zed, and clocks and watches began to appear in workshops. With the intro-
duction of the Taylorist division of labour, a structure w as imparted to all la-
bour processes "that at its ex tremes polarizes those whose time is infinitely
valuable and those whose time is worth almost nothing" (Braverman
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1974:83).
The introduction of wage-labour allowed the employ er to determine how
thelabour-time purchased w as to be spent and to exclude increasingly from
work-time all social activities. Thompson (1967: 81) quotes a factory owner
at the beginning of the industrial era concerning the w orkers at the Crowley
Iron Works:
This service must be calculated after all deductions for being at taverns, al e-
houses, coffeehouses, breakfast, dinner, playing, sleeping, smoaking, sing-
ing, reading of newshistory, quarelling, contention, disputes or anything for-
reign to my business, any way loytering.
A task-oriented notation of time w as prevalent in the preindustrial era, as
Thompson (1967:60) explains. He writes:"A community in which task-
orientation is common appears to show least demarcation between "work"
and "life." Social intercourse and labour intermingled — the working-day
lengthens or contracts according to the task. The task-oriented attitudeof tra-
ditional craftsmen is a positive model for members of collectives and their
supporters. They like to see their enterprises as standing in the same tradi-
tion.
"Work in a sociable atmosphere, which in accomplishing economically
necessary tasks, also fulfils specific social obligations, is in some languages
distinguished from work that has no specific social dimension" (VVallman
1979:11). In collectives, all time should be spent "sociably." Work-time
should in principle not be different from lime spent at home, in political
groups or with friends, and strong personal relationships should be equally
possible. Listening to another member' s personal problem, for example,
should be as important — if not more so — as ftnishing a piece of work on
lime. Interrupting work to participate in political action is regarded as partof
the identity of the collectiv e. The indiv idual member shouldfeel well at his or
her work, take a break whenever he or she is tired, and have a coffee when-
ever he or she feels like it. Emotional problems and the stresses of love are
considered perfectly legitimate reasons for not working well.
'lime as a nondivided entity that belongs to the working individual is part
of a fund of ideas prevalent in the alternative movements of the last twenty
y ears. Since the student mov ements of the 1960s, this has been closely linked
to criticism of " performance-oriented society. " Together w ith Marcuse, die
students criticised the dividedness of life, especially for the working popula-
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tion (Marcuse 1970:62f. ). They maintained that the wage-labourer was re-
warded for the work effort he of fered the capitalist by leisure time, in which
he w as expected to buy himself pl easure through the consumption of goods
that enhanced his social status. He thereby reaffirmed the capital i st system of
commodity production and his own dependence on wage-labour.
The movements of the 1960s, supported mainly by intellectuals, centred
their political actions on consumption and education. They c riticised the " sa-
vage" accumulation of status symbols such as second cars, colour televi-
sions, and photographic equipment, denouncing this as a means of deflecting
the critical energy of the population. Anti-authoritarian kindergardens and
"free schools" were founded in order to give the coming generation the
chance to learnv al ues different from those of performance and competition.
The collectives stand in the cultural tradition of these movements but
contribute to their initiatives the aspect of w anting to change the use of timein
production itself. Colt ec tiv ists w ant to 1 eav e room in the production time for
"relaxation," "inspiration," and "self-management" They reject the idea
that increase in productivity shoul d be a value in itself. Al most no watches
are worn in collectives, lunch is hardly ever at exactly the same lime each
day, clocks that are wrong are left so for weeks, people arrive late or not at
all. They work in the ev ening s and arrange appointments with their custom-
ers outside ordinary working hours.
As a reversai of the logic of a capitalist enterprise, different lev els of effi-
ciency are played down in an alternative enterprise. In 1984 in KoMet, for
instance, every member kept track of the hours he or she spent in the collec-
tive in a book of working-hours, in which not only the hours spent in actual
production were entered but also those spent in organisation, maintenance,
cooking, and recreation. Everyone kept his own book and made sure he did
not work more or less than 45 hours per week on average. Working-hour
books were never left lying open or exchanged in order to avoid one person
cal cul ating another' s individual work-effort. Nev erthel ess, informally
ev ery body knew perfectly w el I w ho the most productiv e members were, but
this knowledge was glossed over and rarely talked about.
Some members ev en feel guilty if they have a more obviously assiduous
work-style than their colleagues. Veronika of the FahrradBüro felt that she
was being unfair to expect from her fel low members the same conscientious
work-style as she herself had. At work, she hardly ever gave herself a break
for coffee or to read one of the professional magazines her colleagues en-
joyed, but she did not want to make them feel guilty about her.
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Everybody has a differentconceptof work, a different rhythm. I am for exam-
ple very rigid and I hardly allow myself to sit clown.... I am always conscious
of the work still to be done, and then I doit I don't think this is very good be-
cause itoften makes me short tempered with the others who don' t react in that
way. (Veronika, Fahrrad13üro, 19.12.1983)
Observing collectiv ists in their work, it struck me that they worked in a re-
laxed way ev en when there was a good deal to do. The KoMet members
claimed sometimes that they were overwhelmed by pressure of work but
then, during the day, hardly anybody w as actually working. Only towardlate
ev ening did the group fall into intense activity, which sometimes continued
all through the w eekend. In Oktoberdruck, the beginning of the summer off-
peak season seemed to affect the members' rhy thm of work in a similar way.
They hung around during the day, drinking coffee and gossiping, often real-
ising too late in the ev ening that thework they had to do w ould take moretirne
than they had expected Despite a low order inflow, they then stayed on until
late at night.
A similar work pattern was found by Thompson among seventeenth and
eighteenth century craftsmen " w how ere in control of their own liv es." "The
work pattern w as one of alternate bouts of intenselabour and idleness... The
temptation to lie in an extra hour in the morning, pushed work into the eve-
ning, candlelit hours" (Thompson 1967:73).
During the 1983 summer off-peak season, w hich lasted from mid-June to
mid-August, the printing presses of Oktoberdruck sometimes stood idle all
day, but the members still came into the collective although they could have
stayed at home. Some of them came in the mornings to have breakfast with
their colleagues, others sat around for some hours to talk about politics or
personal matters. Swimming parties were organised at one of the Berlin
lakes, they hadbarbecues in the courty ard or ice cream sitting in the sun at the
open entrance to the printroom. It was only after a couple of weeks of relax-
ation that they started to busy themselves with the maintenance work, which
they had neglected during the y ear, and beg an to worry about the results they
were going to have at the end of the month. Some of the printers, who calcu-
lated their income by the hour, started to stay around in order totake a greater
share of the colle,ctiv e income at the end of the month. But in any case, the av-
erage hourly wage was low, as it depended on the collective output. Other
members considered taking temporary jobs to make ends meet
Although in times of low work pressure the collectivists seem to enjoy
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each others' company, this pleasure is offset by the expectation of low re-
sults. Especially in collectives like Oktoberdruck, where income is directly
dependent on result, a prolonged period without work causes tensions, and
after a while a relaxed rhythm of work is no longer felt to be a privilege.
The rhythm of work members are free to choose in ordinary times de-
pends to a large extent on their type of activity and the machines they use.
Collectives with a short span of orders, a formai division of labour, or those
active in the service sector, tend to respect more rigid w orking hours, where-
as those with long-terni orders that can be executed by one or two people are
more flexible.
The bicycle collective FahrradBüro had to adapt its working hours to or-
dinary shop opening times and to seasonal fluctuations. In summer, mem-
bers worked, without a break atlunchtime, from 9.30 a. m. to 6.30 p. ni, and
in winter from 10 a. m. to 1 p. m. and from 2 p. m. to 6 p. m.
In production collectives, the rhythm of work is influenced by the type of
machinery in use. The speed and capacity of Oktoberdruck' s large printing
presses determine the printers' and repro-monteurs' rhythm of work to a
large ex tent The need to coordinatework between these tw o interdependent
sections requires that theworking timeis structuredfairly rigidly. Thework-
ers in the montage sections cannot keep their colleagues in the printing sec-
tion waiting, and the printers themselves must work in shifts to utilise the
large Miller press to its optimum.
Donald, the Miller printer, maintained in 1984 that his rhythm of work
was entirely determined by the machine. Although generally he enjoyed
this, hew as sometimes overwhelmedby operating the largepress entirely on
his own, a task that would have been shared in his previous job. When hew as
fitting the sheets to the machine, he had to make several manipulations at a
time and runback and forth around the machine checking the sheet, changing
the colour flow , setting the distances, and making sure the sheets did not stick
to one another. During the printing process, he was so absorbed in the run-
ning of the machine that he no longer realised what was happening around
him. He hated it then if somebody distracted him or asked him a question.
Having a coffee or going to the toilet alsobecame impossible. In 1988, the
number of printers was increased to sev en, and the Miller press was run by
two people, which reduced the production stress considerably.
Donald' s colleagues in the repro-montage section have a more indepen-
dent pace of work. They can do some work in advance, as we saw Ingrid do
(in Chapter 7). They can work on Sunday s and take days off during thew eek.
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The only restriction they hav eis topass the printing plates ov er to the printers
on time. The repro-photography and montage is still basically a handicraft,
independent of machinery. The printing press, on the contrary, was con-
ceiv ed for the production of sertes in a business enterprise and imposes this
same rhythm on the worker in the collective. The work of the printer is the
only example of mechanical sertes production I came across in a collective.
In other collectives highly equipped with machinery, such as KoMet, this
was used for the production of specialised, one-off parts. These machines
are tools in the hands of the workers and do not dictate the pace. In 1984, the
skilled toolmakers of KoMet worked about 45 hours per week, five more
than their skilled counterparts in business and industry. Toolinakers are
among the privileged workers in the metal industry, as they are generally
paid by the hour, not at piece rate (Lappe 1984:34). Their average net salary
was, in 1984 DM 2,400, almost double the income of a collectivist.
Members of KoMet greatly appreciated their completely flexibleworking
hours. Some worked on their orders from nine to six, others from elev en to
nine o' clock. Some preferred to work on Sunday s and then have a weekday
free. The independent and irreg ular rhy t'un of work, though, was notviewed
favourably by all members. Noppe, for instance, regarded it as crucial for
the smooth functioning of the enterprise that everybody start work at the
same time and respect similar working hours. He would have preferred to
have everybody present at the same time in order to exchange information
more directly and coordinate the work tasks more efficiently. Wolfgang, a
member fiercely opposed to any regulation of the working time, admitted
nevertheless that a continuons presence in the collective was necessary to
keep track of the organisational running of the enterprise and, therefore, re-
jected the idea of working part-time.
The engineers of Wuseltronick, who invented new technologies without
hav ing direct pressure from cus tomers, had the mostflexibleworking hours.
Very intense pealcs of work on w eekends and all night alternated w ith a more
leisurely rhy tlun atother times. Wuseltronickmembers maintained that their
work was similar to that of academics and that their most "productive" pe-
riods might be w hen they w ere out w alking in the Grunwald Forest and sud-
denly had a brilliant idea for solving a technical problem. When the collec-
tive began the production of control and measuring instruments, their
rhythm of work became somewhat more regular.
For KoMet and Wuseltronick, producing highly specialised single parts,
an intensive work rhythm w as not alone responsible for their economic suc-
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cess; their attraction for customers lay rather in their creative ideas and high
degrees of flexibility.
The motivation collectivists find in their work seems to be an important
element in determining whether they consider work as divided from the rest
of their liv es or not. Coli ectivists whobelieve they are doing something use-
ful — or at least skillfull — maintain that they identify so strongly with their
work that they cannot stop thinking about it, even in their leisure time. As
Andrea told me:
With OktoberdruckI takecareof somany more things about theplace, like the
organisation and the economic ride. This is a pleasure forme, because it ma-
kes me think. But itis also the reasonwhy workw ith Oktoberdruckis so stress-
ful. I am constantly thinking aboutit, and my friends are getting fed up with
me talking so much about it. (Andrea, Oktoberdruck, 27.9.1983)
Collective work, because it is meaningful and satisfying, lias a tendency
to swamp members and invade their leisure time. Members who identify
very strongly with the collective and who do not have demanding external
obligations allow this to happen. They spend their evenings in political dis-
cussions with other collectivists, write for the collectives' newspaper, and
organise national meetings. But thosew ho do not identify so intensely startto
reclaim more leisure time to realise a wider range of interests.
Conflicting Demands of Private and Collective Spheres
In the early years of many collectives, the ideal of abolishing the separation
between work and leisure also included the idea that times of work and of
nonwork shoul d be spentw ith the same people and that thew orkpl ace should
be close to the habitation. The model for this was the traditional BerlinKez-
culture, with its close intertwining of small workshops and living quarters.
In the founding period of many collectives, there was no strict division
between work and leisure. The effort to build up the new enterprise with a
minimum of original capital required such an extensive input of labour that
no time was left for leisure activities. Every collective can tell stories about
the founding members who used to spend all night working, ate and slept in
the collective, and did not ev en take out any money. . Most founding members
remember this early period as very pleasurable and exciting. A strong fee-
ling of solidarity inspired the group, as members voluntarily submitted
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their private lives to the building up of the enterprise. Relationships with
people outside the group were either neglected or integrated into the com-
mon effort. Fascinated by this new experience, friends and loyers of the
early members helped renovate the workshops and not infrequently partici-
pated in meetings.
The first contradictions appeared when the enterprise started to become
economically viable, and the members beg an to relax. Private and individual
interests reappeared. Friends, loyers, and communal households (Wohnge-
rreinschaften) ceased to be understanding and put pressure on members to
resume their obligations toward them. Some members began to realise that
the collective alone did not fulfill all their emotional and intellectual desires.
A differentiation began to emerge between those who continued to identify
completely with the collective and those who wanted to reclaim a private
sphere. As Fritz of KoMet described it
Wewere not able to realise the aim of becoming a circl e of friends who under-
took a lot of things together outside work and who lived together. The group
was simply too heterogenous. After the phase of stabil ization, everybody re-
treatedinto his owncircle of friends. This exploded a lot of illusions aboutKo-
Met, as in thebegiming somepeoplehad had the strong desireto create a func-
tioning group for "living andworlcing." As this ideawas only sharedby a few,
the first tensions arose relatively quickly, after the first six months or a year.
(Fritz, KoMet, 13.4. 1984)
Numerous collectives were founded on the initiative of a small group of
close friends who perhaps participated in similar political activities, lived in
the same housing commtmity, or had previously worked for the same emplo-
yer. Many members of collectives lived together in changing constellations,
though often only fora limited period. The closest group I encountered was
the bicycle collectiveRiiderwerk. The founding group of elev en people con-
sisted of six friends and their fiv e girlfriends, seven of whom shared a houle
and had corne from the same part of West Germany . INvo and a half years af-
ter the foundation, in August 1984, the composition of the group had scar-
cely changed.
Abandoning the ideal of living and working together is particularly pain-
ful for collectives with closed structures. 'The three founding members of
Wuseltronick, for instance, had started their enterprise in their joint apart-
ment and had lived for y ears in the midst of electronic equipment. Their close
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conununity of friends only expanded w hen the enterprisebecame too big and
had to be moved out into a separate work-space. New members joined and
with them came new links with the outside, which had to be integrated. The
group's self-image required that these relationships be brought in and assu-
med by the whole group. A w eeldy social night w as instituted where mem-
bers could meet informally, along with their friends and girlfriends. But this
not altogether relaxed ev ent did not meet with general approv al . Some of the
members' loyers boycotted it deliberately, insisting on more time and pri-
vacy for their love relationships.
The problem was debated in great detail. The group ev en invited a
psychologist to analyse it with them, but he was unable to help as the group
`eiders' continued to uphold the conviction that they must strive for the clos-
est possible unity between life and work. The "monastery model," as this
concept of a collective later came to be called, shows common characteris-
tics with the total institutions described by Goffman. He points to a kind of
"institutional incest taboo" functioning to prevent dyads withdrawing from
the total institution (Goffman 1961:59).
Included in the goal of integrating the persons closest to their members
was that of making financial provision for dependent family and for different
consumption requirements by the principle of income according to need.
From 1977 to 1984, members took what money they needed or wanted from
the collective money chest, but, as their domestic situations were similar, the
amounts taken did not differ greatly. The situation changed in the autumn of
1983 w hen the bookkeeper, Michael, married a Hungarian immigrant, Ma-
ria, and had to keep her w hile she w as unemployed Ev en before he married,
Michael had been the member with the highest consumption requirements.
A list of members' expenses in 1983 shows that Michael took out DM 2,500
per month, which included DM 861 rent for his apartment, w hile members
like Julius and Peiner didnot spend more than DM 1,000. Despite the collec-
tive's daim to integrate members' closest relations, Julius, who had been
living with his girlfriend for y ears, introduced separate household accounts
so that it could not be said to his detriment that his girlfriend was profiting
from the collective resources.
hhe other members' feelings were ag ainst Michael at the meeting in Feb-
ruary 1984, when the issue of supporting Maria was discussed Ms col-
leagues resented heavily the fact that without asking them he had borrowed
DM 7,000 from the collective money chest before going off to Hungary. . Se-
veral colleagues expressed their unease and lack of confidence in Michael
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but tried to dissociate this from the needs of Maria, who took part in the mee-
ting. Mate, who claimed not to feel responsible for the needs of his collea-
gues' family members, was reminded by the others that he and the other
founders hadbeen maintainedpartly by their girlfriends during the first diffi-
cult y ears of the collective and that they coul d now repay part of this by sup-
porting Maria. Some members, how ev er, feared that the enterprise' s finan-
cial situation would be difficult in the coming y ear and that an additional ef-
fort would be required from all of them to support her. A discussion arose as
to whether the money shoul d be made av ail abl e as a gift or a 1 oan, until Maria
herself intervened, insisting on a loan. When the final decision was made,
nine of the ten members expressed themselves in favour of supporting Ma-
ria, though four of them with the reservation that the income according to
need and want policy must be thoroughly reconsidered.
The "monastery model" finally collapsed when one of the founders,
Hansi, became involved in an intense love-relationship and w as expecting a
child. Hansi started to shift priorities drastically from the collective to his
small family. He refused to work in the ev enings or on w eekends, as hew an-
ted to take on part of the responsibilities of childcare. PTis colleagues discus-
sed for, weelcs whether, and to what ex tent, he shoul d be allowed to hav e a pri-
vate sphere outside the collective. But as the group grew bigger during this
period, it became increasingly unrealisable ta create a total community sha-
ring all aspects of its life. Enormous tensions arose when Hansi purchased a
house in West Germany for his young family. He had to pay the mortgage
with money from the collective chest but refused his colleagues' request to
make the house part of the collective property. This private appropriation
made it impossible to continue the system of income according to want As
Julius put it, " Hansi' s bouse broke the heart of many members of Wuseltro-
nick."
When Hansi left, followed shortly by another highly skilled new member
— both for the same reason that they needed more time and money to care for
their children — the collective decided to abandon the "monastery mode!"
for gond. Shortly afterw ards, the principle of income according to neecl w as
abolis hed and a tutitary pay ment of DM 1,400, which made an allow ance for
family obligations, was substituted.
Parenthood w as also the prime cause of unanticipated tension in the Cam-
bridge (USA) law collective studied by Sager. Suddenly, parents had less
time for work and needed more money. They had a new focal point in their li-
ves, which became more important than their group. Their emotions were
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caught up in an experience not shared by all, and as a result more effort w as
demanded of those w ho did not hav e children (Sag er 1979:144). Talmon no-
ted a similar pattern in the kibbutz. She writes: "In the new kibbutz, new fa-
milies are the source of centrifugal tendencies. They are competing foci of
intense emotional involv ement" (Talmon 1965:3).
Whereas in the beginning most members of collectives lead a somewhat
similar lifestyle and spend the money they earn mainly on their own imme-
diate needs, tensions arise when some start to enter into a different phase of
their life-cycle: they begin to think about having children and, consequently,
take on increased family responsibilities. These members are willing to put
in a greater work-effort in order to increase the returns of the enterprise and
thereby earn a higher income. They want to adjust their work-effort to the
higher consumption demands of their families.
Chayanov (1966:76) analysed a similar economic behaviour among Rus-
sian peasants on farms using family labour. In there Russian peasant farms,
as in a Berlin collective, members can decide on the amount of work-effort
they w ill expend. At the beginrring of the century, the Russian peasant fanner
sold his produce on the market but depended on the labour power of family
members. There were considerable fluctuations in the lev el of labour input
according to the consumption needs of the family. As the pressure of de-
mands increased, for instance when the family consisted of young parents
with small children, the farmer would deploy greater energy and accept a
rate of self-exploitation he would have otherwise refused (Chayanov
1966:81). How ever, "there cornes a moment at a certain lev el of rising la-
bour income when the drudgery of the marginal labour expenditure will
equal the subjective evaluation of the marginal utility of the sum obtained by
this labour" (Chayanov 1966:81), and the peasant will cease to increase his
effort
Contrary to the Russian family, where all the consumers were alsopoten-
tial workers and shared the same interest in consumption, the w orking mem-
bers of collectives experience unequal pressures. Their dependents are out-
side the group and put pressure only on that one particular member. Mem-
bers at different stages of their life-cycle have different needs and are there-
fore unequally disposed to work hard. For a young member with compara-
tiv ely low consumption needs, the moment cornes relatively early when he
will no longer consider an increase in returns worth the additional work-ef-
fort. An average amount of work is enough to maintain a satisfactory stan-
dard of living for the màjority of members and still allow them to work at a re-
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laxed pace. Conflicts inevitably arise when the members with higher needs
try to speed up their fellow members' pace of work; their own solitary effort
for greater efficiency is lost inthegeneral go-slow and does notnoticeably in-
crease the overall unitary rate of pay.
In spring 1981, eighteen months after the founding of KoMet, Hans-
Christian, one of the most active founding members, became dissatisfied
with the income he drew. He w anted to work fewer hours and earn more and
became totally unwilling to use his labour power to help the collective as a
whole achieve a better result As the father of two children, he had higher
consumption needs than his fellow members and no comprehension of their
relaxed attitude towardwork. As his efforts to speed up his colleagues' pace
of work were disregarded and attributed to his "chief-like" attitude toward
the enterprise, he claimed payment according to performance. When the
others refused, he proposed to work at his usual pace but then leave work
when his task w as finished and lie in the sun w hile the others were still " han-
ging around in the sticky workshop. " This attitude brought the conflict to
such a head that he was asked to leave.
Hans-Christian, who had always disagreedwith the mixing of leisure and
work, accused his fellow members of putting too much leisure into their
working lime, wasting Lime cooking and gossiping. He said of his collea-
gues, "They consider each hour spent in the collective equally valuable be-
cause it is an hour of their life, reg ardless of how much they produce in it. " As
the conflict appeared insoluble and the two different sides irreconcilable, the
outcome was that the two parties found themselves facing an arbitration
committee composed of members of other collectives.
This committee decided that KoMet could dismiss Hans-Christian pro-
vided they paid him DM 12,000 to found a new collective. He did in fact set
up a new enterprise a y ear later, but with a structure that determined ex actly
the share each individual member had in the overall results. Each member
calculatedhis re-sult independently, taking in theprofits for himself but, from
this, paying his share of the monthly maintenance costs. This organisational
structure later became an alternative for KoMet collectivists who had grown
tired of the "chaotic work situation" and low pay there.
In collectives, the extent to whichparenthood is felt tobe a probl em seems
to depend to a large extent on the lifestyle of the parents. Of the el ev en mem-
bers and ex-members with children in the four collectives I studied closely,
the five who had left because they were unable to reconcile childcare with
collective work ail lived in nuclear families. Two of the remaining fathers,
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who live(' in communal households, considered work in collectiv es more ad-
v antageous for childcarebecause of the more flexible working hours. Some
of themothers heldasimilar view. They emphasized, how ever, that they had
only been able to copewithboth child and w ork because they 1 iv ed in commu-
nal households, shared all the tasks equally with the father, and had the ad-
vantage of the dense network of alternative pl aygroups in Berlin.
The fact of having dependent family members does not always weigh so
heavily as in the case, of Hans-Christian and Michael , who are their families'
breadwinners. Most of the other collectivists who have children share the
cost of childraising with the other parent, who has Iris or her independent in-
corne. For them, childcare is not a financial problem but often radier a pro-
blem of Jack of free time, because members w ithchildren are still expected to
put in a substantial amount of work whenever required. Jürgen, working in
the Oktoberdruck office, seems to be the onewith fewestproblems in combi-
ning childcare andwork. Since Lisaw as bom ten y ears ago, hehas cared for
her ev ery other day, altemating the childcarew ithher mother, w ithwhom he
is no longer liv ing. The org anisation of his worldng hours allows him toleav e
work every other day at three to fetch Usa from school and to work until se-
ven or eight the next day to make up the time, when Lisa' s mother is caring
for her.
None of the older collecdvists woul d now continue to maintain that mem-
bers should spend all parts of their liv es together. The concept of collective
use of time has become more subtle since the early days. Instead of cl aiming
that the same persons should be together during work and leisure time, now
collectivists say that they want the same types of relationship with their
workmates as with their friends, acquaintances, and family outside the col-
lective.
For some of them, though, this does not necessarily make for leisure and
relaxation. Friedel, aKoMet member, feels his life is being dividedbetween
Iris family of two children, the squatters' house where they liv e, and the col-
lective. He feels overwhelmed by the personal commitment demanded of
him from all sicles. The sporadic bursts of work with KoMet and the night-
long discussions with his fellow squatters drain his energies. When Iris
housemates were negotiating in the spring of 1984 toprevent the evacuation
of the squat, Friedel used to arrive at work at lunchtime, having beendiscus-
sing the future of the squatte? community until dawn. When personal con-
flicts arosebetween his colleagues atwork, hetried to remain aloof, for as he
said, "if I made all these personal difficulties my problems, I would have so
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many of them, where I live and where I work, that I couldn' t endure them. I
have adopted an 'I don't give a shit' attitude."
Although members with strong external obligations may enjoy the more
relaxed rhythm of work, they feel the need to increase the profitability of the
enterprise to raise their incomes and lirait the hours worked. If these needs
are not fulfilled, it is unlikely they will stay long, tom as they are between
their obligations inside and outside the collectiv e. Fluctuation, how ev er, s e-
riously damages both the economic viability of the enterprise and the person-
al bonds holding the collective together. In particular, those collectives that
have existed for a number of years have to account for the fact that the living
situation of their members has changed.
Labour Power Is Not for Sale
As the external interests of their members make themselv es more and more
acutely felt, the tendency in most collectiv es is to make an effort to reduce the
working hours. But this is only possible if greater attention is devoted to
work-effort and efficiency.
The larger personal free-play, whichyou normally have in collectives, is lim-
ited in the FahrradBuro by the chop opening hours. Nevertheless, some get
the feeling that they work more than others. Ulrike S. thinks she is slaving
away while Bernhard sits lazily in the office all day. Bernhard maintains that
Ulrike S. is only thinking about her holidays and how she canput together her
days off as conveniently as possible. Everybody watches everybody else, but
nobody can actually provewho worlcs more and who worlcs less. (Veronika,
FahrradBiiro, 19.12.1983)
Thus did Veronika, a member of the FahrradBüro, describe rather bluntly
the tensions that arose betw een her colleagues over their respective commit-
ments to work. Ulrike, an almost frantically active member, became impa-
tient with her slower colleague Bernhard, w ho had already spent over four
years in collective work. Bernhard, w ho in 1983 w as still full of strong moral
principles, despised Ulrike for her eagerness to takeweekends off instead of
dedicating her life fully to the collective.
Tensions of this kind arise in all collectives at certain points. Members
compare among themselves the amount of work ev erybody does. But as their
political convictions are at odds with the "capitalist" performance principle,
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they do not necessarily express this openly. .
By abolishing wage-labour in their enterprises, the collectivists also re-
versed the assessment of work-time as all kinds of labour — skilled or un-
skilled — is paid at a similar rate. The categories that apply for controlling
and measuring labour-time are purposely blurred: the collectiv ists generally
do not assess how many hours each member works, and, if they do count the
hours spent in the enterprise, no attempt is made to find out how much has
been produced by each person in that time. 'lime spent drinking coffee is not
alw ays distinguished from time spent in production, and gossip with a custo-
mer is hardly differentiated from serious business talk.
Income according tow antis the most radical w ay of brealdng with the log-
ic of capitalist labour. It means the conscious blurring of the link between
personal expenditure and work performance. Similarly to Wuseltronick,
KoMet also set out with an income-according-to-want system, which was
maintained for eighteen months. In a self-portray al from 1980, the members
explained this principle:
The problem: satisfaction cannot be measured in numbers or money. It is ob-
vious everybody' s idea of a fair income is différent. The practice: each takes
as much out of the money-chest as he thinic.s is right Everybody has to decide
for himself how much he needs, whether this is feasible for the collective and
whether the money taken out stands in an adequate relation to that of the
others. There are sometimes frictions because of unequal withdrawals. But
then the arguments are not about the amount of money, but about the use that is
made dit Everybody is ready to discuss his ownway of living with the other
KoMet members and also to question it Up to now this system has worked
well. We know, however, that this system can only be practised in small
groups on the basis of mutual trust (Self-portrayal of KoMet from 1980)
This system w as abolished in 1981 because Hans-Christian claimed a higher
income than his colleagues, not only on the grounds of his greater personal
needs but also because he thought he worked more efficiently.
Unitary income is prev aient in Berlin collectives although sometimes
with modifications, as working hours have started to be valued differently.
In the café collective die Strafienbahn the night hours are paid more highly.
The newspaper die tageszeitung dev eloped an elaborate system of payment
to account for the fact that some working hours involve more tiring and mo-
notonous jobs. In 1990, all members earned the same income of DM 1,500
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net plus DM 400 for eachchild, but the members working at the screen in the
typesetting and layout section only worked six hours a day, while those wor-
king in administration worked seven hours and those editing spent between
eight and twelve hours daily at work. This system was meant to alleviate the
monotonous tasks and giv e those members doing them more opportunities to
participate in other activities connected with the newspaper. But the diffe-
rentwork-sections have become clearly divided and are no longer able to in-
tegrate layerout workers and typesetters into other sections. So these mem-
bers tend to go home after their four hours' work and have developed some-
thing like a job mentality, as their contact with the larger concerns of the pa-
per is very limited.
Unitary pay, spread out equally among the members regardless of perfor-
mance and often also of hours spent, responds to a sense of justice, which as-
sumes that each member will automatically give his best for the enterprise. It
carries the risk, though, that members Jose sight of the enterprise' s financial
situation. Even worse for the morale of the group is that it may make mem-
bers suspect each other oflaziness, and some may beginto resent the poor ti-
me-kezping or irregular hours of their colleagues as a personal injustice. As
Ireland and Law (1982) observed, this mechanism seems tobe generalised in
labour-managed enterprises where the residual is shared independently of
effort. The additional effort of one member must be shared between all the
others and, therefore, is hardly worthw hile for the individual personally. As
a result, workers start to take note of one another' s work-effort and to work
less if the efforts are too unev en. As acons equence, the av erag e performance
may even be reduced (Ireland and Law 1982:63). 'The major internai prob-
lem labour-managed enterprises encounter, if they want to increase their ef-
ficiency, when they combine their members' individual work-performances
into a collective effort. The greater the number of workers, the srnaller the
incentive for individual additional effort (Ireland and Law 1982:63).
In 1984, KoMet members became increasingly concerned about their low
productivity, but they still shied away from control of individual work-per-
formance, as they remembered the tremendous tension that arose as a result
of the only attempt, made in 1982, to attribute turnovers to individual mem-
bers. It then became obvious that some members were making DM 8,000 to
DM 12,000 turnover per month, while others made only DM 800 to DM
4,000, which on average was about half the turnover of an ordinary tool-
making enterprise, as Fritz maintained (Fritz, KoMet, 13. 8.1984). Hebelie-
ved that the actual levels of performance were almost the same in 1984 as
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three years earlier and that it would create rifts between those at the top and
those at the bottom to make public the results.
The members themselves often have difficulty in evaluating their own
work-performance. They estimate the production time roughly in advance
but are incapable of discovering why a job took longer than planned. Hanne,
a KoMet member, described her difficulties:
At the beginning of my timewithKoMet I would have liked to calculate an or-
der together with a colleague and thenassess the time needed for eachwork-s-
tep to find outwhy it took me longer than I had initially expected. Was there a
day when I had worked sluggishly? Was it because I had not realised that I
wouldneed special tools for the order, for which I thenhad to search for ages?
Was it because I lacked routine in the movements or because I wasn' t oper-
ating the machine fast enough to make it turn at its optimal speed? However,
nobody ever found the time to test this outwith me on two or three orders, so I
never found out in which direction I ought to change. (Hanne, KoMet,
8.8.1984)
Hanne found neither help nor support among her fellow members in her
search for a more efficient work-style. The other members scrupulously
avoided comparing testing or assessing the work efficiency of one another,
and they refused to have the actual time spent in production recorded. Fritz,
for instance, was convinced that overall results and individual productivity
could not be estimated without introducing a system of control and of time
measurement, in the style of Taylor.
It' s all a matter of a lack of self-discipline, and this you can only compensate
for if you introduce a system of control, and we don't intend to do that If you
want to muddle along, then you'll just do it This will make itself felt as less
money for the whole enterprise.... You can' t tell anybody how many breaks
hais supposed to take, nor that heshouldwork more efficiently. You can only
say in general that it is necessary toworkefficiently. As long as you don' twant
piece rates andpayment according to performance, you can' tsay anything be-
cause everything is all very subjective. (Fritz, KoMet, 13.8.1984)
In the following years, the tensions over low incomes and fluctuation in
membership increased. The collective experimented until May 1986 with a
doser monitoring of the labour process. Productive and unproductive hours
were written down separately, and breaks were no longer counted as paid
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working time, the latter in fact being reduced to 35 hours per week. As the
ov erall results of the enterprise did not improv e, a proportion of the members
proposed in 1986 to introduce pay ment conditional on the returns of the or-
ders on which the various groupa of members cooperated (auftragsabhângi-
ger Gruppenlohn). They wanted to relate group performance to income and
timeworked. Their concept did not conv ince the other members, w ho reject-
ed this schemè as a form of pay ment according to perfonnance and also be-
cause they were afraid of competition between the work-groups within the
collective. The group of woul d-be reformers eventually splitwith the collec-
tive in 1988 and set up a firm in w hich each member worked on his or herown
accountor cooperatedwith some of the other members as desired. They were
convinced that work performance woul d improve as each member had to
bear the consequences of his or her individual sloppiness; or, as Giselaput it,
"I admit that it makes a difference whether one works for oneself or for the
idealistic idea of the collective."
A form of pay ment according to return had already beeninitiated in 1981
by Constantin, one of the founders of Oktoberdruck. He was at that time not
only the format owner of all the machines the collective possessed but was
also paying back debts, which dated from the financial collapse of the enter-
prise in 1978. He felt in 1981 that he w as die only member acutely aware of
the enterprise' s financial situation and accused his fellow members of devel-
oping the mentality of wage-labourers, receiving their pay at the end of the
month without caring too greatly about the retums die firm w as making. To
remedy their indifference, hew anted to incite them to calcul ate their indiv id-
ual results and receive an income according to individual performance. He
saw the collective as " independent craftsmen grouped together", w ho were
sharing tools, customers, and machinery without being dependent upon a
capitalist owner and w ho were receiving the " real value" of their work.
The other members were fiercely opposedto the monitoring of individual
performance. Although they agreed to the calculation of income based on the
monthly returns, they insisted on assessing the returns collectively. They de-
cided that each section should establish its returns independently and pay its
members accordingly. Each section was treated, for the purposes of the ac-
counts, like a separate enterprise. The printing section, with a higher aver-
age turnover, had on its own to raise the money for the maintenance of and re-
payments on the printing presses. Each printer had to behavelike a small en-
trepreneur, laying aside money in the good months to cover the costs in the
bad ones or fora holiday. The members of the printing section paid themsel-
halshs 00373687 (2009-04-07)
180	 Social Boundaries
ves by the hour, whereas those in the repromontage section calcul ated their
incomes per working day, putting aside a certain sum to pay for the fixed
costs of the w hole section at once. The systemw as intended to improv e mem-
bers' efficiency because their good or bad performance as a section directly
affected their salaries, but it also intensified the jealousies and tensions bet-
ween the sections. In September 1983 the print and repromontage sections
reunited their calculation of results in order to avoid these problems.
Today, the members of each section are paid by the hour according to a
rate that is fixed each month. The hours are counted globally without refer-
ence to the particular orders members have beenworking on. Each member
notes down the fixed time-units and the material spent on an order. For in-
stance, mounting an eight-pagemounting foil withoutphotographs or draw-
ings is written down as taking fifteen minutes, ev en if it actually took the re-
pro-monteur twenty minutes to do that particular one. Every work-step has
its predetermined price and only if unforeseen difficulties arise that are not
the collectivise s fault may the price quoted to the customer be raised As in-
corne is linked to collectiv e perfonnance, each serious mistake or misprint is
felt acutely in the monthly payments. The enterprise is largely protected
from bankruptcy by this system, but the members individually are not.
Oktoberdruck' s system of income was widely discussed in the " Alterna-
tiv e Scene" butw as hardly ev er imitated, not least because the other collecti-
ves did not have the same fixedwork-steps as Oktoberdruck. In the course of
these debates itw as pointed out that the nonassessment of individual lev els of
performance was one of the basic characteristics of a collective enterprise.
Enterprises that were jointly owned but pai d their members according to in-
dividual performance started to be called "communal workshops" (Ge-
meinschaftswerkstatten) to distinguish them from "real collectives."
The carpenters' workshop in Kreuzberg, Holzmanufaktur, was such an
enterprise w hen I v isited it in Nov ember 1982. Itw as explained to me that the
members took on orders alone or as a group, executed them, and were then
paid for them. In the quotation the customer received before the order was
executed, the estimatednumber of hours' workwas set down, the pricebeing
fixed at DM 40 per hour. Acraftsman w ho w orked more efficiently than esti-
mated in the quotationwas therefore able to achieve a higher hourly rate, but
if he made mistakes and took longer, his average hourly rate decreased.
From the fixed hourly wage, DM 4 were deducted for maintenance of the
machinery and craftshop. Eachworker had to pay his own insurance from his
wage. This form of payment favoured an individualistic work-style but did
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not meet with the approval of those members who would have preferred to
receive the same income and cooperate more closely.
The refusai to measure time and work efficiency is not characteristic of
cooperative forms of production as such. In the nineteenth century writings
on Genossenschaften, a higher work performance and a more efficient use of
working timewere described as strong points of cooperativ es (Oppenheimer
1822:54). Compared to the wage-labourers in nineteenth century industry
who were using sabotage and go-slow strikes to limit the exhaustion of their
labour power, cooperativ e workers w ere much more willing to work harder
and more efficiently as they no longer felt exploited by a capitalist
Workers in the Klek factory in Yugoslavia, for instance, cl aimed income
according to piece-rates, arguing that "only people who work should get
paid" (Comisso 1979: 170). The blue-collar w orkers believed that all work,
including office work, should be monitored to increase the firm' s income.
The skilled, part-time, w omenworkers at the Fakenham cooperativ e also fa-
voured piece rates because this would allow them to earn more in less time
and have enough lime for their children (Wajcman 1983:119).
Contemporary theoreticians of cooperative work-forms, such as Velas-
quez, advocate the precise evaluation of members' different work perfor-
mances as a means of avoiding conflict "Only if it were possible to deter-
mine unequivocally the figure of productivity for the individual contribu-
tors, then this could be the basis for evaluating the different work-perfor-
mances and it would eliminate conflicts about payments" (Velasquez
1975:57).
Conclusion
Between 1982 and 1988, discussions about efficiency and profitability in-
creased in frequency. Members began to admit that professionalisation w as
a necessary condition for greater stability. Labour-saving devices that they
had observed in their previous employ ment in business industry were intro-
duced to reduce the time wasted in searching for tools and materials. They
became concerneclw ith eslimating thelev el of efficiency of their work, with
the aim of finding a means to reduce the working hours.
The initial "pure" model of a community living andworking together has
been modified to meet the extemal obligations and interests developed by
members. "Efficiency" became an issue again when members with strong
extemal obligations threatened to leave. Once the time spent in the collective
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was no longer regarded by all as equally pleasurable, and outside commit-
ments had created differences inpriorities and loy allies, equal pay for differ-
ent performance became a latent point of conflict This brought about the tac-
it monitoring of productivity and occasional outbursts of anger about others'
"laziness." Since the most dynamic and hard-working members could not
daim higher status or income than their less efficient colleagues, this someti-
mes resulted in bitterness and frustration. Although the collectives still re-
frain from pinpointing individual differences in performance, some have
started to introduce hourly pay or have tried to agree on more regular wor-
king hours.
Work in a collective still proceeds at a much more relaxed pace than in a
business enterprise, as " no boss stands behind y ou with aw atch in his hand. "
Collectivists have reacquired some of the "art of living" that Thompson
(1967) saw lost as a consequence of the Industrial Revolution. He w rote:
"Men might hav e to relearn some of the arts of living lost in the industrial re-
volution... how to break down once more the barriers between work and
life" (Thompson 1967:95). To uphold this achievement, however, it is in-
sufficient to change the style of work in collectives alone. The lev el of tech-
nology in contemporary society w oul d allow for a more rel ax ed pace of w ork
if the work load was equally distributed. Instead, however, useless occupa-
tions become pai d services and I eisure lime and income continue to be distri-
buted unequally (Gorz 1990:23). The collectiv ists w ho attempt to create dif-
ferent structures inside work mulot escape from the pressures and con-
straints of this society they live in.
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Conclusion
How political convictions of collectivists influence their social and econom-
ic practice and how ideas about society emerge and are transformed in cone-
rete life situations has been the underlying theme of this book. Seen in a histo-
rical perspective, the foundation of collectives at the end of the 1970s w as a
consequence of a reassessment of the viability of political movements after
1968 in the light of internai fragmentation, excessive authoritarianism, and
massive political repression. When the dream of a pow erful, revolutionary
Marxistparty vanished, founders of collectives turnedtore,alising theirideal
of an anti-authoritarian, socialist model of production on a small scale.
intentions they started out with were threefold:
—they strove for the self-realisation of the individual at work allowing for
self-determination, development of skills, and an individual rhythm of
work;
—they w anted to create a collectiv e organisation of w ork bas ed on the princi-
pies of consensus, material equality, and collective property;
—they wantedto have an impact on society atlarge —by realising a direct in-
teraction between producers and consumers and the production and promo-
ting of ecological products — and be a model for overall social change.
Berlin collectives have tried topractice radical democracy at the point of
production in a sphere of life where capitalist society lacks direct democra-
cy. Collectivists believe in an egalitarian community of work based on the
principle of spontaneity.
Over thelast ten years, these hopes and ideas have been confronted with
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the reality of the working day, the need to organise, produce, and sell.
day-to-day experience showed the limits of the adaptability of the individual
to the collectiv e context, the complexities of collective organisation, and the
absorbing character of capitalist society.
Having analysed the intricacies of collective practice, we can now ask
what has remained to this day of the initial ideals? What did collective expe-
rience bring forth for the peoplew ho engaged in it? Are they disappointed, or
do they still consider itworth the effort? Whatw as the larger social impact of
the collective experiment, and what is its perspective for the future?
In theinitial euphoric phase that caused a boom intim foundation of collec-
tiv es for a couple of y ears, members inv ested all their physical and emotional
energy, , and large parts of their priv ate liv es, into the enterprise and commit-
ted themselves voluntarily to a tremendous work-effort. Founders of collec-
tives were workaholics and engaged passionately in collective work. Their
overmotivation was only reduced to proper proportions when some mem-
bers startedtow ork 1 ess, tow ithdraw increasingly into priv atelife, or ev en to
leave the collective.
two most frequent and, at the same time, opposite reasons for leaving
were disillusioned idealism and unfulfilled material needs. Flighly motivat-
ed members left disappointed because the collectives had not been able to
function on an entirely egalitarian basis. They found their "political ener-
gies" bound up in the daily work of the enterprise and decided that they could
be used more effectively outside. Other idealistically motivated members
wentinto the" inner emigration" disappointed about rising personal tensions
and conflicts among theirfellow members. They withdrew from political ac-
tivities, started therapies, or discovered a new body consciousness.
Other members became dissatisfied with the risk-aversion and low per-
formance of their fellow members because their individual needs and wants
hadchanged w hen they entered into a phase of their life that inv olv ed increas-
ed family obligations. Working in an altemativeway, but earning little, was
not attractiv e any more. No longer were they w illing, however, to work for a
boss in a business enterprise, either. They chose to practice a self-deter-
mined style of work in individualistic structures of production where they
did not have to share the fruits of their efforts. They tended to split off from
the collective, sometimes with part of the capital, to work on their own ac-
count in a loosely associating team. They were able to profit hereby from the
entrepreneurial skills acquired in the collective. In Berlin, their ex ampl e be-
came attractive for small entrepreneurs w ho set up firms with an "alterna-
halshs 00373687 (2009-04-07)
Conclusion	 185
tive" touch, like bicycle shops, travel agencies, etc., thathadneverbeencol-
lectives.
Remaining members started to reflect on the causes of fluctuation of
membership. While the Lime spent in the collective w as considered by most
leaving members as a valuable experience and an important phase in their
liv es, the collective enterprise itself suffered more than any ordinary firm
from fluctuating membership, as its organisational structure was based on
strong personal relations. In a still ongoing proce,ss of self-reflection, collec-
tives attempted to adapt their structures to the changing needs of the mem-
bers. Responsibilities were delegated (e. g., for cooking, and dealing with
customers) and taslcs w ereclearly divided (e. g. , office work). More empila-
sis was put on the monitoring of group performance, rentability, and contin-
uous order inflow. Perpetually, , howev er, collectives continued to encounter
three basic organisational problems:
—They were confronted with the emergence of informai leaders and the
need to reduce the complexity of the structures of self-management. They
experienced what sociological theoty had long been pointing out (Sofer
1972): assuming responsibilities and making decisions can become a bur-
den, especially if important issues are at stake and risks are involved.
—Different levels of performance that were paid equally led to tensions and
to the covert observation of fellow members' job performances.
—External obligations requiring lime and money w ere in contradictionwith
personal involvements and financial investments in the collective enter-
prise. This contradiction, which also arises infamily businesses, is infinitely
sharper in collectives where capital is "neutralized" and members mulot
own private shares in the collective.
In spite of their structural problems, the way collectives organised their
work provoked debates that go far beyond their economic impact. Collec-
tives receiv ed considerable media cov erag e, and not only in left-w ing and al-
ternative newspapers. Liberal printed media such as the news magazineDer
Spieg el and theweeldy newspaperDIEZEIT(Dec. 1981, April —May 1984)
published whole sertes about the alternative economy, describing it with a
mixture of admiration and compassion. The established economic journals
Die Wirtschaftswoche (22.2.1985, 27.9.1985) and Das Handelsblatt
(27-28.6.1985) analysed that the strong points of alternative enterprises
were their capacities to" integrate its membersw ith all their thinking, feeling
and will." In these journals, management consultants maintained that they
had 1 earned from collectiv es that material inventives have tobecomplement-
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ed with an intangible participation, touching the feelings of the staff.
Established trade unions, on the contrary, rejected al most entirely alter-
nativ e ideas about production. They hav e criticised the fact that the material
conditions of collectiv e work fell far behind the achiev ements for which w a-
ge-labourers hadfought for decades (collectiv ewage agreements, overtime
agreements, labour conventions, etc. ). They did not consider the emancipa-
tory aspect important enough to compensate for these disadvantages. The
youth organisations of the trade unions started, nevertheless, to enter into a
dialogue with the collectives.
To sum up, the social and cultural transformations of society tow hich the
collective experiments have contributed are basically on three lev els.
First, for the ecology movement collectives served as a concrete example
fora more ecological way of producing. Intellectuals fascinatedby ecologi-
cal production and a self- determined style of w ork carried the debateintow i-
der circles of industry and politics, and adolescents, considering for them-
selves a future job in a collective, brought it into their parents' homes. Not
least, the fact that German industry took the lead in the international market
in the domain of environmental technology has to dowith public debate about
ecologically sound products and alternative ways of producing. In the
1970s, massive popular protest against nuclear power stations went hand in
hand with proposais for exploiting alternative sources of energy, such as
wind, sun, and tides. Equipment w as first dev elopedby small alternative en-
terprises and, only at a later stage, w as included into the research program-
mes of the big energy-producing combines. Tougher laws following mas-
siv epopular protest against the ongoing pollution of w ater, air, and soil obli-
ged Gennanindustry to introducesophisticated air filters and sew age plants .
Industry also started to respond to environmentally conscious consumer or-
ganisations advocating ecologically soundproducts. Items originally availa-
bleonly in small al ternativ e shops, such as phosphate-free soaps, toilet paper
made of recycled paper, vegetables without chemicals grown by ecological
farme- s, and wholegrain Bread baked by small collective bakeries, were
soon to be bought in major supermarkets.
The "ecology economy," however, as conceived by Die Grünen and the
Alternative liste, goes beyond the mere reparation of industrial pollution.
From their marginal political position the ecologists also raised unpopular
issues asking for major changes in the consumption habits dear to the Ger-
man citizen, such as the limitation on indiv idual transportation and theprohi-
bition of excessive packaging material. As a countercurrent to the current
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political and economic trend — with 16 million East Germans discovering
the pleasures of consumption and the West Germany economy booming at
the expense of the collapsing East German one — they still daim that the Ger-
mans should grow less and produce differently if they want to have any
chance to preserve the remains of their natural environment
Second, collectives — especially in the big cities — integratedindividuals
into the production process who would have otherwise stayed outside, such
as unemployed academics or proletarianised students. Collective enterpri-
ses absorbed their critical intellectual potential in a creativeway. Since No-
vember 1989, their entrepeneurial experiences have become relevant for
workers and academics in East Germany who, hav ing lost their jobs in indus-
try or academia, are obliged to create their own jobs and find flexible re-
sponses to unemployment The alternative advisory office STAT7'werke , in
cooperation with the Senate of Berlin, has started to advise them on how to
start a cooperative business.
Third, it sharpened the awareness of a new generation of apprentices and
students of a self-determined style of work. This awareness may resul t in po-
werful demands fora new culture of work. The idea that one should deter-
mine one' s own work pace, conceive and produce a product from beginning
to end, and hav e a say in the organisation of thework shows striking shnilari-
ties with the most recent theories of modern management (Handelsblatt
20.12. 1988:3). The global economy and industrial organisation is changing
in a way that enhances the value of creativity and devalues " mere" effi-
ciency. Due to the international division of labour between industrial coun-
tries (exporting know-how and high-techproducts) and" developing" coun-
tries (providing cheap labour and raw materials), the leading capitalist enter-
prises are beginning toconsider the brains of their mostimaginativ e collabo-
rators as their most valuable capital. To keep their " brain trust" from lea-
ving, modern managers had to learn to letworkers choose their own style of
work, to take initiatives, and assume responsibilities.
This change validates some of the principles explored by alternative col-
lectivists and brings their ideas from the rnargin into the "mainstream" of
economic activity . 'The orig inally " revolutionary" values are thus becoming
marketable. At the same Lime, the elite of collective enterprises is starting to
do well in the freshly affirmed, dominant system of competitive high-tech
capitalism. Although their ideas about collective work may still be inspired
by the ideal of sharing, in economic practice weak and dependent individu-
als, who were originally protected by the collective, now hardly stand a
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chance. The tougher selection criteria inhibit their admission, and the ten-
dency of efficient members ev entually to leav e an inefficient collective seals
the destiny of those alternative enterprises that have refused to adapt to their
competitiv e environment.
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Questions to Collective Enterprises
1) Legal Form.
a) Does the enterprise belong legally to a company of limited liability
(GmbH), an association, a partnership (GbR), or to a cooperative (Genos-
senschaft)?
b) Has the legal form changed over time?
c) Are all co-workers also co-owners? Is there a probatory period after
which they must become associates?
d)Are there silent partners? If yes, how much capital do they have in the
enterprise? In what kinds of decisions concerning the enterprise are they al-
low to participate? What would they receive if the enterprise w as liquidat-
ed?
e) Is the legal form of the enterprise going to be changed?
2) Economic Situation:
a)What is the v alue of the enterprise? How large are the shores of the osso-
ciates? Are there debts and mortgages? How was the enterprise fmanced ini-
tially and how has it made further investments since its foundation?
b) Turnover: What is the average monthly turnover? Over the y ear, to
what extent do monthly turnovers fluctuate? Did the enterprise make a profit
or a loss in the past y ear, or w as the balance equilibrated?
c) Investments: What kinds of investments have been made? Value of
these investments? Points in lime? Are you planning new investments at the
moment?
d)Market For what kind of customers are you producing? Has your cir-
de of customers changedconsiderably ov er time? Would your customers be
able to obtain the saure goods more cheaply from a capitalist enterprise? If
yes, why do they buy them from a collective enterprise? How strongly does
competition make itself felt? Competition with other collectives? Competi-
tion with business enterprises? What are the perspectives for the future?
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3) Internai Structure:
a) Personnel: For how long has the enterprise existed? How many of the
founders still work in the collective? How many members do you have to-
day ? What are their qualifications? Average age? Ages of oldest and youn-
gest members? Has the sex ratio changed over time? How is it today? How
many members are married? Have children? How many members live in a
communal household (Wohngemeinschaft)? For how many y ears did each
member stay?
b) Recruitment and Dismissal: What is the procedure to become a mem-
ber of the collective? Is it difficult to findnew members? Was it formerly ca-
sier or more difficult to fmd qualified new members? Or was qualification
not an important criteria then? Have members ever been excluded from the
collective? If yes, why? What is the most important reason for people lea-
ving? Do you train apprentices?
4) Development of Wages:
a) Level and Form of Wage Payments: What is the average wage at the
moment? Does it cover social contributions? What form of wage pay ment
hav ey ou chosen? According to the result of the enterprise? Unitary pay ? Ac-
cording to want? Other? How has the form and lev el of wage pay ment chan-
ged over lime? Were these changes related to developments in the labour
market? How is the working lime regulated? Do you also work "on the
sicle" ? Do some individual members do so? Does the collective as a whole?
How regularly are wages paid?
b) " Short timew ork" : Do y ou often hav e to work short time? How do y ou
deal with peaks of orders? Do you work overtime?
5) Organisation of Work
a) Machines: What machines did you al ready have at the foundation and
what have you bought since then? Have the new machines caused changes in
the organisation of work? Did the types of products change after y ou bought
the new machines?
b) Division of Labour: How are work-tasks divided — in production, in
marketing? Are the tasks rotated? Are the books kept by a specialist? Is he/
she the managing partner?
c) Decision tnaldng• How do you plan production and marketing? How
often does the collective meet? What are the functions of this meeting? Does
the managing partner have special authority in decision-making processes?
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Questions to Individual Members
1) Workplace:
a)For how many years have you worked here?
b) Which tasks do you do? Have they changed over time?
c) What is your (average) monthly income?
d)Were you trained for this job?
e) Do you shareyour workpl ace with others? Do they change frequently?
2) Personal Situation:
a)How old are you? Male/female?
b) What is your housing situation?
c) Do you have any commitments? Are you married? Do you have to care
for chiidren (on your own)?
d)Do you have to sustainyourself exclusively from income from the col-
lective?
3)Antecedents:
a)What kind of training did you receive (school, apprenticeship, univer-
sity)?
b)Where didyouworkpreviously ?For how long? Doing what?Whatwas
your income? Why did you leave?
c) Have you ever been out of work for long?
d)When did you corne to Berlin? Where did you live previously?
e) Did you previously work in another collective?
f) How did you get your job here? Why did you take it?
4) Perspectives:
a)What are the advantages and disadvantages of working in a collective?
b) What about your work here would you like to change?
c) To what causes would you attribute (any) difficulties?
d)For how long areyou planning to work in this collective? If you change
your job, will you choose to work in another collective?
e) If youcould change yourjob flow, whatkind of work would you like to
do?
What capabilities do people need to have in order to be able to work in a
collective?
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